




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OUTLINE

OF



SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

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
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PREFACE.

THIS book is the basis of lecture-room expositions and discussions which extend through the Middle and Senior years of the regular course in the Crozer Theological Seminary. Its statements have therefore been made as succinct as possible.

Except in the case of one or two important quotations, and the recommendation in a footnote to Section First of works for general consultation, references to theological literature are reserved for the class-room, and would hardly be looked for in a book so small as this.

I cannot too heartily acknowledge my obligations to my own revered theological teacher, Dr. E. G. Robinson. The stimulus received from him, as he meant should be the case, is not the less marked at points where I have reached an independent conclusion. The emphatic counsel to his students, to eschew speculation and hold to facts, indicates at once the path of safety and the method of real progress. No one who follows this advice can escape a certain individuality of view, especially as Systematic Theology affords room for diversity of judgment within the limits of denominational accord.

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iv. WITHDRAWN FROM
PREFACE.

I have followed the natural and logical plan of Dr. Robinson in placing the doctrine of Inspiration in the Introduction, and in deferring that of the Trinity to Soteriology. For reasons given at the proper point, I have quite departed from the customary order in treating "the doctrines of grace."

The doctrine of the church and its ordinances is not presented in this work, because it belongs to another department of instruction, that of Practical Theology. For my views on baptism and communion, I beg leave to refer to a tract of eighty-eight pages lately issued by the Publication Society under the title "Uses and Abuses of the Ordinances."

E. H. JOHNSON.

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, May 12, 1891.

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AN OUTLINE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

PART I. INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. *Definition.*

Theology is an orderly statement of beliefs concerning God and his relations to his works. If those beliefs are accurately stated, and their order determined by their relations, Theology may claim the rank of a science.

In this general sense of the term, Theology may present the beliefs of a false religion; but to Theism a true and reasoned faith concerning God is the highest achievement of philosophy, while Christian Theology sets forth the teachings of revealed religion and vindicates their trustworthiness.

Christian Theology takes special forms which are termed, according to their sources, Natural, Biblical, Historical, Dogmatic; or, according to their aims, Apologetic, Polemic, Practical. Systematic Theology, consulting all accredited sources, and aiming to present a complete view of Christian truth, owes its title to its method: it tests and arranges doctrines by their logical relations.¹

¹ The following works, representing different schools of belief, are worth having at hand for consultation:

1. APOLOGETICS AND CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.—Martineau, Study of Re-

§ 2. *Relation to Religion.*

Doctrines, or inculcated beliefs, are indispensable to religion. Religion, in its practical aspect, is the service of God; but the service offered must correspond to what are believed to be the natures of God and of man.

The importance of doctrine to religion more fully appears in the defense of religion as reasonable. Every one-sided attempt has proved injurious. The scholastic subjection of faith and conduct to authority led to a contentious but unfruitful dogmatism, and finally provoked revolt. On the other hand, to emancipate religion from authority is to consign it to the vagaries of rationalism. Kant's reduction of religion to the fulfillment of moral duties as divine requirements could not but produce an ethical rationalism, vulgarly embodied in the say-

ligion; Diman, *Theistic Argument*; Harris, *Philosophical Basis of Theism*; Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*; Lightfoot, *Essays on Supernatural Religion*; Footman, *Reassuring Hints*.

2. **BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.**—Oehler, *Old Testament Theology*; Weiss, *Biblical Theology of New Testament*; Van Oosterzee, *Theology of New Testament*.

3. **HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.**—Hagenbach, *History of Doctrine*; Shedd, *History of Doctrine*; Crippen, *History of Doctrine*; Schaff, *Creeeds of Christendom*.

4. **SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.**—*Baptist*: Strong, *Systematic Theology*; Hovey, *Manual of Theology and Ethics*; Pendleton, *Christian Doctrine*.

Presbyterian and Congregationalist: H. B. Smith, *System of Christian Doctrine*; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*; A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*; Park, *Discourses*; *Progressive Orthodoxy (New Theology)*.

Modern Reformed and Lutheran: Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*.

Methodist: Pope, *Compendium of Christian Theology*.

Unitarian: Farley, *Unitarianism Defined*; Parker, *Discourse of Religion*.

Roman Catholic: *Catholic Dictionary*; Möhler, *Symbolism*.

5. **MONOGRAPHS.**—Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*; Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*; Dorner, *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*; Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*; Ritschl, *History of Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*.

ENCYCLOPEDIAS, ETC.—Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopedia*; Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*.

ing that, if a man does right, it matters not what he believes. Hegel's dialectical treatment of religion as idea, while flouting the rationalism then current, involved an idealistic rationalism of its own. The deduction by Schleiermacher of all religious truth from the sense of dependence and help begat the now popular rationalism of the feelings. The protest of Lechler, as against all these, that religion is essentially an act of God, a communication of himself to man, re-opens the way to a rationalistic mysticism. Finally, the futile attempt of Agnosticism to foster the worship of an unknown God, and of Secularism to devise a religion with no God, emphasizes the necessity of religious doctrine to a religious life. No real religion is purely ethical. Not even the Sermon on the Mount is the foundation for any Christian sect.

The truth in each of the theories concerning religion is needed as a safeguard to the truth in the other theories. It would seem that, in order to religion, first, man must be constitutionally capable, on the one hand, of feeling dependence and obligation, and, on the other hand, of recognizing help and duty when presented; secondly, for the guidance of mankind, depraved and ignorant, the truth concerning God must be explicitly and supernaturally revealed; thirdly, since even in recognizing the divine command and grace, the human heart is unable to accept them, God must impart ability so to do; and thus, fourthly, man at length fulfills his religious function: he trusts, loves, adores, and obeys God. It is the convictions wrought into the mind during this process that Systematic Theology attempts to elucidate and classify.

Such an account of the relations of religion to theology suggests the inquiries whether it is possible to know God, and what are the sources of that knowledge.

§ 3. *The Possibility of Knowing God.*

Theology is withstood at the threshold by modern Agnosticism, the denial either that it can be known whether there is a God, or else that it can be known what sort of being he is. Agnosticism thus replaces Atheism in opposing Christianity, but claims to be a friend of religion. Whether the existence of God can be known is a subject for later consideration. Assuming that he exists, the present question is, Can finite minds form correct ideas concerning an infinite Being?

I. Agnostic Positions.

The denial that they can is due to postulates which modern scientists have accepted from metaphysicians. Kant taught that, inasmuch as all knowledge is through relations, and relations are determined by the mind itself, therefore we cannot know things as they are, and our knowledge is valid only for ourselves. Hegel insisted that the Absolute includes all reality, even moral evil, to the confusion of theological notions. Sir William Hamilton argued that, since all knowledge is through relations or conditions of the knowing subject and of the object known, it is impossible to know the Unconditioned,—that is, the Absolute or Infinite. Dean Mansel urged that to ascribe causation to the Absolute or quality to the Infinite is to think of these as limited, and therefore it is in the interest of faith itself to relinquish all attempts at a rational theology. Herbert Spencer turned these admissions against the doctrine of a personal God, but insisted that, although religion and science alike lead to the Unknowable, we are compelled to think of this as the actual and absolute substance and force, the ground and the cause of all that can be known.

II. Replies to Agnosticism.

1. General Refutation.

Though subtle, these speculations attempt too much. Denying on *a priori* grounds that it is possible to know about God, they claim to invalidate the *a posteriori* evidence as to his nature. Agnosticism is certainly bound to show that, if God exists and is in any relation whatever to the universe, whether as its creator, architect, upholder, or energizer, still these relations cannot afford to rational creatures the least knowledge as to what kind of a being he is. But, however difficult the problems in which the absolute or the infinite is a factor, it is inevitable that the works of God should reveal him. Indeed, as we shall see, it is an exhibition of the divine attributes which alone goes to prove the divine existence. Agnosticism, then, though professed by men of science, is unwarrantably speculative. Facts would not suggest it.

2. Special Replies.

Besides this general evidence in rebuttal, it is perhaps not impossible to detect the fallacy in each of the agnostic positions above stated. Thus it may be replied—

(a) To Kant, that to deny the objectivity of relations is to deny what the structure of the mind obliges it to affirm, and what is attested by every step in the progress of natural science. The so-called “forms of thought” are really illustrations of the mind’s competence intimately to know “things in themselves.”

(b) To Hegel, that absolute perfection, not metaphysical illimitability, is the determinative reality in God; but perfection is definite, knowable, and excludes every form of evil.

(c) To Hamilton, because there neither is nor can be any evidence that a being necessarily unrelated, and therefore strictly unknowable, exists, his objections do not apply to ideas concerning a Supreme Being of whose existence we have proof.

(d) To Mansel, that since, as he admits, the Absolute is the self-existent, the Being to whom no relations are necessary, he is precisely the one on whom all other beings depend, and who through this relation becomes a possible object of knowledge. Further, it is conceivable that the Absolute and Infinite, in accepting relations, has voluntarily accepted limitations, and thus has brought himself within that range of knowledge which Agnostics themselves admit.

(e) To Spencer, that the distinction between substance and quality, phenomenon and noumenon, is purely logical; that to know phenomena or qualities is to know substances as related to the organ of knowledge, and does not imply that so much as thus becomes known would be contradicted by further knowledge through fuller relations.

III. Cautions.

Due regard to the difficulties which may be discovered in each position from the opposite point of view suggests the following cautions:

1. Our verifiable knowledge of God is not necessarily sufficient to solve all problems in theology. On the contrary, since God is infinite, he can be known but in part, and finite intelligence should expect to find its just conceptions merging into the inscrutable. We may hold that every excellence of God is boundless without venturing to infer what, in any given case, his boundless excellence will lead him to do. When the obscurity of a theological problem is unmistakably due to the factor of the infinite, it is unreasonable to believe that the

problem can be thoroughly solved. This need not be charged to incorrectly apprehending, but is due to inability of comprehending, the infinite.

2. On the other hand, if our necessary conceptions of God are invalidated by antinomies which they involve, then ultimate ideas in mental and physical science are invalidated by corresponding antinomies, and all knowledge is at an end. If divine things must be excluded from the realm of science, nescience is virtually extended over every sphere; and thus, as always heretofore, Agnosticism refutes itself.

§ 4. *Sources of Theology.*

Every unmistakable representation of himself which God has afforded must be consulted by Systematic Theology.

1. The Bible was given expressly in order to declare the actual and purposed relations of God to man. The Bible therefore necessarily is what it has proved to be, the direct source and the final standard of Christian doctrine.

2. The Christian Church keeps alive a consciousness of the facts with which the New Testament deals, a consciousness which makes its teachings seem momentous truths. Such presupposed facts are human sinfulness, weakness, salvability, and actual experience of redemption through means of which the New Testament is a record.

Hence the church is properly entrusted with the oracles of God, and has progressively interpreted them. As a further consequence, the formal definitions and the current tradition of its faith are an actual source of the views accepted in any denomination of Christians, and must be consulted, in order to secure the fruits of Biblical study during the past Christian centuries.

3. Man was made in the image of God, and that image,

so far as it remains, is a revelation of God in every individual.

(a) Man's moral constitution affords assurance that his Maker was a Moral Being. The law of God awakens a response in his heart [Rom. 2: 14, 15], and is written afresh in the hearts of believers [Heb. 10: 16]. If, then, our ethical convictions were demonstrably a correct reading of the laws inscribed in our moral constitution, they would be an authoritative criterion in theology; but, whether normal or perverted, they remain an actual standard, a medium through which we view the moral nature of God. It remains to be seen how far they are a safe standard.

(b) Similarly, the laws of human thought supply arguments for the existence of God, and, in so doing, shape our conception of the corresponding aspects in his nature. Theologians, it is true, may claim without warrant that certain ideas are required by the very nature of mind, and it may be a grave question what inference to draw from ideas unmistakably necessary; but the opposite of necessary ideas being unthinkable, it is as idle to deny their authority in theology as in other spheres of thought.

4. The physical universe reveals its Creator. "The invisible things of him . . . are perceived through the things that are made" [Rom. 1: 20]. So far as this revelation is correctly apprehended, it must be accepted.

§ 5. *Relations of the Sources.*

The rapid progress of the natural sciences has been attended with so important modifications, or attempts at modification, in psychology, ethics, and theism, as to call for fresh inquiry into the relative authority of the accepted sources of theology.

I. The physical world and the human mind.

Every adequate defense of theism avowedly assumes the validity of primary beliefs or first truths: such as that every event has a cause, and that there is a real antithesis between right and wrong. Since these conceptions are primary, they can neither be analyzed and defined, nor, if disputed, can they be proved. They are accepted because at once self-evident and necessary; that is, they are ideas the contrary of which cannot be believed. As self-evident they are apprehended by intuition; that is, immediately, not by inference.

But empirical philosophers, including many evolutionists, deny that first truths are cognized by an original and necessary intuition. The elder empiricists held that they are the individual's inferences from his own experience, at most corroborated by the experience of other individuals; while many evolutionists explain them as impressions inherited, according to a physiological law, from the cumulative experience of our ancestors. Herbert Spencer therefore regards primary beliefs as intuitive to the individual, empirical to the race.

In reply we may insist that it is not necessary to trace the rise in consciousness of first truths or primary beliefs in order to establish their authority. On the contrary, we notice that—

(a) Their origin can only be conjectured. It is impossible for memory to go back so far, or for observation to penetrate so deeply into the operations of a child's mind, as to discover whether these ideas arise for the first time as inferences from particular cases, or as intuitions of a general truth underlying judgment upon a particular case.

(b) However primary beliefs originate, their validity is now recognized by a faculty of knowledge as prompt and uner-

ring as any we possess. To doubt them would be to stultify oneself. It is impossible rationally to hold the contrary of necessary ideas.

(c) The faculty by which first truths are known must have been an original endowment of the human mind. How it was trained is a question for psychology, not for theology. But we note—

(d) That development of intellect and conscience is marked by a wider apprehension and deeper appreciation of first truths is a fact that strengthens their authority. So far from indicating that they were framed through a factitious association of ideas while man was in a savage state, it goes to show that they are verities, late it may be, like many of nature's simplest and highest laws, in coming to full light, and perhaps at first accepted upon the authority of persons fittest to judge; but fitted to win the rank of universal and changeless convictions, and thenceforth to be regulative of all judgments within their sphere.

II. Natural Science and the Bible.

The student of natural science is in many cases disposed not only to undermine the authority of those first truths which serve as the philosophical postulates of theism, but also to deny the doctrines of revealed religion, in particular the reality of special creation, providence, and miracle. He objects to these as contrary to the known method of nature, and supports his objection by an attempt to trace the Biblical doctrines through a process of natural evolution to purely natural sources. The detailed relations of natural science to theology will be considered under the topics affected. We now note in general—

(a) The naturalist must not beg the question. But to

reject divine interventions in the order of nature on the ground that all events are due to purely natural causes, is to take for granted the very point at issue. The issue must be decided by evidence. We admit that special creations and miracles require the most cogent proof, that science has no means by which to detect the presence of God in his works, and that it must not announce his agency merely because unable to discover another agent; at the same time, science is not competent to deny that God has interposed until it has shown that purely natural agencies are capable of effecting all that has taken place.

(b) The authority of natural science is complete within its sphere; but the conjectures of scientists, although entitled to respect, are of no authority whatever.

(c) God did not conceal in his works a contradiction to what he would afterwards declare in his word. Thus far, each has proved to be in important particulars the interpreter of the other.

(d) To exhibit a process is not to account for the origin of the process. A development of Christian doctrine can be traced, because growth of ideas is a law of the human mind; but the seed-thoughts may have been planted by the hand of God. For example, Christ did not come until the fullness of times, but the times could not have produced Christ. Again, his teachings have been unfolded by human study; but human study did not invent his teachings.

III. Intuition and the Bible.

If intuitions are a trustworthy basis for theism, what is their authority in theology? Various answers have been given.

(1) Schleiermacher, living in an age of unbelief, and denying the infallibility of Scripture, found in Christian consciousness the source and certification of Christian doctrine.

(2) Not a few members of evangelical churches in Germany, England, and America, revolting from certain orthodox teachings, have justified their protest by according a qualified authority to religious feeling. "The New Theology," so-called, insists that Christian consciousness, progressively enlightened, must be accepted as the interpreter of the Bible.

(3) Conservative orthodoxy replies that the affirmations of Christian consciousness, or of religious feeling, appealed to are not, properly speaking, intuitions, but the ever changing caprices of "the Spirit of the Times," and that to follow them is to subvert, not to interpret, the Scriptures.

(4) Mediating between these extremes, we may urge that man finds in his moral convictions a criterion to which all religious doctrines are inevitably submitted. But his moral convictions constantly need rectifying. Even admitting their correctness, we might find the range of their applicability no wider than the simple affirmations at the basis of theism. Although an actual standard in theology, they are not a safe standard. The Bible remains the only trustworthy rule of faith and practice.

It is evident that, if too great reliance be placed on Christian consciousness, the authority of the Bible is impaired; if too little, then Christian experience is disparaged. The fourth of the above positions avoids both extremes. In seeking to vindicate it we notice that the issue can be more accurately defined. The alleged "intuitions," or affirmations of "reason," of "religious feeling," of "Christian consciousness," or of "Christian experience," are but judgments formed in each case by comparing a proposed doctrine with the standard which a man finds in his own constitution. The issue, then, is not between the Bible and intuitions, properly so-called, but between interpretations of the Bible and interpretations of

human nature, or inferences from intuitions. In order thoroughly to understand this by no means simple problem, it must be studied from different points of view. We will consider in turn—

1. The intrinsic worth of the two standards.

A. In behalf of the Bible it should be remarked—

(a) That the distinctive beliefs of Christendom concerning God, the only beliefs which can there find acceptance, are unmistakably traceable to the Scriptures. The fact that we owe to the Bible a view of God and his relations to men which human reason never otherwise reached, but cannot reject, shows the ascendancy of the one over the other.

(b) That the Bible has proved to be an unique source of knowledge concerning God is due to the fact that it is an express revelation for that purpose from God himself. This gives it higher authority than all which but indirectly and incidentally reveals God.

B. In behalf of the standard in man himself we note that—

(a) Man was made in the image of God, so that any statement concerning God may appropriately be tested by so much of that image as remains.

(b) Man was made for active relations to God. All our highest faculties may have dealings with him. They need adequate employment, and this need awakens appetencies which can be satisfied only in God. Whatever doctrine, therefore, fails to satisfy these appetencies is spontaneously discredited as misrepresenting him.

(c) The New Testament recognizes a subjective standard in man. Paul traces his authority over the Corinthians to his manifestation of the truth to every man's conscience, not their acceptance of the truth to the manifestation of his authority [2 Cor. 4 : 2]. The truth thus finds attestation even in the uncon-

verted [1 Cor. 14 : 24, 25]. Both Paul and Christ refused to teach those in whom the standard was hopelessly debased [Matt. 7 : 6 ; John 3 : 12 ; 1 Cor. 3 : 1, 2]. It is repeatedly and emphatically stated that spiritual men are especially qualified by the Holy Spirit to judge spiritual things [Acts 16 : 14 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 10-16 ; 12 : 3, 8 ; 14 : 29 ; 2 Cor. 4 : 6 ; 2 Tim. 1 : 12 ; 1 John 5 : 10]. Our Lord went so far as to say that to have an obedient spirit was to be qualified to decide whether even his own teachings were from God [John 7 : 17].

The authority of the subjective standard would be unimpeachable, if that standard were unimpaired. But sin has marred the image of God, so that men have ascribed to their deities their own passions and vices [Rom. 1 : 23, 25] ; the ruling idea or appetency concerning God, the ever changing fashion in religious tastes, shifts the emphasis with every generation from doctrine to doctrine, instead of holding it firmly upon all truth which corresponds to the moral nature in man. The New Testament, on the contrary, is unfalsified by sin. Thus intrinsically of highest authority, the Scriptures may claim a further advantage in respect to—

2. Ease and accuracy of interpretation.

The exegesis of many passages is still unsettled ; and yet to understand the Bible is as much easier than to understand the intimations of our nature concerning God, as to understand an adequate book on any obscure subject is easier than to write the book. The Bible tells us what is true ; from the Christian consciousness we would have yet to discover what is true. Therefore, even if the image of God in man were uninjured, if our religious faculties were normal and all equally alert, the Bible would still have the marked advantage over the Christian consciousness of being more readily, more exactly, and more fully comprehended.

The sharp contrast of competence and disability thus far recognized in Christian consciousness, and, on the other hand, the pre-eminent authority of Scripture, leave it still uncertain what is the actual value of the standard found in our mental and moral constitution, especially after its renewal by the Holy Spirit. This value may be learned from—

3. The historical relations of the Bible and Christian consciousness.

A. As matter of fact, these standards have proved to be in accord. On the one hand, the essential doctrines of Christianity are too plainly set forth by Scripture to be in doubt. No one questions whether the Bible teaches that God is one and all-perfect, that man is a sinner, that Christ is in some sense divine and our Saviour, that the Holy Spirit regenerates and sanctifies, that the benefits of the gospel are to be secured through faith, and that men are to be judged according to their deeds. But neither does Christian experience ever fail to attest these fundamental teachings.

On the other hand, as to all points on which the meaning of Christian experience is uncertain, the exegetes also fail to agree. Indeed, as to these points the exegete is so far from opposing what he finds in the Bible to what he finds in his inner life, that, in proportion to his reverence for the Book, he is slow to read in it a teaching which his religious experience seems to contradict. These undecided issues relate to subordinate facts of the gospel, or to theories about fundamental facts—the matters upon which Christian denominations have divided.

B. Again, an authoritative revelation is indispensable in practice. Rationalism has never devised a working religion. Men feel the need of express instruction from God himself as to what they should do in his service.

Yet, conversely, deference to Christian consciousness has

led many followers of Schleiermacher to faith in the Bible. The ideas which he attributed to the continuity of Christian consciousness were originally imparted by Christ and his apostles, and are recorded in the word of God; hence the word answers so satisfactorily the questions raised by experience as gradually to recover, among men of evangelical spirit, a large part of its proper authority. Trust in the affirmations of religious feeling or Christian consciousness seems to mediate between rationalism and orthodoxy. At which ever point its follower is found, it may incline him to the other. Like a bridge, to borrow a figure, it leads toward the opposite shore.

C. History proves that neither standard can be neglected with impunity. Exclusive regard to "the formal element" in Christianity, that is, to the sacred Scriptures or to a supposed authoritative tradition, affects Christianity as Phariseeism affected the religion of Israel. On the other hand, unreserved deference to "the material element" in Christianity, that is, to the new life and its spiritual insight, fosters pietistic heresy, fanaticism, and the rationalism of "the inner light."

This review of the relations between the Bible and the standard found by the Christian in himself justifies the following conclusions:

(a) To deny the doctrines accepted by both exegesis and Christian consciousness is permissible only to the sceptic who rejects the authority of both; since a believer in either would have to take the absurd position that the standard he trusts has always and by everybody else been misunderstood.

(b) It is not absurd to contest those interpretations of either the Bible or Christian consciousness which have always been in dispute.

(c) If any unmistakable teaching of Scripture fail to commend itself, the question arises whether the protest of religious

feeling is normal; whether, indeed, the protest is not due to misapprehending what the subjective standard teaches. In any case, the plain sense of the Bible must be accepted, and hope may be indulged that fuller insight into both standards will discover their real agreement.

But, on the other hand, a doctrine which is out of accord with our deepest convictions, although accepted in our creed, cannot hold a place among those convictions. Christian consciousness, while not a criterion of the truth of doctrines, is a test of their effectiveness. It alone can give force to religious principle and heartiness to religious belief.

(d) Hence an invaluable guarantee for the permanence and triumph of Christianity is found in its self-evidencing power. Hostile criticism may raise against the Bible doubts which we do not know how to resolve; but the church has tested its contents and found them true. It was after a large religious experience that Paul was able to write: "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed to him" [2 Tim. 1 : 12].

IV. The Church and the Bible.

Acknowledging the authority of an unbroken *consensus* between Scripture and Christian experience, the question arises how the *consensus* is to be ascertained. It is a question of the highest moment. Unless we can infallibly know what the Bible means, the Bible's infallibility practically goes for nothing.

Romanism claims that the Church decided what Scriptures are canonical, has secured the safe transmission both of these and of apostolic tradition, progressively unfolds their meaning, and by the mouth of the pope infallibly pronounces on all questions of faith and discipline. But neither Scripture nor history justifies the claim. On the contrary—

(a) While it must be conceded that, until the New Testament was written, the teachings of Christianity could be authoritatively learned only from apostles or other specially qualified men; yet after the New Testament was provided, it became a fixed and unimpeachable standard of final appeal.

(b) The canonicity of the sacred writings was and is determined by the best historical evidence, though not without support from the character of the writings themselves.

(c) Although the doctrines fundamental to Christianity have always been implicitly if not explicitly accepted; although express definition of these doctrines has been secured only through consultation, and the official teachers of the Church have ever been the recognized expounders of its faith, yet ordination to ecclesiastical office never conferred ability to determine and declare what are the tenets of the church. That common belief may be readily ascertained from the history of doctrine. Creeds have expressed the views of their day; sometimes of only a party in their day.

Thus, by its unerring recognition of what the Bible presents as the essentials of Christianity, and by the persuasive attestation to these which its experience affords, "the church of the living God" has become "the pillar and ground of the truth" [1 Tim. 3 : 15].

§ 6. *Relations to other Branches of Theological Science.*

The place of Systematic Theology in a curriculum is not fixed by its logical relations; but a recognition of these materially aids the production of a scheme of sound doctrines. All departments of theological science are now constantly re-explored, and in certain of them great progress has recently been made. The influence of this fact upon Systematic Theology cannot be inconsiderable.

1. Apologetics is better prepared than ever before to justify belief in the existence of God, and the evidence for a written revelation has not been weakened. At the same time, Natural Theology is more cautious about affirming doctrines which are actually derived from the Bible, and, at most, corroborated by Nature.

2. In the department of Isagogics, reinvestigation of the Canon has not displaced any one of the sacred books; the Higher Criticism, or determination of the authorship of the Scriptures and the methods of their composition, is followed with intense and widening interest, while at the same time it is becoming more guarded in claim and more conservative in spirit; meanwhile the Lower Criticism, or settlement of the text, has assured us that for doctrinal purposes it is safe to consult any of the texts now in use.

3. Exegesis finds in the fruits of modern philological and archeological research important aid toward a scientifically exact interpretation of the Bible.

4. Biblical Theology is providing a statement of the doctrine characteristic of each writer, or group of writers, together with an estimate of the correspondences or contrasts found in their teachings, and a review of the causes of the same. Biblical Theology thus warns Systematic Theology against a mistaken use of proof-texts, recalls it from over-bold speculation, and guards it against the tempting inference of dogma from dogma.

5. Historical Theology, in exhibiting the actual process by which doctrines, true or false, came into full light, vindicates the importance of truth by pointing out the effects of doctrine upon life, of life upon doctrine, and shows the unmistakable trend of controversy toward a defensible unity of belief. The fruit of historical studies perhaps most important to Systematic Theology is twofold: a breadth of view which refuses to ascribe any great and lasting movement in religion to error

alone, combined with heedfulness against accepting as a discovery in theology any notion which history shows to be a long exploded heresy.

Quite in keeping with the methods and aims of historical studies in Christian doctrine, the modern science of Comparative Theology adds emphasis to the doctrines cherished by the common faith of mankind, and reassures us of the pre-eminence of Christianity.

6. Systematic Theology may now present in due order the doctrines which the Scriptures yield to the advancing insight of the church, and which are found to be in accord with the historic "analogy of faith." So long as it is heedful of the results reached by other methods, Systematic Theology remains conservative in spirit, progressive in thought; but without such deference, it ever tends to force on conscience unwarranted dogmas.

7. Practical Theology teaches the art of using Christian doctrine for the conversion and edification of men. The pastoral office often reacts strongly on Systematic Theology, exalting doctrines which can be effectively preached, and disparaging others without a recognition of which all doctrine is misconceived. Practical Theology has an eye to the relative importance of doctrines, while Systematic Theology vindicates their interdependence.

§ 7. *Aims of Systematic Theology.*

These are either direct or incidental.

1. The direct aims of Systematic Theology are—

(a) To gather from the Sacred Scriptures and from all trustworthy collateral sources true views as to God and as to man in his relations to God.

(b) To present Christian doctrine in a logical system.

Without system there is no science; without science, no thorough knowledge.

2. Incidental to constructing a scheme of doctrines are—

(a) The establishment of a few fundamental principles which will not only aid in fixing the order of the system, but afford insight into the doctrines themselves. Such determinative principles are the scientific conception of law and the realistic view of human nature.

(b) Acquaintance with living issues, and with the way to seek a decision, when a decision cannot yet be reached.

(c) That devout joy and deepening sense of responsibility which ought to attend every advance in religious knowledge.

§ 8. *Methods of Systematic Theology.*

The Analytical method, beginning with man either as lost or as saved, details the means for his redemption, the history of his fall, and the revelation of God both in these processes and in the work of creation.

The Christological method, finding in the historic Christ the sum of all truth, treats the facts concerning God and man as presupposed by the incarnation.

The Trinitarian method classifies doctrines according to the offices of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

The Federalist method states what has taken place, and is yet to find place under the alleged covenants of works and of redemption.

The Historical method accepts the order in which doctrines were revealed.

The Synthetic method presents in turn the doctrines of God, of man, of redemption, and of the last things. Other methods besides these have occasionally been employed; but the Synthetic is generally preferred, and will herein be followed,

on account of its simplicity, historical correctness, and logical progression.

§ 9. *Inspiration.*

Accepting the Bible as the ultimate standard in Christian doctrine, before adducing its lessons on other topics we inquire what it teaches concerning itself.

I. Definitions.

Inspiration was a special influence by which the Holy Spirit qualified select persons to declare the mind of God to man. This is the general sense of the term; but inspiration includes three offices:

(1) Revelation, or the supernatural impartation of truth to the human messenger of God. In a more general sense, all the works of God are a revelation of him to rational beings.

(2) Illumination, or insight conferred by the Holy Spirit into the truth, from whatever source derived.

(3) Inspiration, in a narrower sense, is divine guidance of the messenger in delivering his message.

II. Evidences.

1. Claims to Revelation abound in Scripture. Moses declared that he received the law from God. The prophets insisted that God spake by their mouths. The apostles, including Paul [Acts 9 : 1-17; Gal. 1 : 11, 12; 2 Cor. 12: 1-12], had personal acquaintance with him who was the embodied revelation of God. Jesus promised that the Holy Spirit would make further revelations [John 16: 13-15]. Even wicked men like Balaam in some cases received a revelation.

2. Evidences of Illumination are also abundant. Paul

assures spiritual men that the Holy Spirit aids them all in some degree to understand spiritual things [1 Cor. 2: 14, 15; Eph. 1: 17, 18]; but he claims special insight for himself and certain co-laborers [1 Cor. 2: 6-13; 12: 8, 10; 14: 6, 29, 30].

3. Evidences of Inspiration, in the sense of the Holy Spirit's control over the announcement of the truth, are partly direct, chiefly inferential:

(a) Certain texts expressly claim that the prophets received divine aid in utterance [Ex. 4: 10-12; Deut. 18: 18; Jer. 1: 6-9]; Jesus promised that, when his apostles were summoned before magistrates, the Spirit would teach them not only what, but how to speak [Matt. 10: 19, 20]; apostles recognized this element in the writings of prophets [2 Tim. 3: 16; 2 Peter 1: 21], and claimed it for their own [1 Cor. 2: 13].

(b) Thought and language are so closely united that, when utterance attends revelation, the Holy Spirit, in imparting ideas, necessarily confers more or less ability to express them. The Psalms were evidently composed under a present impulse and aid of the Holy Spirit.

(c) When the record was subsequent to the revelation, as was the case with almost the entire Bible, it is reasonable to infer that, inasmuch as the truth was revealed to prophets and apostles for the very purpose of having it published to men, no help required for a safe delivery of the message would be withheld.

The evidences above cited apply to prophets and apostles. What claim does the Bible make in behalf of writers who were neither apostles nor prophets? Notwithstanding that the sacred books which have been left to us by non-prophetical and non-apostolic writers lay no direct claim to inspiration in any form, still the Bible virtually testifies in their behalf:

(A) The unknown writers of the Old Testament were believed by the Jews to have written under the supervision, and therefore with the endorsement, of prophets. But neither Christ nor his apostles objected to the popular regard for the entire Old Testament. On the contrary, they expressly endorsed the elder Scriptures *as a whole*. [Matt. 5: 17, 18; Luke 24: 44; John 5: 39; 10: 35; 2 Tim. 3: 16; 2 Peter 1: 19-21].

(B) As to non-apostolic writers of the New Testament, we should bear in mind that the prophecy of Joel and the promise of our Lord were fulfilled at Pentecost by the bestowal of the Spirit's miraculous gifts upon many besides apostles [Joel 2: 28, 29; John 14-16, *passim*; Acts 2: 1-18], and that prophecy was a not uncommon gift during the apostolic period [Acts 11: 27, 28; 21: 9-11; 1 Cor. 14]. It is therefore presumable that the non-apostolic writers of the New Testament had all necessary supernatural aid for the preparation of their momentous records.

It is an early tradition that Mark attended upon Peter, and Luke upon Paul, giving in their gospels the substance of the narrative which they were used to hearing from an apostle's lips. The Epistle to the Hebrews was evidently written under a distinctly Pauline influence.

III. Phenomena of Inspiration.

(1) The effects produced by the offices of inspiration, whether singly or combined, exhibit the diversity which Paul said was a characteristic of spiritual gifts [1 Cor. 12: 4-11]. The bewildering ecstasy that more than once overpowered King Saul [1 Sam. 10: 9-12; 19: 20-24]—a phenomenon not altogether unlike the gift of tongues as known to the Corinthian Church [1 Cor. 14: 2-19],—the reluctant but conscious proph-

ecies of Balaam [Num. 23-24], the malicious yet unwitting prediction of Caiaphas [John 11 : 49-52],—anomalous inspirations of bad men,—are not more dissimilar to each other and to the results of inspiration in good men than are cases of the latter kind, each to each. The “mouth to mouth” communications with Moses are expressly distinguished from “visions” and “dark speeches” granted to prophets [Num. 12 : 5-8]. These, again, are in broad contrast with the lyrical effusions of piety in the Psalms, with the gloomy philosophy of Ecclesiastes, with the shrewd, satiric, sometimes cynical advice of the Proverbs, with the now argumentative, now impassioned epistles of Paul, and with the narrative portions of both Testaments. A unique opportunity for comparing the various products of inspiration in the case of a single writer is afforded by the Gospel, the Epistles, and the Revelation of John.

(2) The several offices of revelation, illumination, and inspiration are not always distinguishable, and, when distinguishable, not always separate. This is of special importance in view of the fact that the offices of Christ came to the knowledge of the apostles largely through illumination—a gift which they shared with all spiritual men. Revelation alone could make known that Christ existed before the incarnation, that he created and upholds, that he rules and will judge the world; but repeated revelations from his own lips failed to give his most intimate disciples an idea of his redemptive work. This idea was attained at length, we know not how slowly, through illumination. The Holy Spirit ‘brought to remembrance’ what Jesus had said [John 14 : 26], when at length the Master’s words could be dwelt upon in the light of his completed mission.

There is no intimation in the New Testament that the apostles owed the doctrines of atonement and justification to fresh revelations, but only to insight into earlier revelations,

unless possibly in the case of Paul [Gal. 1 : 11, 12]. Even Paul does not maintain a sharp distinction between revelation and illumination, but gives the name of revelation to any process by which the Holy Spirit makes the truth known. In 1 Cor. 2 : 7-10, knowledge of the atonement is expressly attributed to revelation; but ver. 11-16 immediately explain the revelation as an illumination, which latter is indeed the theme of almost the entire chapter.

But that illumination is nevertheless distinct from revelation is proved by the facts that—

(a) Illumination, or spiritual mindedness, is proportioned to obedience and piety [Ps. 25 : 14; 119 : 99; John 7 : 17; 8 : 43; 15 : 15; 1 Cor. 2 : 14-16], whereas the wicked sometimes received revelations.

(b) Neither prophets [Zech. 4 : 5; Dan. 12 : 8, 9; 1 Peter 1 : 10, 11] nor apostles [Matt. 16 : 21-23; John 13-16, *passim*] always understood the revelations which they received; but to confer understanding is precisely the function of illumination.

A further class of phenomena in the Bible is due to the distinction between its—

IV. Divine and Human Elements.

The Bible exhibits marks of its dual origin.

1. The divine element is perhaps to be found in the very words reported by a prophet, notably in the Decalogue. It may safely be credited with the general style of psalmists, prophets, and apostles, at once full, free, and elevated, sober, simple, and precise. It is certainly recognizable in the sustained superiority of the Bible in respect of contents over the sacred literature of other peoples, especially over Jewish and Christian writings near its own period; in a unity of concep-

tion and aim which covers documents strongly individualized and produced centuries apart; above all, in adequately presenting the matchless character, teachings, and career of Jesus.

2. The human element would be taken for granted in documents that bear the names of human writers. But—

(a) It is sometimes avowed in such phrases as "David himself saith in the Book of Psalms" [Luke 20: 42], "the Book of the words of Isaiah the prophet" [Luke 3: 4], "I Paul say unto you" [Gal. 5: 2], "We also believe, and therefore speak" [2 Cor. 4: 13], "I speak as a man" [Rom. 3: 5], "I speak not after the Lord," "I speak as a fool" [2 Cor. 11: 17, 23].

(b) The human element is manifest in the rhetorical style peculiar to each writer; also in the color imparted by personal idiosyncrasy to the contents of ancient hymns and prophecies, to apostolic doctrine, and to the choice and arrangement of historical materials,—notably in the case of the gospel narratives.

(c) Characteristics of an Oriental people and a former age appear in the references of the Old Testament to physical phenomena [Gen. 1: 7; 7: 11; Ps. 50: 1; 93: 1], and to movements of the divine mind [Gen. 6: 6; Ex. 32: 14, cf. Num. 23: 19; also cf. 1 Sam. 15: 29 with v. 35 and Rom. 11: 29]; in the application of round numbers to historical periods [e. g., of forty years, Deut. 2: 7; Judges 3: 11; 5: 31; 8: 28; 13: 1; 1 Sam. 4: 18; 1 Kings 2: 11; 11: 42; 2 Chron. 24: 1], to armies and battles [2 Chron. 13: 3, 17], and to the genealogy of our Lord, which Matthew gives in three divisions, each alleged to consist of just fourteen generations [Matt. 1: 17]; in the freedom of New Testament quotations from the elder Scriptures [cf. Acts 7: 16 with Gen. 23: 17-20; 33: 18, 19; 50: 13; also cf. 1 Cor. 10: 8 with Num. 25: 9; and Heb. 10: 5 with Ps. 40: 6]; in the familiar difficulty of har-

monizing various accounts of the sayings or acts of Christ; in the use of arguments which, however convincing in their day, can hardly be as effective now [Gal. 3: 16; 4: 24, 25]; in the oriental and antique hyperbole which characterizes not a few of our Lord's own precepts [Matt. 5: 39-42; Luke 6: 30; 14: 12, 13]; finally, in the imperfect morality of the Old Testament, as explained in a typical case by Christ himself [Matt. 19: 3-9], and as rebuked by him when it reappeared in a vengeful plan quite of the old type, proposed by two among his own disciples [Luke 9: 54-56].

In attempting to distinguish between the divine and the human elements in Scripture, reverent caution is imperative. It is a grave error, on the one hand, to attribute to express dictation by the Holy Spirit those forms of conception and statement which supplied the divine message with a vehicle more intelligible in a former age than now; or, on the other hand, hastily to set down as human errors statements which may yet signally evince the care of the All-knowing Spirit. The one course would furnish weapons against the Bible; the other would throw away a weapon for its defense.

V. Authority of the Bible.

(1) When we consider the aid of every sort which the Holy Spirit afforded for the writing of the Bible, the endorsement of the Old Testament by our Lord, and his pledge to the writers of the New, we conclude that, to those who accept the claims of the Scriptures in their own behalf, they infallibly express what it was the will of God to declare.

(2) On the other hand, when we recognize, without being able to separate, elements divine and human, we see that the use of a medium available for ancient peoples requires an his-

torical and critical, because reverent, study, in order to its correct interpretation.

VI. Theories of Inspiration.

The most important of these are :

1. The Naturalistic, or the theory of Intuition ; namely, that God dwells in all men, and reveals the truth to all in proportion to their character and genius. This theory is favored especially by pantheists and anti-Christian students of Comparative Theology.

Obviously, this is not the Bible's account of its own inspiration. The Bible does not admit that pagan teachings bring, like its own, a divine endorsement. It admits, however, that the heathen have the light of nature [Ps. 19 : 1-6 ; Rom. 1 : 19, 20], and allows us to believe that they are not altogether without supernatural enlightenment [Num. 22-24 ; Matt. 2 : 1, 2, 12].

2. The theory of Illumination, or Partial Inspiration ; namely, that, while God is revealed in nature, in man, and especially in Jesus Christ, direct impressions of truth upon the mind must be rejected as magical ; that illumination, or insight into objective revelation, is the only form of inspiration ; and that, since illumination varies with the enlightenment and piety of the person inspired, not only the historical, but also the moral and religious teachings of Scripture are encumbered with errors. This theory is expressed in the formulas : "The Bible is not the word of God, but contains the word of God" ; "The writers, not the writings, were inspired."

It is the theory of Broad Churchmen and "New Theologians" generally. In the hands of some it can hardly be distinguished from the theory of Intuition, while as held by

others it claims almost entire inerrancy for the religious teachings of the Bible. In all its forms it is open to the objections:

(a) The testimony for revelation above presented shows that illumination is not the only means by which the Holy Spirit makes the truth known.

(b) The same testimony shows that knowledge of truth by inspired men was not always proportioned to their moral and religious character.

(c) Divine authority is often claimed by the Scriptures, and a failure of it never acknowledged on matters that required authoritative teaching. In support of this statement we may appeal to certain texts often quoted against it; namely, 1 Cor. 7 : 25, 40, in which Paul contrasts his own spiritually guided judgment (illumination) with an express commandment (revelation) from Christ. But in disclaiming authority in this instance he assumes that, without this disclaimer, his words would be taken as authoritative.

(d) The errors alleged by this theory have in many cases proved to be correct statements. At the most, they are to be regarded as belonging merely to the form in which the truth was cast for the people of an ancient day. But, if errors in form only, they are not to be regarded as errors at all. Of this sort are the statements that the sun rises, and that God repents.

3. The theory of Plenary Inspiration, namely, that the writers of Scripture were held by the Holy Spirit to absolute accuracy in every respect. This theory has taken two forms:

(A) Verbal Inspiration, according to which every word was selected by the Holy Spirit, or even dictated through a human amanuensis. Once a favorite theory of English, Scotch, and American theologians, it has now generally succumbed to the convincing array of human elements in Scripture. For

example, the style of the many books in the Bible is as characteristic of their several writers as is the style of any secular author; and to ascribe this fact to the Holy Spirit's selection of precisely the words which the writer would have chosen is so violent a conjecture, and so manifestly forbidden by the "law of parsimony," that the verbal theory has naturally yielded, with advocates of plenary inspiration, to—

(B) The theory of Dynamical Inspiration; namely, that the thought, not the language, of the Bible was inspired; or, more broadly stated, that the Holy Spirit enabled the writers to declare the truth free from error, while allowing them to choose their own methods of statement.

Although thus capable of various interpretations, this theory accords to the Bible full authority, and is objectionable only in so far as it pretends to describe the process of inspiration, concerning which the writers of Scripture say but little, and perhaps knew no more. Any attempted rationalé of the action of the divine mind upon the human tempts its advocate to a violent treatment of the objections which it is certain to encounter.

It is of no small moment that we should avoid the common error of attaching undue importance to the theories about inspiration. It is a matter of speculative rather than of practical interest. The issue among Christians involves little but inspiration in the narrower sense. It is admitted that complete revelation was afforded in the person of Jesus Christ; that the Holy Spirit conferred on the apostles sufficient insight into his nature, teachings, and work to acquaint them with all either they or we need to know; and that such aid as this qualified them to tell what they knew.

If, then, the writers of the New Testament had no special gift of inspiration, we should be in the position of jurors listen-

ing to witnesses, the competence of whose knowledge and the integrity of whose intentions were adequately assured. Like such witnesses, the writers of the New Testament might fail to agree in minor particulars, and as to such particulars we should not know, as on any other theory we do not now know, exactly what to believe; but they would still be in agreement about every thing of highest moment, for it is admitted that their revelations and insight were adequate as to the substance of the gospel. Such a view has the advantage of accounting for apparent discrepancies without imperilling the credibility of the record, as is the case when the discrepancies have to be reconciled with inspiration in the narrow sense.

But, as on many other topics, an easy solution of difficulties here involves greater difficulties. The evidence is sufficient for inspiration in every sense; so that while the harm of renouncing it in the narrower sense ought not to be exaggerated, we are entitled to believe that the accuracy of the writers was secured by all necessary guidance in recording the message of God to man.

PART II.

THEOLOGY PROPER.

§ 10. *The Existence of God.*

Present State of the Theistic Argument.

Since Hume led the empirical philosophy into thorough-going scepticism, and the critical method induced Kant to discard all testimony but that of conscience to the existence of God, the standard arguments for his existence, without exception, have been persistently and unsparingly attacked not only by opponents, but also by defenders of theism.

Some theists renounce the possibility of demonstrating that there is a God, but assume it as a first truth. That is, they hold that God can be known at first hand as an object of rational intuition, as a logical *prius* of all other knowledge. Thus he may be intuited as infinite Being correlative to finite; as absolute Being correlative to dependent; as creative Reason guaranteeing the veracity of human reason; and as a holy Law-giver, recognized in the very idea of law. The position thus taken is open to the objections that—

(a) First truths are self-evident; but self-evident ideas are insusceptible of analysis, or of demonstration by any logically prior idea. The idea of God, on the contrary, is highly complex. It can be resolved into its elements; these can be separately tested; when tested, must be proved capable of synthesis; and when harmoniously synthesised, must be shown to stand for a Being that exists. The existence of God may be inferable from intuitions, but is not itself intuited.

(b) Of two inseparably correlated ideas, the mere fact of correlation does not give to one logical priority over the other. That idea is logically prior which was first in the mind, and which logically carried the other with it. So far forth, then, as the idea of the divine existence is but a logical correlate of ideas already in the mind, it is logically dependent, when it is temporally sequent, upon those ideas.

(c) Knowledge of an object may logically involve the idea without involving the existence of another object. The existence of the second object is logically inferable only when the first is known to be in nature inseparable from the second. For example, knowledge of an object limited in extension logically involves the idea, but not the occupancy, of unlimited extension. On the other hand, an object limited in duration certifies the existence of some being unlimited in duration to which its own existence is due; but it remains to be proved that the universe is not that eternal, self-existent, absolute being.

(d) Knowledge of the divine existence rests upon the very ideas which it is said to support. These ideas, so far as they are true, either represent facts of sense, knowledge of which we gain empirically, or they are first truths, and are known by intuition. For example, the trustworthiness of human logic is already taken for granted when it is argued that this trustworthiness requires the existence of creative Reason as its own logical *prius*. Or, if it be replied that the existence of God is a first truth, not a fact assured by argument, then the competence of the human mind to know first truth intuitively is already assumed in one case; but if in one case, why not in all cases? Again, if the idea of right and duty is not intrinsically valid, it cannot be known that right is real in the case of God, or duty an actuality when imposed by his will.

In other words, unless the ground be taken, and success-

fully maintained, that the validity of human reason and the reality of moral distinctions are not primary beliefs and first truths, then to say that they require the idea of God as a first truth for their support is to say that first truth must lie back of first truth—a contradiction of terms. Knowledge of the divine existence, therefore, instead of being logically prior, is logically sequent to our valid primary beliefs.

Although the protracted debate has not yet secured agreement among theists concerning the relative worth of the standard arguments, yet certain important results are becoming manifest. Among these may be mentioned:

(a) Since it is the business of philosophy to account for the hold of primary beliefs upon the mind, reaction has set in against the negative, and therefore inadequate, results of the old empirical philosophy and of its modern kindred, Positivism.

(b) Evolutionism, whether or not true as a universal philosophy, is synthetic and constructive, not analytic and destructive. It deals with processes, not with origins; for that alone can be unfolded which is already enfolded. It is now plain that Evolutionism need not, and cannot, undermine faith in God as the Creator and Ruler of the world.

(c) Until recently the influence of Kant had won for the moral argument exceptional favor. Of late, sounder theories of knowledge and of causation, together with the ever-widening discovery of order and adaptation in the world, have secured a restatement and a renewed confidence in the arguments from nature. But it is still sometimes objected that—

(d) The infinite cannot be inferred from the finite. It is enough to reply that the infinite in duration, at least, must be taken for granted. It is certain that something has existed from eternity, and the arguments from nature need only show,

to begin with, that the universe itself cannot have been eternal. If it is proved that some other being than the universe is from eternity, the theistic argument has gained a firm foothold.

(e) The limits of criticism having apparently been reached, the standard arguments, with a single exception, find their data extended and their conclusions limited, but complementary and confirmed.

1. The Cosmological Argument.

This name has been conventionally adopted, because the argument accounts for the cosmos, or universe. It is more strictly etiological or causal, an argument from the contingency of phenomena to a First Cause. The argument takes one of two forms, physical or metaphysical, according as it relies upon analysis of physical facts, or interprets them by the metaphysical notion of causation, or efficient force.

1. The Physical Phase.

In this form the argument makes use of but two indisputable facts in nature; namely, matter and motion.

It is certain that something has existed from eternity. But matter cannot have been eternally existent, because—

A. The present state of the material universe is a product of evolution from simplicity to complexity. The process may as certainly be traced back from complexity to simplicity. But absolute simplicity excludes antecedent change, for any change would be a step in the development which has taken place. And since it is an axiom of physics that matter in a state of quietude cannot spontaneously move, we have reached a point when a Being independent of the universe initiates its processes. Thus, if the supposition of matter in a state of absolute simplicity

were admissible, we would have now found in the beginner of cosmic motion the self-moved Architect of materials already in existence.

But the materials of the universe can never have been in a state of absolute simplicity before which there was no motion. Whatever view be taken of the constitution of matter, it is certain that extension is one of its essential properties, and that extension is proportioned to density or tenuity. But any degree of density or tenuity which has ever belonged to any one of the great masses or systems of matter now in existence, was a result of those "stresses" in opposite directions which are usually called, on the one hand, the "attractions" of gravitation and cohesion; on the other hand, the molecular or intramolecular "repulsion" of heat. Matter, therefore, without active properties would be without properties essential to its existence. Rigorous physical analysis leads to no possible state of things prior to the one which the first motion in the universe produced, but plainly teaches that, before that moment, the universe could not have existed. The absolute beginning of motion was the absolute beginning of matter. The Architect was the Creator.¹

B. Measurable changes admit only measurable time. A series of such changes from eternity ought already to have reached any assignable stage. In other words, in an eternal series of changes every moment is the wrong moment for any given change. The idea of such a series is, therefore, self-con-

¹ It is generally regarded as settled that all bodies are made up of molecules with intermolecular spaces (Cooke, "The New Chemistry," p. 37 f; Clark Maxwell on Constitution of Bodies, in "Encyclopedia Britannica"). According to the prevailing theory of atoms, the properties of different substances are due to their different atomic motions (Art. Atoms, by Clark Maxwell, in "Encyclopedia Britannica"). But appeal is not made to these doctrines of modern physics, because they are more or less speculative; whereas, the data on which the argument in the text is based seem to be beyond question.

tradictory, and the universe, because it is changing, cannot be the result of an eternal process. To deny this is but to affirm that finite duration is infinite duration, since the ratio between changes and time is indissoluble.

But, as matter, because it is mutable, cannot be eternal, so the Creator, because he is eternal, cannot be either mutable or material. From the point of view of physics we are shut up to belief in a self-existent, spiritual Creator.

These conclusions are not avoided by substituting an infinite succession of cycles for an unbroken progress from eternity. Because—

(A) The same thing may be said of any cycle which was said of any given stage in a progressive development from eternity; namely, it ought to have been reached long ago, and all eternity does not furnish the right time for it.

(B) Cosmic changes evolve enormous and ceaseless dissipation of energy in the form of heat. This fact encumbers the theory of an eternal series of cycles with the following difficulties:

(a) Each cycle begins with an immensely greater evolution of heat than that with which it passes into the cycle next following; therefore, its primeval nebula is correspondingly expanded, and its history lengthened in the same ratio. It follows that, an eternity ago, some cycle must have been eternally long, hence is not ended yet. The theory of an infinite series of cycles is therefore self-contradictory, and resolves into the theory of uninterrupted development already discussed.

(b) Ceaseless dissipation of energy from eternity would require an infinite store of potential energy in the past. But an infinite store of energy is disproved by the fact that—

An exhaustion of energy is impending, upon which the solar system, for instance, will become an inert mass. But the

infinite is inexhaustible. A process from eternity must endure unto eternity.

2. The Metaphysical Phase.

Every change must have a cause; but the only real cause is a first cause; therefore the ever changing universe must have had a First Cause.

Furthermore, the idea of causation arises in the mind upon the exercise of will. We have a conception of cause, or efficient force, only by virtue of the fact that, in forming volitions, we ourselves are consciously causes. The First Cause must therefore be conceived by us to be a Will, that is a Person.

(1) Questions arise as to the scope of this argument.

(A) Does the origination of force involve the origination of matter?

Yes, because all the properties of matter which give evidence that it does, ever did, or ever could exist, are due to force. For example, integration, or the production of mass, density, and form, is by energy. So are texture, temperature, and color.

(B) Since all forces are convertible into each other, while the sum of force is never increased, does it not follow that all the operations of nature are continuous manifestations of the originating divine energy?

No, because physical and mental energy are not mutually convertible. Volition releases, but does not pass into, muscular energy; while impact upon the body awakens, but does not pass into, thought.

(2) Metaphysical and psychological objections may be raised against this phase of the argument:

(A) It seems to make God changeable. If the mutability of matter forbids us to consider it eternal, the immutability of the eternal Spirit forbids us to regard him as the Creator, since creation would be a change both for him and in him. We reply:

(a) We may consistently refer the beginning of temporal events to a Being who alone is able to institute those events, without pretending to explain what took place in the eternal mind before time began.

(b) The divine spirit might be active from eternity to eternity and yet undergo no change. This will be shown when the spirituality of God is considered.

(c) The mystery necessarily attaching to the infinite may and must be pleaded when we deal with him who is infinite.

(B) No motive can be imagined for selecting any moment for the creative act. It is as difficult to conceive the divine Spirit, after the lapse of an eternity, and subject to no impulse from without, determining to create the world at any given moment, as to conceive of an infinite succession of finite phenomena. We reply—

(a) It is not merely difficult but impossible to conceive of any real cause which is not a first cause.

(b) While matter cannot conceivably find the cause of its first movement in itself, the infinite Mind cannot conceivably find a determining motive outside itself. In other words, the supposition of a self-moved, spiritual Creator is psychologically consistent, but the opposite supposition is unthinkable.

(C) The validity of our idea of cause is denied on the ground that it is a habit, not a necessity, of thought; that experience gives us only phenomenal succession, and that our notion of cause or force is derived from fancying our own will to be an originating cause, a producer of force. This purely empirical but thorough-going objection may be met by the following considerations:

(a) Whatever the origin of the idea of causation may be, it is now impossible to think the contrary of that idea, that is, to reduce cause and effect to a succession of phenomena wanting the *nexus* of force. We are compelled to accept the causal judgment as valid.

(b) No fact in experience is more certain than that in the process of forming a volition, every person, whatever be the range of motives which he is capable of taking into account, is self-determined. We know that we "create" our own volitions.

(c) Although volition does not originate but only releases physical energy, it is equally certain that volition absolutely causes the release. How this effort of the will escapes being the creation of a releasing force we cannot understand; but its analogy to creation of force justifies ascribing the creation of force to that Being whom the necessity for a real cause obliges us to accept as the First Cause.

Uniting the results afforded by both phases of the cosmological argument, we find that the phenomena of the physical universe and the laws of the human mind substantiate the belief that a self-existent, personal Spirit is the Creator of all. Whether we may call him God remains for other forms of the theistic arguments to show. It is enough if they find a firm basis laid for them in the etiology of the cosmos.

II. The Eutaxiological Argument.

The argument from order has but lately received a distinctive name. Independent treatment of the argument is also of comparatively recent date. It has usually been regarded as part of the teleological argument.

Uniform order in any sphere is a mark of controlling

intelligence. The universe is pervaded by laws which only extreme rigor and refinement of intellectual processes can ascertain and state, and thus discloses an Intelligence to human conception infinite. How widely order, or law, prevails may be gathered from the facts:

(a) All living things may be classified under various types; while the production of these classes in, upon the whole, an ascending series exhibits an order inclusive of all organisms.

(b) It is yet more remarkable that the highest physical laws may be reduced to mathematical formulas. This is the case, for example, with celestial and terrestrial mechanics, with the laws of heat and electricity, light and sound, even to some extent with chemistry, botany, and zoology. These formulas are not the fruit of observation, but of the strictest processes of abstract reasoning. They signalize the correspondence of the order of nature with the order of thought. What the laws of mind require us to ascribe to matter is found to be true of matter.

Such a correspondence of thought to things needs no explanation on any theory of monism. If materialism is true, then the laws of matter include the laws of what is called mind; or, if idealism is true, then the laws of mind are those also of what passes for matter. But on the theory of dualism the only possible explanation is that matter and mind have a common origin.

Nevertheless, the eutaxiological argument is a heavy blow at materialism. It compels this philosophy to testify against itself. Materialism might account for the accord between the two realms of matter and mind; but how could it account for the two realms? Attributing all phenomena, even the human mind, to evolution from a primordial nebula, materialism for-

bids us to ascribe to an originating Mind those orderly processes which, it declares, have produced finite minds. But if organism could produce mind, the original capabilities of matter would all the more need accounting for.

Furthermore, atomic properties, however potent, would be without effect unless the atoms were fitly combined. The primal combination must have provided for every detail at every instant since time began. Any slip in the process might have wrecked the whole system of nature. Whence the original collocation competent to secure cosmos instead of chaos? It could not be by chance; it must have been by Intelligence.

The argument from contingency and the argument from order are mutually corroborative.

(1) Eutaxiology supports etiology:

(a) In the metaphysical form of the cosmological argument. This argument ascribes the universe to a creative Will on the ground that the origin of force is discovered, and force itself conceived of, only through the exercise of volition. This is to assume that what is necessary in thought is necessary in nature. But the argument from order justifies this assumption by showing that the highest inductions of physical science are expressed in the purely mental deductions of mathematics.

(b) In the physical form of the cosmological argument. The order or law which characterizes any object is due to its qualities. But its qualities are grounded in its constitution; and, since things without constitution do not and cannot exist, therefore to confer upon things their constitution, qualities, and order, is to create them.

(2) Etiology supports eutaxiology.

The argument which ascribes the universe to a personal Will prepares us for evidences of Intelligence. Volition itself includes foresight of ends.

(3) While both arguments lead back to creation, they differ in basis. The argument for creative Will appeals to the element of change in nature; the argument for creative Intelligence appeals to the element of fixity—the one to the fact of motion, the other to the fact of law.

(4) Furthermore, the will and the intelligence thus far testified to by nature, unite to form purpose, and thus lay a foundation for—

III. The Teleological Argument.

This argument finds evidences of a Designer in the numberless adaptations in nature to rational ends.

But the conclusiveness of the argument has been denied on various grounds:

(1) That adaptations indicate the existence, not of God, but only of a demiurge, whose ability, though large enough for the purposes actually achieved, is infinitely short of infinite. And this because—

(A) Infinite power would not employ adaptations, or means, but would go straight to its ends.

(B) The abilities of the Designer have not sufficed to prevent the intrusion of evil in the world.

We reply that—

(a) In a scheme of finite objects, on no matter how vast a scale, adaptation of means to ends is indispensable, and plainly indicative of intelligent purpose.

(b) We do not ask from the teleological argument evidences of infinite, but only of immense, power and wisdom. An inductive argument is limited by its nature to less than an infinite number of data, and its conclusion must be correspondingly limited. Nevertheless,—

(c) The exhibition of wisdom and power by the universe is so varied and so vast as to justify the positions that—

(aa) The destructive processes of nature do not indicate any deficiency in the Designer, but prove the incomprehensibility of his design.

(bb) Whether the universe is boundless or not, the resources of its Designer are without known limit. The data which the teleologist adduces prepare us at least to accept testimony from some other quarter that the skill competent for all things actual is equal to all things possible.

(2) Adaptation to rational ends is known to imply design only in the case of artificial objects; but since we do not know that the world was made, it is unwarrantable to infer that it was designed.

The answer to this objection varies with the position claimed for the teleological argument.

(a) If the arguments from contingency and order are either or both accepted, then the world is to be regarded as a manufactured article; and, as such, not only warrants, but requires us to construe its adaptations to ends, however obscure, as evidences of design. Final cause must be ascribed to personal cause.

(b) If an independent position is sought for the argument, it then becomes an estimate of probabilities. This, however, does not seriously, if even perceptibly, weaken its force. Modern jurisprudence teaches that the most conclusive testimony as to events can claim only a higher or lower degree of probability; and yet events may be proved beyond reasonable doubt. And so the teleological argument legitimately imparts to most minds a firm assurance that the numberless interdependences in nature, complex yet congruous, cannot be accidental, but are due to divine forethought and control.

(3) Not a few evolutionists, regarding adaptations in

nature as the fruit of a purely natural process due to the properties of matter, refuse to see in them any indication of design. Other advocates of evolution admit that rational adaptations, whatever the process through which they arise, are unequivocally significant of purpose and plan.

From this point of view Janet's analysis is ingenious and impressive. For the most part following Janet, we observe:

When a coincidence of phenomena constantly recurs, explanation is needed, not only of the phenomena, but of the coincidence. When such a coincidence tends regularly toward a distinct end, the end must be regarded as ideally present in the production of the coincidence; that is, the coincidence is for the sake of the end, and finality is a law of nature. This being admitted, the question arises whether finality is immanent or transcendent, whether nature is self-led, after the analogy of automatic nerve-action and of instinct, or follows the design of an intelligent Will which is above nature. It may be answered:

(a) That immanent finality does not exclude transcendent finality, while transcendent would naturally include immanent. An intelligent contriver, if he could, would fit his invention to work out his plan.

(b) To ascribe to nature automatic choice, or even instinct, is to state the problem, not to solve it. Intelligent purpose alone can explain the convergence of natural processes on a vast scale toward rational ends.

In a word, modern science may change our conception of the method of nature, but in so doing affords the more multi-form and impressive evidence of controlling design. The present tendency of theistic evolutionists is very marked toward ascribing the entire course of nature to the constant, rather than to merely original, activity of God.

IV. The Ontological Argument.

This is a deduction of the existence of God from the idea of him as perfect or as necessary. The following are typical forms of the argument:

1 From the idea of perfection.

(A) Anselm argued that we have the idea of a Being than whom a more perfect cannot exist. But unless we have an idea of him as existing, then we can have an idea of a Being more perfect than he. We are therefore compelled to think of the all-perfect Being as existing.

(B) Descartes held that not mere existence, but necessary existence, is a perfection, and the argument as thus amended he accepted. But he used an argument drawn from his own postulate that the existence of God must be assumed as a guarantee of human reason: our conception of an all-perfect Being is innate, and could be implanted only by such a Being.

Every argument drawn from the idea of perfection is reducible to the identical proposition that, if we think of an all-perfect Being at all, we must think of him as possessing every perfection; that is, if God exists, he is self-existent. It confounds a definition with a demonstration.

2. From the idea of necessary existence.

(A) Cudworth rejected all the earlier forms of the argument as involving a *petitio principii*, but considered his own statement of it valid: A necessary Being is possible; a necessary Being is impossible unless he exists now. Therefore a necessary Being exists now.

But this is only an appeal to ignorance. More fully stated it would run: A necessary being may or may not exist; I do not know which. If he ever existed or is to exist, he must now exist. Therefore I do not know whether a necessary Being ever did, does, or will exist.

(B) Samuel Clarke mingled parts of the cosmological and ontological arguments. Justly assuming that something has existed from eternity, he asserted that the eternally or necessarily existent being could be recognized by the impossibility of denying its existence without self-contradiction; and in this way he sought to identify God as the eternal and necessary being. Infinite space and infinite duration, he said, could not be denied. But these are only qualities, and therefore imply an eternal and omnipresent substance, that is, God.

Two errors may be detected in Clarke's argument:

(a) Infinitely extended substance cannot be inferred from localized substance. The proper conclusion is the identical proposition that infinite space affords room for infinitely extended substance.

(b) Necessary being and being which cannot without self-contradiction be denied are not interchangeable expressions. The former certainly includes the latter, but may include more. What the laws of mind forbid us to conceive as non-existent, they obviously require us to conceive as existing. But a being possessed of necessary existence may be unknown to us; or, if known, its self-existence may not be recognizable. Clarke, therefore, was not justified in deciding against the eternity of matter merely because it could without self-contradiction be thought of as not existing.

Concerning the various forms of the ontological argument, it may be observed that its error is not in assuming that what is necessary in thought must exist in fact, but in virtually assuming what it purports to prove; namely, that the existence of God is necessary in thought. It mistakes a thought about God as necessarily existing for a necessary thought of him as necessarily existing.

On the other hand, while the existence of God cannot be dialectically deduced from the idea of perfect Being, no being less than perfect can be accepted as God by a mind which already entertains the idea of perfection. And further, the response of our moral sensibilities to this idea supplies what many regard as the only secure basis for theistic belief; to wit—

V. The Moral Argument.

This argument, as sometimes stated, virtually claims for man an intuition, or immediate knowledge, of God. For example, conscience testifies to the existence of moral law; but recognition of law is said to be recognition of a Lawgiver—a claim already commented upon. It is safer to regard the moral argument as a rational inference of the divine existence from moral intuitions, or from the response of what may be regarded as our moral faculties to the idea of an all-perfect Being. This response is manifold and clear, or confused and weak, according to the degree of our moral development and moral sensibility. Appeal to the following facts would perhaps be most generally appreciable:

1. Man intuitively knows that there is a distinction between right and wrong. In recognizing this distinction he becomes aware of unqualified obligation to adhere to the one and shun the other. But—

(a) The existence of conscience is first understood when the idea is presented of an all-holy Creator who demands that we shall be like himself, and who has implanted in our nature the sense of obligation as a security for the fulfillment of his will.

(b) Conscience finds in an infinitely holy Person a needed moral Archetype for man, and an impressive measure of the obligation to be holy [cf. 1 Peter 1 : 16].

If this is not a revelation of God in conscience, the thought of him is responded to by conscience with a distinctness proportioned to the vigor of our moral health.

2. The esthetic sensibility is capable of worshipping transcendent beauty and sublimity, and desires to know that it may worship them. When the exaltation of God is apprehended, admiration deepens into awe, and the demand of the esthetic sensibility is fully met. At such a moment it is impossible to doubt the existence of the all-perfect One.

This phase of the argument is allied to that from conscience in two particulars:

(a) It is in his moral attributes that God is most exalted. But while conscience defers to these as morally perfect, the esthetic sensibility adores them as infinitely beautiful and sublime [Ps. 29 : 2].

(b) Precisely as it would be impossible to look upon an all-holy Being as one with whom we have nothing to do, so the thought of an all-glorious Being is not only poetical but practical. The whole energy of our esthetic appreciation, or worship, claims relations with such a Being as real.

3. The human heart, with love as its normal function, yearns for an object worthy to employ its utmost vigor. When God is so loved, our healthful affections recognize him as the One for whom they exist, and insist on his reality with a confidence entire as their devotion to him.

4. A Being who meets so varied and urgent moral needs is an object of corresponding trust. The sense of dependence, beginning with experience of physical limitations, and acknowledged even by the agnostic in regard to the Unknown, grows as our higher powers turn toward God, and can be felt most profoundly when most amply satisfied.

In general, the demand of every moral faculty for full

exercise is a normal appetency; and the satisfaction which these appetencies find in the idea of God gives moral assurance that he exists. Their testimony is not to the satisfactoriness of abstract ideals, but of a Person who embodies ideals. So exclusively personal are the longings and the gratifications of our moral faculties, that they certify either the existence of an all-perfect Deity, or the boundless self-delusion of man.

Objections to the Moral Argument.

(1) Precisely this self-delusion is what some find in the moral argument. They reduce it to an affirmation that a thing exists merely because we wish it to exist. But those things do exist which our organization demands. Hunger notifies us of a physiological want, justifies belief that nature makes provision to meet that want, and largely guides us in the choice of food. The appetite for knowledge urges the mind to search for truth, and is rewarded by the progressive discovery of truth. Confidence may reasonably be felt that the physiology of our moral powers is not in hopeless and grotesque contradiction to the laws of body and mind.

(2) Nor is the authority of our moral convictions shaken by the evolutionist theory of their development from a non-moral sentiment of caution, of submission to the chief of a tribe, or of parental concern for offspring during the long period of human infancy and childhood. On the contrary—

(a) The demands of our moral sensibilities are more urgent and their authority more fully recognized with every advance in moral development.

(b) The evolutionist has yet to show how experience of pain or of pleasure can evolve a sense of duty which overrides all consideration of pleasure and pain; especially, since it may well be doubted whether the simple virtues of a savage

would not cause him, apart from the verdict of his conscience, more inconvenience than his simple vices.

Again, the evolutionist would have to show that a moral estimate of a chieftain's orders as just or unjust would not be already present when the sense of moral obligation to obey arose.

And parental care, instead of suggesting the idea of duty, would have no moral quality to suggest, until the indispensable condition of moral quality, namely, the capacity of moral discrimination, had already been developed. "I fear to" is not "I ought not"; and "I must" is not "I ought."

(c) The experience which the evolutionist cites might very well be a discipline which awoke and trained the conscience, without being capable of producing conscience. It must be borne in mind that evolution is a process, not a creating. Only what is involved can be evolved.

VI. The Historical Argument.

The experience of the human race, especially the history of Christianity, testifies to the existence of a God. This argument is closely related to the teleological and moral arguments.

1. The teleological argument is corroborated by the movement of history toward ends presumably consonant with the will of an over-ruling Deity. A large perspective is ordinarily needed to bring this fact into full relief; but sometimes events, each intrinsically significant, and all of them indispensable to momentous results, arise independently, yet so concurrently as to signalize the timing of them by divine plan. Such was the provision within seventy years of the four chief agencies in the intellectual, political, and religious progress of the modern world. To wit: Printing with movable types was introduced about the year 1450; Constantinople fell, and Greek learning

was broadcast over Europe in 1453; Columbus discovered a new hemisphere for the new age in 1492; Luther broke the spell of superstition, emancipated faith, and provided the religious element of modern life by publishing his theses on a church door in 1517. A little reflection will show how each of these epoch-making events played its part at precisely the right date for fullest co-operation toward the best that has come from them all.

2. The moral argument is illustrated by the alleged universal belief in a God. Though the fact has been challenged, more exact inquiry goes to establish it, with the possible exception, in a few cases, of extreme and unquestionable degeneracy.

3. Both the teleological and the moral arguments find historical attestation in the benefits which accrue from religious belief.

4. Christianity is a factor in history which must be accounted for. And since its prevalence among the most enlightened and progressive peoples is due, not to argumentation, but to evidence of various sorts which it offers in its own behalf, Christianity, wherever it prevails, is the chief assurance of the existence of that Being whom and whose ways it declared to men. In other words, the only adequate account of Christianity as an historical phenomenon is that it is true. Christianity presents itself indifferent phases:

A. As human.

(a) Christianity is a tradition competent to testify to the fact that Jesus once lived, and, in no small extent, to the view which his disciples took of him from the earliest times.

(b) A system of external institutions. Of these the church, in respect of the age it has attained and may look for, in extent of territory, in the scope and penetration of its requirements, is by far the most important organization of men. But the church and its observances, the Lord's Day, baptism,

and the communion, are monuments to the resurrection of our Lord, and to the acceptance from the first of those distinctive articles of Christian belief, redemption by Jesus Christ and regeneration by the Holy Spirit.

B. As divine.

(a) Christianity is a Book, and as such has been unalterably set forth alike for the disciple and the critic. But this Book has withstood remorseless criticism from every quarter, and is established in the reverence of the civilized world.

(b) A scheme of doctrines which unfold their own meaning, evince their own truth, and to a large extent guard their own purity.

(c) A life at once so strong, so beneficent, and so unique, both in its confession of weakness and in its reliance upon God, as to argue persuasively that its origin and support are from God, and thus to testify to his existence.

C. As divine-human, the personal Christ, who claimed to be himself Christianity, "the Way, the Truth, the Life." He is at once the substance and the support of Christianity; that which is to be proved, and the proof. All Christian traditions, institutions, sacred writings, and doctrines centre upon him, and are an insoluble enigma, if he was not what the church has always held him to be. Christianity as a life shows the present part which Christ takes in history. His influence is not mainly that of his ideas, but that of a living person. As such it is probably more commanding continually than the influence which any other person has exercised over his immediate followers.

In appealing to Christianity for evidence that there is a God, care must be taken to rest only on historically attested facts. Otherwise the argument proceeds in a circle, from an assumed to an inferred existence, proving nothing.

Remarks on the Theistic Arguments.

Finally, as to all the theistic arguments it may be noted :

A. If the first is accepted, the others are conclusive.

B. Taken together, they have a cumulative force due to the rapidly increasing ratio of improbability that so many kinds of evidence, with so innumerable details in favor of some of them, can be fallacious and misleading.

C. Our relations to God are so largely a matter for heart and conscience that, when these are unresponsive, arguments valid to the understanding fail to impart a feeling of assurance.

§ 11. *The Personality of God.*

Personality consists in reason, conscious self-determination, and conscience. The central element in personality is the faculty of conscious self-determination, or will. But will implies ability to discriminate, not only within the narrow range of brute intelligence, but with the broad scope of reason; that is, capacity to recognize considerations of every kind pertaining to conduct. Thus, since moral considerations are among these, personality culminates in the capacity for ethical self-judgment, or conscience.

That God is a person is assured by all the testimony to his existence. The causal argument ascribes to him will; the argument from order asserts his intelligence; these views united testify to rational purpose; the moral argument expressly alleges the moral powers of God; a divine personality is manifested in the history of God's relations to men.

Philosophers and even theologians have sometimes attempted to raise God above personality, chiefly on the grounds that—

1. The condition of self-consciousness—namely, a distinction between self and not-self—did not exist prior to the creation.

2. Personality involves limitation. One person cannot be also another person; but the Infinite is the all-inclusive.

3. A personal God would have been aware that he was admitting evil into the universe, and must thus have made himself responsible for evil. Conscious purpose is therefore only a symbol of something impersonal in God.

To these objections it may be replied in turn :

(1) We are not bound to conjecture the mode of the divine existence prior to that period which gave the first intimation that a divine Being existed. Every such intimation is of a personal God, and the difficulty of framing a divine psychology does not justify any inference against that which all evidence goes to show.

Some would avoid the difficulty by affirming the eternal tripersonality of the Godhead. This no doubt answers such a purpose, and is a doctrine warranted, as we shall see, by Scripture; but it is an attempt to clear up an obscure doctrine by one still more obscure.

Others suggest that God could find the condition of self-consciousness in distinguishing between his attributes. Or, since there never was a moment when the Eternal did not contemplate creating the universe, he always had the idea of a distinction between himself and his works.

(2) The personality of God excludes no attribute which would not itself be a limitation of the divine perfections; and if it excludes an identification of his substance and will with those of created beings, this is a result of voluntary self-limitation in the act of creating.

(3) The reduction of personal attributes to a symbol of

what is real in God either virtually admits his personality, or involves a pantheistic degradation of him below personality. In the latter case, the irresponsibility of God for evil is secured only by relieving man also of responsibility; for with the pantheist moral distinctions vanish into grades of development, human personality becomes an illusion, and, in brief, the common consciousness of mankind is defied.

§ 12. *The Unity of God.*

The effort of philosophy to unify all knowledge has often proved favorable to monotheism. That effort never, perhaps, seemed so near success as to-day. Correspondingly, unity of the divine essence is now part of every conception of God, whether theistic or pantheistic. At the same time, it was never more certain that dualism could not be fused into monism. The material cannot be converted into the spiritual, nor the spiritual into the material; therefore pantheism makes but an illusory show of success.

1. All evidence for the divine existence points to one God, no evidence to more than one.

(a) God is the origin of all forces; but the doctrine of correlation and conservation of force resolves all forces into one, and only one Originator is needed for one force.

(b) Universal order indicates one presiding Intelligence.

(c) Adaptations in nature do not, it is true, in all cases reveal the Designer's aim, but neither do they indicate a conflict of designs. As has been well indicated by Martineau, dissonances "arise upon the line of the very same law which also yields the greatest harmonies" [*"Study of Religion,"* vol. I., p. 379].

(d) The moral consciousness of the race recognizes one scheme of moral law and one moral Governor.

(e) The history of mankind exhibits one overruling Will.

2. Resistless power is a primary attribute of God alike with rude and with cultured minds; but two infinities of power would equal each other, and then neither would be resistless. They cannot co-exist. It is not plain that two infinities of any other kind would be mutually exclusive.

3. The unity of God is self-commended. In Christian lands the objection to polytheism virtually has the force of a necessary conviction. We may believe in no God, but not in many gods. Nor is this phenomenon exclusively Christian. Notwithstanding the frequent lapses of the Hebrew people into idolatry, monotheism, once clearly conceived, has ever shown an inherent force capable of overthrowing the polytheistic superstition. The more intelligent heathen opponents of our missionaries protest that their doctrine is fundamentally monotheistic.

This invincible sentiment may not with certainty be traced to a source in either empirical inference or native intuition. But even if it be a product of advanced civilization and refined religious training, it is not therefore factitious, but all the more evidently suitable to man.

Whatever the origin of monotheistic belief, it is fully supported by the conception of God as all-perfect. The sentiments which testify to the existence of such a Being require that every perfection of which there is evidence shall be ascribed to him. The moral impossibility of accepting any inferior being as God would thus appear to be the source of the repugnance felt toward polytheism. The self-evidence of monotheism is accordingly plainest to those who hold in view the moral excellencies of God.

4. The evidences from the physical and the moral spheres unite in the coincidence of physical with moral laws. To respect the laws of our bodies is a large part of virtue, and

moral law receives a not insignificant sanction in the physical good or ill that waits upon the doing of right or wrong.

§ 13. *The Attributes of God.*

Regarded as conceptions in the human mind, the attributes of God are the qualities which we attribute to him; but considered with respect to the divine essence, they are so much of the kind of being God essentially is as becomes known through his relations to dependent beings.

Various methods of classifying the attributes have been employed, and even urged as alone suitable; but simple and satisfactory as any is that classification which follows the relations through which the attributes become known.

I. Attributes related to Duration.

1. The eternity of God. By this is meant that the existence of God is without beginning or end.

Infinite recession of existence into the past and infinite procession into the future utterly baffle the imagination, but reason exacts belief in them. Eternal existence must be ascribed to the self-existing Being. As he never began, so he can never cease, to be.

The Scriptures often refer to the eternally pre-existent as that which "was in the beginning," or by equivalent phrases [Ps. 102 : 25; cf. Heb. 1 : 10; John 1 : 1, 2; 1 John 1 : 1; Rev. 1 : 8]. The Hebrew conception evidently was that he who already existed when the worlds began was himself without beginning.

2. Immutability was shown by the cosmological argument to be a necessary attribute of the Eternal. More fully stated

the relation of these attributes is as follows: No process of change can have taken place from eternity, because no assignable stage can have an assignable date in such a process. But neither can that which is *liable* to change be eternal; for the eternal is self-existent, or necessarily existent, while the changeable is essentially contingent, or dependent. The eternity of God therefore involves his immutability.

But the question arises whether immutability belongs to the divine essence, or to modes of the divine Being, or to both. Certainly it belongs to the essence of God, and apparently to his mode of existence. But if a changeless essence would seem to preclude changing modes, on the other hand an uniform mode of existence would preclude the act of creating, as well as the variety of sentiment which is involved in care for the varying states of all dependent creatures, and particularly in concern for the diverse characters of moral beings. We are certain that immutability cannot be immobility or impassivity, and that God is active although changeless. Perhaps the paradox is not to be entirely resolved, yet the following considerations may be taken into account:

- (a) The infinite always involves the incomprehensible.
- (b) In the act of creating, God voluntarily accepted limitations.
- (c) The attribute of spirituality will throw some light upon this problem.

3. Spirituality. That God is in part a spirit is assured by his personality; but that he is without body is an immediate inference from his eternity and immutability. The immaterial alone is exempt from change.

There is justification for believing that spirit is capable of ceaseless activity without undergoing change. Motion involves

change in material agents because they were integrated by the expenditure of energy, and this energy can be recovered only through their disintegration. But spirit is not an aggregate of molecules; it is a monad, and therefore essentially indivisible and unchangeable. What we call growth of the human mind is probably but development of the organism in which the mind is lodged, particularly of the brain.

An attribute essential as spirituality to the idea of God must be taken into account in dealing with all the mysteries of his nature.

II. Attributes related to the Physical Universe.

1. Omnipotence is power to do all things not contrary to the divine perfections. The possibility of ceasing to be perfect would be a present imperfection. To purpose doing self-contradictory things would be an absurdity, and God cannot be absurd.

Different sources of knowledge concerning God present different views of his omnipotence.

A. The physical universe—

(a) By its creation reveals power without known limit.

But—

(b) It does not reveal unlimited power, unless itself limitless; as to which nothing is known.

(c) Yet, while suggesting no bound to the power of its Maker, the universe lays bounds upon the activity of its Ruler. While he keeps it in existence, he must deal with it according to its nature. Even miracles, as we shall see, are not an infraction of this self-imposed rule.

B. The moral sentiments of mankind assure us of what the physical universe cannot prove, the limitlessness of the divine perfection in respect of power. To the enlightened worshipper,

if the Maker be not almighty, he is only the highest of known beings—a demiurge, not the Deity.

C. The Scriptures throughout attribute all power to God; though what this means may have been less patent to the patriarchs than to the apostles. While any trace remained of the belief that Jehovah was but the God of the Hebrews, and that other gods might exist for other peoples, a corresponding defect would linger in the popular conception as to his attributes, particularly as to that of omnipotence. And when this ancient fancy of ethnic deities was outgrown by the Hebrews is not entirely clear; therefore we do not know whether the almightiness declared by the Bible meant to its first readers all it means to us.

2. Omniscience is knowledge of all things actual and possible.

A. To create the universe shows how much God needed to know. The actual extent of his knowledge may be inferred from the marks of foresight and reason.

B. That what may seem to us defects in the plan do not prove ignorance in the Maker is assured by resort to the moral argument for the reality of a Being who possesses all perfections.

C. The Scriptures assert the knowledge of God in regard to matters that bewilder us [Ps. 139 : 6 ; 147 : 4, 5].

Abtruse questions are suggested by the doctrine of divine omniscience :

(a) By what method does God know all things actual and possible, past, present, and future ?

It is safe to say that he knows the essence and the totality of every thing, and consequently sees its past and future in its present.

But the answer is often given that to God eternity is an

ever-present Now; that therefore all events are to the divine mind without succession, and his knowledge of them without contingency. If absoluteness and infinity both of being and of knowledge necessitate this conclusion, as they seem to, we face here an antinomy in the idea of God as at once the absolute and infinite, and yet the creator and ruler. For causal relation and succession of events are facts, therefore must be facts to the divine mind. Perhaps the nearest approach to a solution is that to create is to accept limitations. Whenever a perplexity can be traced to the infinite, we know how much, in knowing how little, can be known.

(b) If God foreknows all events as certain, how can man be free?

It has been replied that, while God knows all possibilities and provides for them, yet, in making man free, he set limits not only to the fruition of his own will, but also to his knowledge of what free agents will do. But confessedly the more Scriptural, and at the same time the likelier, reply would be, that God knows in advance what men will do, because he fully knows what men are.

The divine wisdom is the knowledge of God guiding his acts. Complete knowledge includes knowledge what to do.

3. Omnipresence is the presence of the personal God in all his works. The undivided Godhead is everywhere.

Omnipresence is possible only because, being a spirit, God is without parts, divisibility, or subjection to any spatial limitations. With no unreal correspondence to the divine omnipresence, the indivisible human spirit is everywhere in the human body. Its function in one part is not the same as in another part, except that it is the vitalizing principle of the whole.

Being immaterial and unlimited by the laws of matter, the personal God not only pervades all physical objects, but is immanent in all spirits. His presence with us is not figurative, a presence merely of sympathy and help, but mysterious and real.

If thought can reach the boundaries of the material universe, God must then be conceived as extending on through infinite space. Omnipresence there merges into immensity.

The Scriptural argument for the omnipresence and immensity of God is familiar, and is confirmed by the argument for the existence of an all-perfect Being.

III. Attributes revealed through Moral Relations.

1. Holiness. One feature is common to all views of the Supreme Being which are attained through moral relations, namely, his moral excellence. Moral excellence, therefore, is itself an attribute. The usual and best name for it is holiness. Holiness can properly be ascribed to any being only when moral excellence is maintained by him with all the energy of which he is capable. The holiness of God is his moral excellence maintaining itself with infinite energy as of infinite worth. It is purity become power. Or, since both of these descriptions are figurative, the divine holiness may be defined as infinite and unchangeable moral goodness.

Holiness has sometimes been defined as the sum of the divine perfections, or as the sum of the moral attributes. Either definition is unsatisfactory.

(a) Holiness is not the sum of all perfections; because, whatever moral quality may attach to the acts and states of a moral agent, there is much besides moral quality in them; and

the moral quality of holiness cannot be the sum of non-moral qualities.

(b) Neither is holiness the sum of the moral perfections of God; because holiness belongs to the nature of God as such, while most of his other moral attributes concern his relations to his creatures. An inherent quality may control active qualities, but is no more the sum of them than a being is the sum of its actions or relations.

But it should not be overlooked that to allow any of the divine perfections to be impaired would be the greatest imaginable evil. It would be a crime against the nature of God, and fatal to his deity. Holiness, then, though not the sum-total of divine attributes, is a defense of them all, and being itself unchangeable, serves as a complete safeguard to the divine immutability. In its relation to the other attributes, holiness in God might be defined as his moral instinct of self-preservation.

2. Benevolence is that attribute in God which leads him to desire the well-being of others, that is, to love them.

By many benevolence is now regarded as, in the last analysis, best descriptive of the moral excellence of God. Scriptural support is thought to be found in the statements that "God is love" [1 John 4 : 16], and that "love is the fulfilling of the law" [Rom. 13 : 10; cf. Matt. 22 : 36-40]. But—

(a) God is not literally love; nor, as the words are sometimes paraphrased, is his nature love. A being is not a feeling. God is a being who naturally loves. Whether this is the deepest moral reality in him remains to be considered.

(b) To say that love fulfills the law is not to say that love and obedience are identical. Love is the sufficient motive to obey, and it is this fact which justifies the terse language of Paul. But the motive to a deed ought not to be confounded

with the deed, nor with the quality of goodness in the motive or in the deed.

At another extreme, many object to resolving holiness into love because, as they allege, these attributes are in effect antithetic. Contrariety of view so pronounced ought to disappear upon careful consideration of the nature of love and of its effects.

Once more, love is commonly supposed to be incapable of analysis, and therefore to have indefinable merit. Neither the supposition nor the inference from it is well grounded.

The questions before us are, What is love? what is the merit of love? and, how is love related to holiness?

(1) What is love? Love, or liking, is a native impulse in sentient beings to fulfill their functions. In the case of bodily organs, that impulsion is appetite. For example, the appetite for food is a natural longing of the digestive apparatus to do its office. In general, we normally like or love most that which is fittest to our faculties, and which most fully employs without straining them. Our faculties are either self-regarding or social. Correspondingly—

(A) Self-love is the impulse to fulfill functions which concern oneself.

(B) Social love is the impulse to fulfill social functions. Of these the following may be distinguished:

(a) Ability on the part of rational beings to recognize the existence of both self-regarding and social faculties in others. Now it is the immediate dictate of nature to discharge self-regarding offices, therefore social love primarily desires that others should do the same. For this reason a wise benevolence dictates that every man should rely upon his own exertions, and loyal devotion to God would first of all have him to exist and to act in his own behalf.

(b) Our social faculties are largely faculties of self-impairment; therefore love to others impels us to give ourselves to them. Such a faculty is pre-eminently that of speech. For the same reason the pious offer themselves and all they have to God.

(c) Some of our social faculties are faculties of acquisition. Seeing and hearing are of this sort. Hence it is that social love longs to possess its object. Hence also jealousy. The craving to use one's faculties of getting is further stimulated by the desire that one's friend should use his faculties of giving. The devout long to be assured that even God himself discharges his social office and gives himself to them.

It should not be overlooked that, inasmuch as the social faculties are the noblest faculties in man, the impulse to use these might well be regarded as an impulse of the highest self-interest, while to neglect or to misuse them is the deepest possible injury to oneself. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake," said Christ, "shall find it." [Matt. 16 : 25].

(2) What is the merit of love? This is to be found partly in the fact that to love is one among many normal functions, but pre-eminently in the fact that love is the incentive to all other normal functions, that is, to the true ends of being, as these ends are determined by the natures of the beings concerned.

(3) But this conclusion not only declines to resolve holiness into benevolence; it also sets aside the supposed antithesis of these attributes. The moral persistence of God in being what he is cannot lessen his desire that his creatures should be and act according to what he made them; and this, we have seen, is precisely the aim of love.

3. Justice is the impartial award to every one of that which is suitable to him, the rendering of his own to every man. What is due is determined by what a man is; and what he is includes his capacity to become better. Conduct is both an exposition of what one already is, and an intensification of the same.

The real relations of justice to benevolence now appear. The distinction between these attributes in the divine Being is solely one of form. Strict justice cannot render to any one less than that which is appropriate to him; but neither can benevolence demand any more. Benevolence intends what is well for the creature; justice insists on what is fit. But the well-for-us and the fit-for-us precisely coincide. The only thing well for us is the normal employment of our powers and the development of our potentialities, including relations to ourselves, to creatures, and to God; but to provide for this is precisely what is fitting, and therefore due to us. In the divine nature "mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other" [Ps. 85 : 10].

To our limited understanding these attributes often set up contrary demands; while, as a rule for our own guidance, 'mercy should rejoice against judgment' [James 2 : 13]. It is much easier to see what is well for another than what is due to him, and far safer to follow the suggestions of benevolence than of justice, for even revenge claims to be but just.

If there is no essential antagonism between the benevolence and the justice of God, no ground exists for that distinction between different kinds of justice which has played an important part in the theology of New England. This theology taught that distributive justice, or justice proper, apportions rewards, and penalties—in the latter case appearing as vindictive or

punitive justice; that commutative justice is equitable barter or exchange; while public justice is not justice at all, but is benevolence administering government wisely in the interests of the governed. These distinctions are sometimes convenient in form, but, if supposed to involve distinctions in substance, they are misleading.

(a) Justice is in each case a rendering of what is fit and due.

(b) Justice is a requirement of holiness, not a contrived policy in government.

4. The remaining moral attributes need no detailed discussion. Mercy is kindness to the wretched, "the desire to spare and save" (Stormonth). Grace is favor to the undeserving. Veracity is conformity of statement to fact—a conformity simply normal in a Being who knows all reality. Blessedness is the joy which God finds in being infinitely good, and in using his powers according to the dictates of his perfect nature. His glory is the dignity and splendor of his nature in itself (essential glory), or as revealed in his works to rational beings (declarative glory).

The Primacy among Moral Attributes.

It should not now be difficult to show that holiness takes precedence among the moral attributes of God.

(1) As between holiness and benevolence holiness is to be regarded as primary; because—

(a) Holiness is itself moral excellence, while the moral excellence of benevolence can be explained.

(b) Holiness is an attribute of being, while benevolence is an attribute of action; but action presupposes and is controlled by being.

(c) Benevolence must take counsel of holiness, since to desire for a being aught contrary to holiness would be to wish him harm; while that which holiness leads God to seek, benevolence finds best for the creature.

(d) The Mosaic Dispensation elaborately symbolized, and the Christian Dispensation makes provision to meet, the requirements of holiness as supreme. "First pure, then [by consequence] peaceable" [James 3 : 17].

(2) As between holiness and justice it is obvious that, since holiness is the moral quality which, for rational creatures, inheres in normal being, while justice is normal action toward sentient beings, justice is *per se* subordinate to holiness. In the relations of God to moral beings, whether good or bad, justice is the exponent of his holiness.

(3) As between benevolence and justice the definitions show so complete identity in nature and concurrence in aim that precedence cannot be claimed for either. It is only to our ignorance that either one can seem imperative and the other voluntary; for both are secure if either wins. To human view while probation lasts grace reigns, yet justice is not defrauded; and if any suffer eternally for sin, benevolence must acquiesce. Whatever is precisely suited to any one cannot be other than the best possible for him. It must be so, although his plight may be so wretched that the only thing in it which seems well is that the case is no worse.

§ 14. *The Divine Decrees.*

The decrees of God are the eternal and sovereign purposes for which he created all things. They embrace not only the universe as a whole, but every object in it; not only consummations, but every subsidiary event; not only the active furtherance of good, but the incidental permission of evil.

I. Evidences of Decrees.

1. From Natural Theology.

Natural Theology presents the most uncompromising aspect of decrees. They cannot be dissociated from the idea of God which nature furnishes. Every argument for the divine existence is virtually an argument for the eternal purposes of God. Proceeding from the most complex argument to the simplest, we notice :

(a) History viewed at large testifies to a divine Over-ruler. But history assures us that his purposes have been accomplished, not solely by the overthrow, but in part through the agency, of evil. Pre-eminently, what Christ as an historical personage achieved is due more to the ills he bore than to the good he wrought. The greater part of his influence upon history he owes to a crime of the human race against himself.

(b) Our moral faculties testify to the existence of an All-perfect Being whose sovereignty is so absolute that all events, however revolting, must be regarded as, in some way above our understanding, appointed by his authority and permitted by his goodness.

It may be objected that, as the moral argument reaches the idea of sovereignty through the idea of perfection, the latter must condition the former, and forbid us to believe that evil is in any sense included in the decree. But the proper inference is that evil must not be charged upon the All-perfect, although his sovereignty in the matter is complete. The moral argument teaches us that his sovereignty is as complete as his perfection, and as blameless.

(c) The teleological argument expressly declares the reign of design or purpose. But adaptations to ends exhibit an intention that some creatures shall prey upon others,—an enigma analo-

gous to that of moral evil. In particular, the evolutionist doctrine of progress through struggle for existence intimates that physical evil was introduced that good might come. The whole teaching of nature is that God entertains a plan wider and farther-reaching than we can pretend to know.

(d) Order or law indicates presiding intelligence; but it is an Intelligence which has incorporated in the universe, as in a complex mechanism, a destiny, which it must work out. Laws discovered or formulated by modern science, like the law of heredity, outdo in harshness the most austere theology. A pantheistic view of nature is not less necessitarian than a positivistic, and is optimistic only at cost of belittling evil.

(e) The proof that God is the first cause is proof that he is a Will. But he is eternal and unchangeable; therefore his purposes are changeless and eternal.

Uniting the argument for Will with the argument for Intelligence, we have the most startling view of decrees. The All-knowing knew in advance what would occur if he made the world. To decide on creating was virtually to decide on all that has followed.

2. Evidence from Scripture.

(a) A few texts expressly declare the existence of decrees; e. g., Isa. 14 : 24; 46 : 10; Eph. 1 : 11.

(b) Prophecy represents future events, not only as foreseen, but as in large part predetermined.

(c) The predestination of some men to salvation is an illustration of decrees. But the fuller statement of this phase of the doctrine belongs to soteriology.

(d) The doctrine, however, is not to be looked for so much in single texts of the Bible as in its prevailing conception of the supremacy of the divine will. This appears in—

(aa) The acceptance of the will of God as the standard

of right. Acts otherwise abhorrent were performed without scruple when God required them. Thus Abraham felt no compunctions about offering Isaac; no hint is given that Jephthah thought himself exempt from fulfilling his rash vow; nor did the command to extirpate the Canaanites seem to require any vindication at the period when either Testament was written.

(*bb*) The declaration that God instigated wicked men to deeds confessedly wrong. For example, the Lord is represented by a prophet as sending a lying spirit to deceive Ahab [1 Kings 22 : 22, 23]; as intending to send a strong delusion upon the wicked that they may believe a lie [2 Thess. 2 : 11]; as hardening Pharaoh's heart that the divine name might be declared in the earth [Rom. 9 : 17]; as determining the very things that should be done to Christ [Acts 4 : 28], and delivering him by determinate counsel and foreknowledge into the wicked hands that would crucify and slay him [Acts 2 : 23]; even as fitting some vessels of wrath for destruction [Rom. 9 : 22], and appointing that some should stumble at the gospel [1 Peter 2 : 8]; while, in reply to an objector, Paul claims for God the right to do as he pleases with his own [Rom. 9 : 19-21].

The entire artlessness of these statements, the evident unconsciousness of any need to justify God,—except in the case of Paul, whose attempt at justification is but the widest assertion of sovereign rights,—shows as plainly as express statements could that the sovereignty of God's purpose underlay the entire Biblical conception of his relations to things and men.

But while the Bible does not lower the conception of the divine sovereignty which may be derived from nature, it nevertheless provides—

II. Safeguards Against Misconception of Decrees.

1. The doctrine of decrees should not be mistaken for the

ancient doctrine of fate. Fate was believed to be a mechanical destiny ruling men and gods. But the Scriptures represent decrees as turning on the most personal element in God—his will.

2. Decrees should not be mistaken for the modern doctrine of necessity. Not a few physiologists urge that men are under an essentially mechanical necessity of yielding to impulses received from without. But the Bible addresses man as free. What he does, he too knows that he does because he chooses so to do.

3. The doctrine of decrees offers but a single aspect of the case, presented for practical ends, and ought not to be accepted as a theoretical exposition of the whole matter.

(a) A secondary truth is misleading when mistaken for a primary truth. It is true that the will of God is the proximate standard of right; but the ultimate standard is the holiness of God.

(b) God is sometimes represented as directly doing what the course of his providence brings about as the only means of correcting great evils and bestowing great good. Reformers are wisely eager to see the harvest of evil and good ripen, that they may separate the tares from the wheat. It was thus that the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, and thus that his wickedness could be defeated. He hardened his own heart, and it was respite from severity that led him so to do [Exod. 8 : 15, 31, 32; 9 : 34]. Even Christ could say to Judas, after Satan entered into him, "That thou doest, do quickly" [John 13 : 27].

(c) This method of governing the world is not arbitrary, but is in strict accord with the laws of the human mind. The greater part of the events described in the startling texts above referred to come about through the agency of habit. Habit is the momentum of the mind. It is therefore economy of effort. We would be incapable of doing, at the cost of overcoming

moral inertia in each instance, what we readily do by habit. But it is incident to this advantage that habitual evil also is easy, and can be overcome only by what may seem disproportionate violence. To him who looks for God's part in history, the human element may sometimes appear insignificant, while the divine is conspicuous and almost alone.

(d) More than all, while the Bible casts no doubt upon the supremacy of the divine will, it lays emphasis alike upon the holiness and benevolence of God, and upon the responsibility and convertibility of man. Paul repels the notion that the non-elect have "stumbled in order that they might fall" [Rom. 11 : 11], and assures Timothy that God "would have all men to be saved" [1 Tim. 2 : 4]; while Peter explains the delay of vengeance by the long-suffering of God, who does not wish "that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" [2 Peter 3 : 9]. We know that the decree cannot be capricious, for God is wise; that it cannot be evil, for he is holy; and that it cannot be unkind, for he is good. Without knowing what the decree is, we might safely entrust ourselves to it and say, "It is Jehovah; let him do what seemeth him good" [1 Sam. 3 : 18].

We conclude that, although the Bible does not, and perhaps could not, show us how the sovereignty squares with the goodness or even with the holiness of God, it insists upon all the divine perfections, traces the prerogatives of God to these, and thus guards against one-sidedness and extravagance of view.

III. Theories of Decrees.

1. The hyper-Calvinistic, that God eternally purposed to bring about all things, including sin, by his own direct or indirect efficiency.

But to intend evil, either directly or indirectly, would be incompatible with holiness and grace. There is no tenable objection to believing that God directly or indirectly promotes the good.

2. The moderate Calvinistic view that God permitted evil either—

(a) That good might come; which is open to the same objection as the preceding theory; or—

(b) As incidental to creation. Indeed, any scheme which included free moral agents would seemingly include a possibility of sin. But since, to the foreknowledge of God, the plan adopted included the certainty of sin, the difficulty remains that a decree to create apparently involved responsibility for all the consequences.

3. The Pelagian view, which, starting with an extreme doctrine of human freedom, affirms that the divine will is always conditioned by the freedom of man, and on that ground denies decrees. But the present advocates of this opinion in some cases admit it to be unscriptural, and make little account of this fact.

4. The moderate Arminian insistence on human freedom and admission of divine sovereignty, with a denial of decrees on the grounds:

(a) That the relation of the divine and the human wills is too profound a mystery to warrant the affirmation of decrees.

But it is not unwarrantable to regard the sovereignty of a person as the sovereignty of his will, or purpose. This is but to push back as far as possible the frontier of impenetrable mystery. Decrees expose, but do not cause, the difficulty.

(b) The holiness and benevolence of God forbid him to decree even permissively the existence of evil.

But he has decreed the existence of a world to which evil was a foreseen incident.

(c) The doctrine of decrees is incompatible with freedom of the will in man.

But God, foreknowing what free wills would do, must be regarded as including their free determination in his plan.

(d) The doctrine of decrees leads the wicked to charge upon God the responsibility for their conduct and fate.

But what God destines for any man he brings about through that man's volition. Meantime he commands and invites every man to follow righteousness and peace, and must be believed to have decreed the welfare of every one who does not voluntarily and finally reject the offered good.

§ 15.. *Creation.*

Creation may mean either the origination of spirit and matter by fiat of God, or the formation of living things by divine intervention out of substance which has existed from eternity. The Bible alone directly testifies to creation in either sense.

I. Testimony of the Scriptures.

That the Bible teaches the introduction of at least some new species by special act of God, no one denies. Most persons have also understood it to teach the absolute origination of matter. The texts which may be quoted for this view are not numerous, and some of them at least are capable of a different interpretation. Yet no other interpretation was or is natural to the reader who exalts the Almighty over the universe as the Bible has taught man to do. The following passages may be referred to :

(a) Gen. 1 : 1. The Hebrew word *Bara* in the Kal form is never used except of an act of God, and never with an ac-

cusative of material employed. The phrase "in the beginning" would indicate, according to Hebrew idiom, that nothing but God had existed before the event spoken of as "the beginning." And the second verse represents chaos as following, not as preceding, the first creative act. Grammatically it is true, but not rhetorically, the first verse might be accepted as a curt announcement of the entire process about to be detailed, and the second verse as describing a state of chaos which had existed from eternity; but this is an interpretation which only necessity or adventurous ingenuity would be likely to propose.

(b) Rom. 4: 17 tells us that the faith of Abraham, to whom God had promised a son, grasped the fact that God calls into existence the things that are not. This may be accepted as Paul's interpretation of the first verse in the Bible.

(c) 1 Cor. 8: 6 teaches that God is the source of all things, as Christ is the agent in their creation.

(d) In form Heb. 11: 3 merely denies that visible things were made out of visible materials; but in substance it tells what the faith of the Hebrews could grasp as to origins. Three alternatives are possible: visible things were made out of visible; out of invisible; or out of nothing. The first is expressly denied by the text; we have no reason to suppose the second was the belief of the Hebrews; therefore this text in effect declares, with all the energy of understatement, that, in the view of true faith, "the word of God" made the worlds out of nothing.

II. Testimony of Metaphysics.

Appeal to the necessities of thought confirms the doctrine of the Bible. It may be regarded as an illegitimate method of seeking the truth about physical things. But it would be to the confusion of science and philosophy alike to admit that

the laws of mind are out of harmony with those of matter. That absolute reliance upon the conclusions of physical science which is now the chief stimulus to its pursuit would be at an end.

(a) The most careful observations and most obvious conclusions would be unworthy of acceptance, because reached by the use of untrustworthy faculties.

(b) Induction rests upon specimen facts, and appeals to the uniformity of nature as its warrant. But the uniformity of nature rests in turn upon the necessary metaphysical assumption that objects of the same class have and must continue to have the same common properties; because to suffer a change of properties would be to become an object of another class.

(c) The instrumentality of pure mathematics would have to be relinquished, because its conclusions rest solely upon the validity of the laws of thought. But mathematics is an indispensable organ of physical investigation; the law of gravitation, for instance, was worked out by its means.

(d) The progress of knowledge in all spheres, while utterly failing to reduce matter and mind to one substance, shows with startling distinctness their intimate relations and the delicate harmony of their laws. It is not then superfluous to recall the metaphysical phase of the cosmological argument; to wit,—

It is inconceivable that a process of finite causes and effects can have existed from eternity. The only real cause is a first cause. It is idle to imagine the contrary of so self-evident a fact.

If it be objected that we are unable to conceive the creation of things out of nothing,—*ex nihilo nihil fit*,—it may be replied that the doctrine of creation assumes the existence of a Power competent to do all things which are not contrary to his perfections; and that, although we are unable to represent in

imagination the absolute beginning of things, we have no difficulty in conceiving that God could effect it,—the only sense of the word “conceive” pertinent to this discussion.

III. Testimony of Natural Science.

Natural Science is now known to be not unfavorable to a theistic view of the world, but probably a majority of eminent naturalists repudiate the Biblical doctrine of creation. This is done on various grounds.

1. Naturalists are disposed to assume the eternity of matter: and for the reasons that science cannot know aught of a creation; it finds matter indestructible; it refuses to concede any addition to the forces of the universe. But, on the other hand,—

(a) If science cannot know a Creator, it cannot know there was none until it has at least shown matter to be eternal—the very point at issue.

(b) To say that indestructibility proves eternal pre-existence is again to beg the question; because indestructibility may be due, not to capacity of self-existence, but to support by the power of a Creator.

(c) To deny that the sum of forces has been increased is to deny what there is no need to affirm. There is no scientific objection to either of two alternative views.

(aa) The doctrine of the convertibility of force, in the name of which the denial is made, itself assures us that God, if he endowed matter with force, merely transmuted the force resident in his will into special forms of energy. Or we may take the ground that—

(bb) The doctrine of the convertibility of force cannot be urged against an addition to the sum of forces, because before the creation there were no forces.

2. Many biologists hold to the spontaneous generation of life on the ground that mechanical and chemical forces must be considered adequate to effect all that has taken place in the world. It may be replied—

A. This general assumption would carry with it the anti-creationist doctrine *a priori*. But no account of the origin of life can be accepted without proof. The origination of life, either creatively or spontaneously, is a departure from the observed course of nature. It is unscientific to insist on the one or on the other of these marvels without conclusive evidence, and the naturalist is no more at liberty than the theologian to beg the question.

B. The presumption is strong against the identity of vital and inorganic forces. This presumption is due to the facts that—

(a) Spontaneous generation, or abiogenesis, has never been artificially secured, although artifice can provide favorable conditions with far greater readiness than nature could.

(b) Vital force is plainly distinguishable from chemical and mechanical forces throughout the entire life history of an organism. Vital force constrains physical forces into the service of building or restoring organic tissues; but when vital force declines and is finally lost, physical forces begin to tear apart what they had put together.

We conclude then that, while the presumption is against supernatural interventions in our day, it is against spontaneous generation formerly; and if it does not tell against descent of species, it is because in this case, as we shall see, the process of evolution has left its traces.

C. If abiogenesis were proved, creation would not be disproved. The inorganic would then be known to possess that power of begetting the organic which organisms themselves exhibit in the ordinary propagation of individuals, creation

would be mediate instead of immediate, in the one case as it is in the other ; but in both cases alike involution must precede evolution.

3. Evolutionists of all schools reject the doctrine that every species was produced by a special creative interposition. The account given in Genesis is thought by respectable exegetes not to require this interpretation, but to be even better understood as teaching that the four creations of living things produced but the earliest members of a class, and laid upon nature the charge of evolving all the included species.

Evolution has not been proved ; but the tendency is very marked among scientific men to accept it as an article of scientific faith ; and, thus far, the not unscriptural derivation of species by descent from forms introduced through a few divine interpositions has more evidence in its favor, and is freer from difficulties than any other view now held upon this subject.

A. Evidence in favor of a not unscriptural doctrine of Evolution is—

(a) The correspondence of embryonic to race development, of ontogenesis to phylogenesis. The embryo of an individual takes successive forms characteristic of simpler types, and which possibly sketch the descent of its type from other types.

(b) The existence of homologues, or anatomical identity with functional difference ; for instance, as found in the pectoral fin of a fish, the wing of a bird, the pastern and hoof of a horse, and the hand of a man.

(c) The significant occurrence of rudimentary or abortive organs. These organs were once useful to an earlier and presumably ancestral species, but have become atrophied through disuse by the species in which they appear as rudimentary.

(d) The geographical distribution of related species over

related territory. Notably the restriction of the sloths to South America, and of the singular spoon-bills to Australia.

(e) The geological succession in isolated territories, like New Zealand, of existing species to related but not identical fossil species.

(f) The enormous presumption that nature has done whatever has occurred within her realm. This presumption makes miracles in our day well nigh incredible, and weighs equally against miracles and supernatural creations in any former period. To deny them on this account would be, as above urged, to beg the question; but cogent testimony is needed in order to overcome this negative evidence.

All the foregoing evidence is *prima facie* as favorable to one theory of evolution as to another. That it is available only for a theory not out of harmony with the Scriptures may be seen from—

B. The Evidence against unscriptural theories of Evolution.

(a) Especially unthinkable is a purely natural transition from insensible plants feeding on inorganic matter to sentient animals feeding on organic matter. Nor is the difficulty set aside by the fact that the mechanical movements of some "sensitive plants" are not distinguishable from those of some animals which lack a nervous system; nor by the further fact that the fungi constitute a class of vegetables which, like animals, feed on organisms. To natural science the origin of animal life is still a matter of speculation, not of knowledge.

(b) The Darwinian theory of Natural Selection is based on the observed tendency of species to variation. It is claimed that, during the struggle for existence in former ages, those varieties survived which were fittest to their environment,

and that the slow accumulation of differences produced new species. This theory is widely felt to be open to the objections :

(aa) The tendency to variation has not produced an unmistakably new species since man appeared upon the earth.

(bb) Few variations afford any advantage in the struggle for existence.

(cc) Varieties show a tendency to infertility as departure from the type of their species becomes marked. The actual tendency is to revert to type.

(dd) Persistence of type is further illustrated by the inability of animal hybrids to perpetuate a breach in species.

(e) The theory of gradual Evolution self-guided, upon the whole, toward improvement of species is liable, in common with the theory of Natural Selection, to the objections :

(aa) Sudden changes in the earth's crust have destroyed many forms of life, and been followed by long periods of quiet, during which species at first rapidly multiplied and afterwards gradually became fewer.

(bb) The want of transitional forms is too marked to warrant the hypothesis of a gradual evolution. This want is greater among fossils than at present, when new species are not in process of formation. For example, the amphioxus or lancelet is a living form intermediate between vertebrates and mollusks, and the ornithorhyncus, or spoon-bill, is a link between saurians and mammals ; but neither of these nor any other transitional form leading up either to vertebrates or to mammals is found among fossils.

To escape these objections the theory has been proposed of—

(d) Heterogenesis, or descent of species by sudden leaps, or modifications in embryo, somewhat after the analogy of certain lower orders of animals, like the tape-worm or the plant-

louse. But facts cannot be quoted for the possibility of such changes; because—

(aa) In all existing cases heterogenesis proceeds in a circle, always reproducing the original parental form.

(bb) The arrest of the series at one of the intermediate points would be a degradation of species; whereas, the protraction of embryological life until a higher species than that of the parents is formed is wholly without example or anything analogous to example.

(e) The theory of Primitive Generation, denying all derivation of species from species, whether slowly or suddenly, affirms that primitive germs developed indifferently into forms which had only the characteristics common both to plants and animals; that from these were evolved forms representative in turn of the larger divisions in each kingdom, of orders, classes, genera, and that these last produced the various and unalterable species.

But this bold theory has little in its favor except its boldness.

The difficulties attending a naturalistic evolution of man are deferred to the doctrine of his creation. Meantime it is distinctly probable that, while the greater number of species have been developed from other species, divine interposition was required at the opening of the several periods when the most important transitions took place.

§ 16. *The Final Cause in Creation.*

It is necessary to believe that God, as a rational Being, had some ultimate purpose in creation. That all-inclusive purpose must be wide enough to cover the counter processes of good and evil. It must be intimately connected with what

passes under our view, and yet, like the sun amidst its planets, remote enough to serve as a common centre for these apparently erratic movements.

But we are met at once by the singular paradox that the self-sufficiency of the all-perfect One would bar every motive for the creation which makes him known. We find an universe demanding a Cause, a Cause precluding an universe. The only end which seems not wholly incompatible with the divine perfectness is the normal desire of God to employ his powers and to see a reflection of himself in his works. But the activity of God constitutes in large part his blessedness, and the reflection of his attributes is his declarative, as distinguished from his essential, glory. So that we conclude—

1. The final cause of the creation is the blessedness and glory of God. Uniting these two ends we may say that God made all things primarily for himself.

This is distinctly the teaching of the Bible. God cared for his ancient people "for his own sake" [Isa. 37: 35; 43: 25; Ezek. 20: 9]; he teaches inspired men to ask blessings "for his name's sake" [Ps. 25: 11; 31: 3; Dan. 9: 19], and makes even the wrath of his enemies to praise him [Ps. 76: 10; 46: 10; Rom. 9: 17]. The glory of the Father was the aim of Christ [John 12: 28; 17: 1, 4]; and Paul taught Christians, "whatsoever ye do, to do all to the glory of God" [1 Cor. 10: 31].

If it be objected that all-engrossing selfishness is thus attributed to God, we reply—

(a) The objector needs to exalt his conception of God until the Supreme Being attains in his view a worth so high that he cannot fitly make any object other than his own glory his end, or any criterion except his own preference his guide.

(b) The blessedness and glory of God are the only com-

plete security for the well-being of the creature. We therefore notice—

2. The secondary object of God in creation is to confer benefits on sentient beings, in particular upon man. This is assured by the facts:

(a) If the Creator seeks blessedness in normal activity, he must find exercise for his justice and benevolence; but these contemplate what is suitable and beneficial to his creatures.

(b) The full glory of God is reflected in rational beings only when they are most like himself; and thus to secure his own glory is to provide for their highest advantage.

(c) The song of the angels at the birth of our Lord announced the union of glory to God with blessing to men [Luke 2: 14].

§ 17. *Conservation.*

I. Scriptural Representations.

The Bible teaches that the source of existence is also its supporter. In some passages creation and conservation are so closely associated as to intimate that the latter office is involved in the former [Acts 17: 28; cf. Neh. 9: 6; 1 Cor. 8: 6; Col. 1: 16, 17; Heb. 1: 2, 3; 2 Peter 3: 5, 7]. It is easy to believe that to keep things from lapsing into nothing cannot essentially differ from bringing them into being out of nothing.

The nature of the relation by virtue of which God maintains all beings and forces has not been revealed and is not to be discovered. It is sometimes conceived as a divine immanence, or pervasion of all things by God; sometimes as a *concursus*, or co-operation of God with all. Opinion always tends either to a deistic isolation or to a pantheistic identification. At present the movement is strongly toward a pantheistic

or semi-pantheistic account of conservation. The following are the most important—

II. Theories as to Conservation.

1. The Deistic, that God in creating the universe endowed it with self-maintaining substance, forces, and laws. Accordingly, all events in the history of things or of men have come about without divine interference. The autonomy of nature is so analogous to freedom of will in man as to commend this theory to some of the early Arminians.

(a) But, while natural science cannot offer any conclusive objection to this theory, the theistic student of nature finds a weighty presumption against it in the mysterious and apparently spiritual nature of force.

(b) The Deistic view virtually denies divine conservation, and could not be mistaken for a scriptural presentation of this divine office.

2. The Pantheistic theory regards natural processes as a self-evolution of the One who is the all. That all-embracing Being is conceived either as absolute Idea which ultimately comes to light as reason knowing itself, or as indeterminate and unknown Substance, a "two-faced entity" which appears as matter in nature and as mind in man, in man first attaining consciousness, and in Christ, as some pantheists admit, first knowing itself as God.

This theory decidedly antagonizes the scriptural doctrines of the true personality of God and man, of God's priority to his works, and hence of his distinctness from them. That God is distinct from the world and that he is a person are the warp and the woof of biblical theology. Christianity makes the universe depend upon God; Pantheism makes God depend upon the universe.

3. *Creatio continuata*, the doctrine that God sustains the universe by the continual exercise of creative energy. This scholastic view has been revived as a doctrine of divine immanence, and in that guise is gaining no little vogue with theistic evolutionists and with theologians whose predominating interest is the reconciliation of theology with the current philosophy and science. And as the deistic theory has found itself at home among Arminians, so the doctrine of divine immanence is a view of God's relation to the material universe peculiarly congruous with the Calvinistic view of his relation to human souls. In the extreme form now under consideration, it regards the whole energy of the universe, either including or excluding that of the minds of men, as a divine activity. Thus creation is at once natural and supernatural, occasional and continuous.

A. Philosophical support is found in the agnostic admission that the mysterious causal energy of the universe may well be regarded as divine; and in the ordinary reference of all causation primarily to will.

B. Physics, insisting on the convertibility of force, would identify all forces with the originating Force. Otherwise, all subsequent forces would be either so much added to force previously in the universe, that is, in God himself, which science cannot concede; or so much deducted from the divine resources, which theology dare not admit.

C. A still more pantheistic character is given to this doctrine by the favored metaphysic of leading physicists, which, regarding atoms as vortices in a perfectly fluid ether, virtually reduces matter to manifestation of force, and force to modes of motion. Thus the doctrine of *creatio continuata* sets out from a positivistic respect for physical phenomena, and ends in an idealistic defiance of consciousness.

Against a theory of divine immanence which resolves conservation into continuous creation it may be maintained—

(a) The self-existent Spirit is not, strictly speaking, the seat of force, but of ability to create; so that, in creating forces, God neither added to any force that pre-existed, nor deducted from it, because none pre-existed.

(b) Against the doctrine in its early form, namely, that God at every instant re-creates all things, the objection holds that it denies all causal relation between successive states of things. To refer these states to divine causation is to set aside the distinct testimony of self-consciousness and observation that the causal *nexus* binds together the successive states themselves; and this denial in turn reduces our belief in causation itself to a delusion.

(c) Especially is the *ego* too well assured of its own substantiality, its distinctness from the *non-ego*, its freedom and responsibility, to accept a resolution of substance into force, of force into motion, and of motion—sins included—into a divine process.

(d) Or if it is thought that the spirit of man is self-moved, and physical motion alone is directly due to divine activity, we must object that—

(aa) To resolve all physical force into divine force is to resolve all physical substance into God. On the one hand, all the properties through which matter notifies us of its existence are due to force; if force, then, is divine, matter has the property of divinity. On the other hand, force has no known existence apart from matter; matter, therefore, on the existence of which divine force is dependent, cannot itself be less than divine.

(bb) The adduction of proof that physical and mental energy are mutually convertible would be the only scientific warrant for ascribing all physical motion to divine activity. In human experience physical and mental processes are certainly co-ordinated, but as certainly not convertible. Phys-

ical motion does not disappear in the mental act of perception ; the mental act of volition does not re-appear in physical motion. We have, therefore, no ground for affirming that this rule is reversed in the relations of God to material things.

4. *Concursus* of divine energy with natural forces, the former perpetuating and directing the latter. This account of conservation represents God as immanent and active in all, but as identified with none. *Concursus* was a favorite explanation with the scholastics, and is probably the popular view of the case. Indeed, if we reject the deistic exclusion of God from nature and the pantheistic or semi-pantheistic identification of God with nature, and still insist upon conservation, it must be conceived under the form of a *concursus*, or not at all. But it is wisest to frame no theory of the method by which God preserves his works. The Bible does not furnish any, and science can hardly make such a theory the subject of proof.

§ 18. *Providence.*

God not only maintains all things in existence, but he directs all things toward the ends for which he made them. And, since his own glory and blessedness are secured through the well-being of his creatures, the divine providence is not improperly conceived as in effect his care for his creatures, in particular for man. Providence is distinguished as General and Particular.

I. General Providence.

The provision which God in his government of the world makes for the human race as a whole, or for nations and communities, is his general providence.

Evidence of general providence is furnished—

1. By the Old Testament expressions of interest in the Hebrew people, and by the New Testament account of what God has done, yet does, and will do in behalf of his church and of mankind.

2. Events which history adduces in proof of the existence of God equally attest his general providence.

3. To patriotism public interests so transcend private that it is frequently attended by solemn and religious exaltation of feeling, and those who do not pray for themselves invoke the intervention of the Almighty for a cause which seems to them not unworthy of his care.

II. Particular Providence.

Particular or special providence is the divine care over individuals. It covers all our personal interests, as well as those of God's own kingdom so far as the individual can affect these, and has regard to the minutest conditions involved, physical as well as spiritual. The name of "special providence" is generally restricted to a conspicuous show of divine care, but represents no distinction except of impressiveness.

Proof of particular providence may be found in—

1. The Scriptures. These testify that—

(a) The favor of God toward the Hebrew people was largely due to his love for an individual patriarch, judge, or king.

(b) The New Testament characteristically assures every man that he enjoys the especial care of God.

(c) Certain texts explicitly state that God attends to the smallest details [Ps. 37 : 23-25; Prov. 16 : 9, 33; Matt. 10 : 29-31; Luke 12 : 22-30; Rom. 8 : 28].

2. General providence includes many particulars. It is true that the interests of some individuals might conceivably

be disregarded, as soldiers must perish if victory is to be won; but an abundant compensation is assured to every righteous man for any sacrifice which God exacts for the common weal [Mark 8 : 35; 10 : 29, 30].

It is especially noteworthy that movements of the highest importance in history turn on the training and fortunes of individuals. The names of Moses and Paul, of Luther and Judson in the church, of Charlemagne and Mirabeau, of Washington and Lincoln in the state, suggest that, whatever might have been accomplished apart from these men, momentous issues hung upon their life or death.

3. If general providence is the more credible to the irreligious, to the believer particular providence is a matter of experience. A wise and trustful spirit recognizes continually the guiding hand of an heavenly Father.

III. Theories of Providence.

These are closely related to those of conservation, and are no more satisfactory.

1. A modification of the Deistic theory is that God provided in the original constitution of things for every contingency which would arise. But—

(a) The constitution of the universe could not furnish either the Holy Spirit or divine forgiveness, in answer to prayer. These gifts are always special interventions.

(b) Nor is it easy to believe that God has placed the universe beyond his own reach, except through a miracle.

2. Pantheism really excludes divine providence, for it regards all processes as an unforeseen and necessary development. Or, if any unconscious bent of nature toward progress is affirmed, this is but a blind sort of general providence, which subordinates each stage of the process to the stages that

follow, and in a manner cares for the whole at cost of the parts.

3. *Creatio continuata* theoretically involves incessant direction of nature ; but—

(a) In effect it acknowledges only natural processes, for it identifies the divine activity with the natural. Hence—

(b) This theory, like that of predestinated provision, furnishes no basis for an adequate account of prayer.

4. *Concursus*, or co-operation of divine with natural forces, also looks to steady intervention. But the objection to it is the reverse of that to continuous creation,—

(a) It leaves no place for the regular exhibition of natural law. This objection does not lie against it as a theory of conservation, but as a theory of providence, that is, as an account of God's direction of all natural events to the service of his will. Observation does not tolerate an account of the course of nature which requires it to be deflected as continuously as would be necessary if all special providences were special interruptions.

It might, indeed, be alleged that God would rule over nature and man according to an order prescribed by the constitution of his own mind. But—

(b) Such is the order of nature itself. The theory on this supposition is embarrassed by ascribing to divine overruling precisely what it needs no overruling to bring to pass. This is, of course, prohibited by the law of parsimony.

5. So large a proportion of human events is determined by the will of man, that the range of divine providence has been restricted by another theory to influence of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind and heart.

It is certain that the Christian has been taught to look for such guidance ; but as a rationalé of divine providence this theory does not provide for the facts :

(a) Mind is so related to matter that, in order to control over either, the other must be controlled.

(b) While the Divine Spirit certainly introduces order into the moral sphere, and does this through the instrumentality of ideas, it is impossible to understand how it could bring anything but confusion into the mental sphere, if it interferes with the natural movement of thought to the extent which this theory asserts as to mind, but denies to be admissible as to matter. Assuredly it cannot be admitted that the laws of thought are less inviolable than the laws of things.

Without venturing a theory about matters clearly beyond explication, it may be possible to find in each theory as much to approve as to condemn. With the deist we can believe that most events which the providence of God brings about might be assured by pre-arrangement; with the pantheist and the semi-pantheist we may well refuse to accept the isolation of God from his works; with the believer in *concursum* we may recognize the reality of natural substances and forces without debarring the Maker from control over them; and with the advocate of a spiritual interpretation of events, we may welcome the agency of the Holy Spirit at large in the affairs of men. But it is impossible to account for all providential aids in any one of these ways, or to accept either of them as a clear path through the mystery of God's dealings with the world and with its inhabitants.

§ 19. *Prayer.*

Prayer asks the favor and help of God in the religious and in the secular concerns of man.

In addition to the difficulties met in the doctrine of providence, the doctrine of prayer faces the further question how an

all-wise and unchangeable Sovereign can be affected by the petitions of men.

Taking for granted as too familiar to need proof that the Scriptures encourage men at all times to pray, and postponing to another division of theology inquiry as to the intercession of Christ and the office of faith for those who pray, we notice here :

I. The Relation of Prayer to Spiritual Benefits.

No reason can be given for supposing that this relation is outside the domain of law. The contrary is shown by the scriptural warnings: "If I regard iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me" [Ps. 66 : 18] ; "Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss" [James 4 : 3]. Clearly, the efficacy of prayer is limited by moral propriety.

The most general law of prayer was stated by our Lord : "Every one that asketh receiveth" [Matt. 7 : 8]. That this is not an arbitrary appointment, but is an indispensable condition of receiving spiritual benefits, is plain from the following considerations :

(a) Spiritual benefits must at least be desired, or they cannot be accepted when offered ; and desire for benefits from God is the essence of prayer.

(b) A normal relation to God involves consciousness of dependence upon him. The more he is to us, the deeper our felt need of him. To lack the sense of dependence is of itself to repel spiritual good.

(c) Our Lord teaches us that the heart of God is amenable to the appeal of trust [Luke 11 : 5-13 ; cf. Matt. 7 : 11]. Neither articulate nor even self-understood longing is requisite. Though "we know not what to pray for as we ought, the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is

the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God" [Rom. 8 : 26, 27].

Indeed, so obvious is the connection between asking and obtaining spiritual good, that the benefits of prayer are by some ascribed solely to its reflex influence.

But this extreme attempt to remove God from our reach, and us from the reach of God, is warranted neither by Scripture nor by Christian experience. The moral re-action of prayer may be one of the means, yet is not the only means, employed in answering prayer. Forgiveness, adoption, regeneration, are not the accumulated results made upon the petitioner by a series of his own prayers ; they are distinctly acts of God.

II. The Relation of Prayer to Temporal Benefits.

This relation is too obscure to be explained. So far as the interests of the body and estate are promoted by peace of mind, by purity, and by moral vigor, the utility of prayer for temporal good is as clear as that of prayer for spiritual good. But so far as benefits can reach us only through providential furtherance, the utility of prayer for temporal blessings is obscure as the method of divine providence.

Many have urged that God has reserved some unknown natural agents as his own means of directing nature, just as the use of other natural agents is open to man. Others have preferred the supposition that in the original ordering of the universe the temporal good we desire was timed to arrive just when we should ask for it. But while neither of these provisions is impossible, neither can be certified, and the second is of the mechanical, deistical sort which finds little favor in any quarter to-day.

But we need not doubt that God has an indulgent regard for the desires of those who love him. It is right to lay all

our innocent wishes before God, without feeling bound to decide for him whether it would be well to gratify us [Phil. 4 : 6]. We may and should accept the assurance of Christ, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will and it shall be done unto you" [John 15 : 7], with such limitation only as he laid upon his own petition, "Not my will but thine be done" [Matt. 26 : 39, 42, 44 ; cf. Heb. 5 : 7 ; Luke 11 : 2].

§ 20. *Miracles.*

God has seen fit from time to time to claim the attention of men by those extraordinary manifestations of his power and purpose generally called Miracles.

I. Their Nature.

A miracle is a phenomenon apart from the ordinary course of nature, and unmistakably due to superhuman power. A divine miracle is manifestly wrought by God. Unless an extraordinary event can with certainty be referred to a power above man's, it cannot be distinguished from a prodigy or from jugglery, and its miraculous character must be denied.

Although a miracle is such an event as natural agencies could not of themselves produce, it does not follow that it is either a violation or a suspension of the laws of nature. We have no reason to doubt that all the forces which are concerned with the object upon which a miracle is wrought are operative according to their several laws ; and, if the usual effect is not seen, this is because those normally working forces are counter-acted by some other force, either natural or supernatural, applied by a superhuman will, precisely as when artificial results are wrought by man.

But while the properties and forces characteristic of an object are always a factor in the result, the supernatural element in that result may or may not be due to the use of natural means. When a wind swept the Red Sea from its bed and back again for the rescue of the children of Israel, the miracle was that the wind obeyed Moses; but no known natural agency made the Jordan part at the touch of the priests' feet. So to the notice of a passer-by the miraculous drafts of fishes might be the gift of chance, for the only certain supernatural element in the case was the Lord's knowledge that the fish would be caught; while, on the contrary, the multiplication of the loaves and fishes was apparently due to creative power alone.

It follows that a miracle can be distinguished from a special providence, not by the absence of natural agencies, but only by the indubitable presence of divine agency.

II. Credibility of Miracles.

If miracles are credible it is because —

1. Miracles are *possible*. Two conditions must be met:

(a) Power capable of working miracles must be possible. So far, miracles are possible if the existence of God is possible. Were his existence in question, the occurrence of miracles would set that question at rest.

(b) The laws of nature must be fixed. Without a rule there can be no exceptions, without a natural order no miracles. But for the order of nature to change so completely as to render miracles indistinguishable from natural phenomena would undo miracles by a transcendent miracle. It would be to change the nature of Nature; and this would be to substitute other things, as well as another order, for those which now exist.

2. Miracles were *probable* when God had sufficient reason

for revealing himself by their means. Whether they are probable now can better be considered after determining their office.

3. Biblical miracles were *unmistakable to their witnesses*. It can never be demonstrated that the unknown forces of nature are incapable of working any result, however prodigious. But for a witness of the Bible miracles to explain them in this way would be the infatuation of unbelief. In such cases scepticism would be credulity. It is possible to give a superstitious credit to nature.

4. The *trustworthiness of the witnesses* to miracles is assured by the genuineness and authenticity of the Bible. That records, which we have sufficient reason to accept as written at the time and by the persons alleged, could be false is rendered incredible by—

(a) The absurdity of such tales in the face of a generation which knew them to be untrue.

(b) The fact that no other great religious teacher has pretended to miracles. How then does it happen that Moses, Jesus, and Paul, confessedly the chief among the world's religious guides, claim or were credited with wonders which they did not perform?

(c) The notable sobriety, simplicity, and candor of the biblical narratives guarantees to literary criticism the honesty of their writers; and it is impossible, if they were spectators, as some of them claim to have been, that they could merely fancy they had seen such marvels as they describe. But the burden of proof does not rest on the Bible alone. Extra-biblical evidence is not wanting. For example—

5. The resurrection of Christ is at once the best attested and the all-attesting miracle of Christianity. Its occurrence is proved by the existence of the church, of its ordinances, and its beliefs. But in accepting the resurrection of our Lord we

accept his divinity; and with his divinity all the miracles of the New Testament become not only credible, but indispensable. If he be the Son of God, he must prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

6. The congruity of the miracles, on the one hand, with the nature, character, and teachings of Jesus, on the other hand, lends support to both. But this theme must be postponed until we have determined what is—

III. The Office of Miracles.

This is indicated by their nature. Unmistakably wrought by God, miracles necessarily call attention to him, and tend to an all-inclusive end; namely, to establish his kingdom among men.

As to how they serve this purpose, there has been and is no little dispute. The exegete naturally looks for a deep and varied significance in the miracles; whereas, the expounder of Christian Evidences, finding miracles a stumbling-block rather than an aid to faith for the modern sceptic, seeks to show that the truth of doctrine does not turn on the acceptance of miracles, and that their office was to certify a messenger to earlier days, not to intimate nor vindicate his message to our day.

But these offices are not mutually exclusive. A miracle may attest a messenger and also convey a message of its own; it may be in itself profoundly significant, yet not lose its validity as a credential. That these two offices are in thorough accord is assured by the fact that they are but direct and indirect methods of approaching the same end. Under the Old Dispensation the method of miracles was for the most part, but not solely, direct; under the New Dispensation it was chiefly, yet far from exclusively, indirect.

1. The theocracy was a kingdom of this world, and naturally its miracles in large part did the work of carnal weapons. The plagues which compelled Pharaoh to let the Hebrews go, the engulfing of their pursuers, the pillar of cloud and fire to guide them, the bread from heaven on which they fed, the public giving of the law, the crossing of the Jordan, the fall of the walls of Jericho, the series of miraculous victories by which the land of promise was won, or in after centuries held, the fire from heaven upon Elijah's sacrifice to convince the people anew that Jehovah was God—all these served the theocracy in the directest way.

Under the New Dispensation the kingdom is spiritual, and such was the intended effect of its miracles. By displaying the kindness of God in the healing of disease and the feeding of the hungry; by drawing faith to Jesus as the Son of God in the stilling of the tempest; by proving his right to forgive sins in the healing of a palsied man; by revealing him as the source of life in the raising of Lazarus; finally, by establishing his own divinity and assuring our justification in the miracle of his rising, miracles were so far a direct exposition of the gospel, and contributed immediately to the reign of grace among men.

2. But they also fulfilled their office indirectly by certifying or by preserving a messenger of God. The burning bush, the change of Moses' rod into a serpent, the budding of Aaron's rod, the test of a wet and a dry fleece granted to Gideon, the feeding of Elijah by ravens, the safety of Daniel in the lions' den—these miracles either furnished the times with a prophet or served as his credentials.

In the gospel age, so far as miracles attested that Christ and his apostles bore a divine commission, so far they contributed but mediately to the new kingdom. This is all that miracles meant to Nicodemus [John 3 : 2], and was the utmost

that Jesus for some time expected the Jews to learn from them [John 5 : 36]. Testimony of the same kind was afforded to the apostles [Acts 15 : 12; Heb. 2 : 4].

In some cases the same miracle served both directly and indirectly. All Israel was the prophet of God, and every conspicuous miracle in its favor claimed a hearing for its testimony to the true God. Similarly our Lord summoned his friend from the grave in order to reveal himself to Martha as the ruler of life, but only to win from the Jews an admission that God had sent him and would hear him when he prayed [John 11 : 25, 42].

IV. Congruity of Miracles with Doctrine.

Miracles, whether pretended or real, always correspond to the doctrine of those who perform them. This is because the words and the works of men alike represent their character. It is a fact of high importance in studying the miracles of Jesus.

1. It greatly enhances their evidential value alike for his age and for ours; because it sharply distinguishes them from diabolical miracles, from magic, and from jugglery. Mischief or moral emptiness mark the latter; dignity and deep significance the former. Revealing at once divine goodness and power, the miracles of Jesus illustrate the good tidings which he brought. If this correspondence were lacking, miracles would be a serious burden to faith; its presence adapts them to win the trust of both simple and wise.

2. Conversely, this congruity substantiates the truth of our Lord's teachings; and does it while turning away the reproach that Christian doctrine is too unreasonable to be accepted without pretence of miracles. It is not unreasonable to believe that God is willing to save men by the sacrifice of his Son; we can even find something becoming to God in

such a sacrifice [Heb. 2 : 10]; but it would be unreasonable to believe that Jesus was the Son of God, unless he wrought miracles significant of his nature and mission [John 5 : 31, 36]. The supernatural basis of Christianity required a supernatural attestation.

Argument from correspondence of miracles to doctrine is not arguing in a circle, but appeals to a mark of genuineness without which neither miracles nor doctrines would be credible.

3. This correspondence throws light on the question whether miracles may be expected in the present age.

(a) It shows why they have ceased. Having certified the claims of Jesus, miracles may well leave his grace to commend itself to our needs. If long continued, miracles would have ceased to be signs [John 6 : 26], and have proved a disturbance and a demoralization; the spiritual aims of Christianity would have been sacrificed to the degrading hope of leading an idle life, and our religion itself have become a gazing stock. The evils inseparable from wonder-working often led our Lord to conceal his miracles so far as possible, and furnished reason enough why he should not again show himself to the world after his resurrection. The same grave consideration led Paul to turn the desires of the Corinthians away from the startling gift of tongues to the edifying office of prophecy. There is no reason to suppose that miracles continued longer than necessary, but the history of the church shows that they ceased none too soon, and that their return is not to be desired while the present order of things endures.

(b) On the other hand, when the personal reappearing of our Lord is near, signs and wonders are again to be looked for. It is natural that belief in "faith cures" as supernatural interpositions should often be associated with expectation of the early coming of Christ.

§ 21. *Angels.*

The Bible makes known the existence of a race of beings superior to man [Ps. 103 : 20; Matt. 24 : 36]; in essence spiritual [Heb. 1 : 14]; in origin severally created, not generated [Ps. 148 : 2-5; Matt. 22 : 30; Col. 1 : 16]; immortal, and either holy and happy, or wicked and miserable forever.

Both angels and demons (or devils) are clothed with a mystery so stimulating to imagination that they became in former times a theme of fantastic speculation, but for the same reason are now regarded with sceptical indifference. Neither kind of treatment is warranted by the Scriptures, which are the only trustworthy source of information.

I. Good Angels.

That these are not to be discredited as creatures of Oriental imagination, nor adopted as a subject of fanciful conceits, but are real and important beings, may be gathered from the following considerations :

1. Although sometimes appearing in visions, they were repeatedly presented to the senses, and not infrequently to more than one person at once. Angels were seen and heard by Abraham and Sarah, by Lot and the men of Sodom [Gen. 18 and 19]; an angel withstood Balaam, first invisibly, then visibly and audibly [Num. 22 : 22-35]; the angel which released Peter from prison was expressly distinguished by him from a vision [Acts 12 : 9, 11].

2. So far from exhibiting Oriental fancifulness when treating of angels, the Bible shows in connection with no other topic a more veracious simplicity, or more divinely guarded reserve. This is exemplified in the fact that ordinarily they are represented as sent only to some notable person, or on some momentous errand. Thus, cherubim excluded our first

parents from Eden [Gen. 3 : 24]; at the burning bush the angel of Jehovah revealed the divine name to Moses, and commissioned him to undertake the Exodus [Exod. 3]; the Law was ordained by angels [Gal. 3 : 19; cf. Acts 7 : 53; Heb. 2 : 2]; the angel of the Covenant announced himself as captain of the Lord's host when Joshua led the tribes into Canaan [Josh. 5 : 13-15], and reappeared at various emergencies in the history of Israel [Judg. 6 : 11-23; 13 : 3-20; 2 Sam. 24 : 16; 2 Kings 19 : 35; Dan. 3 : 28; 6 : 22].

Angels were sent on frequent messages in connection with the birth of our Lord [Matt. 1 : 20-24; 2 : 13, 19; Luke 1 : 11-20, 26-38; 2 : 9-15]; they ministered to Jesus after the temptation [Matt. 4 : 11], and during the agony in Gethsemane [Luke 22 : 43]; attended his resurrection [Matt. 28 : 2; Luke 24 : 4, 23; John 20 : 12], his ascension [Acts 1 : 10], and repeatedly interposed during the infancy of the church [Acts 5 : 19; 8 : 26; 10 : 3-7; 12 : 7-11, 23]. Angels, therefore, were real beings to Christ.

3. Our Lord also taught their existence, and his references to them are peculiarly significant. His protest against contempt for lowly disciples (or possibly children) was, "Their angels do always behold the face of my Father" [Matt. 18 : 10]. In order to correct gross views of the future life he said, they that "rise from the dead are . . . as the angels" [Matt. 22 : 30]. Inquisitiveness about the day and hour of his own second coming is checked by the statement that no man knows it, "no, not the angels of heaven" [Matt. 24 : 36]. How great its glory shall be we learn from this, that "all the holy angels shall be with him" [Matt. 25 : 31]. And how willingly he gave himself for us is plain when he says that, if he prays now, the Father will give him "more than twelve legions of angels" [Matt. 26 : 53].

4. Disregard and unbelief as to these pure and exalted

beings are revolting when we reflect that they are "all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation" [Heb. 1 : 14]. How they exercise their ministry, whether by unaccountable persuasions to righteousness, or warnings against what proves to be a mortal peril, as some think, is a matter on which too little has been revealed to support a confident assertion, and too much has been intimated to justify a sweeping denial.

5. Angels would fill a wide gap between man and his Maker in the ever ascending hierarchy of being. Rising from inorganic matter through all grades of living things, the rational and impressive order of nature, if there are no angels, breaks off at man. But a race of beings allied to us by the possession of rational spirits, while above us in their independence of bodies, and themselves, according to Scripture, holding various ranks [Col. 1 : 16 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 16 ; Jude 9 ; Rev. 12 : 7], meets the demand of analogy,—an analogy, singularly enough, emphasized by the modern naturalistic account of the close relation of species.

6. The proneness of most peoples to multiply divinities, demigods, and lesser superhuman beings, upon the whole corroborates, rather than puts under suspicion, the doctrine of angels. It is true that opinions differ on this point. As Comparative Theology brings into view correspondences of religious belief among diverse and widely separated races, some find in this a proof of universal superstition ; others welcome it as an evidence that the Spirit of God, or the tradition of a primitive revelation, or the sure intuition of the religious nature in man, or even in some degree each of these, has led men in all lands and ages into partial knowledge of the highest things. Those who reverence the Bible should not be dismayed to find that it embraces every universal, perhaps every deeply rooted ethnic belief.

But if the polytheistic tendency is not regarded as normal enough to strengthen the Christian belief in angels, it has sometimes proved strong enough to convert angels into objects of unlawful worship [Col. 2 : 18]; and this result has had not a little to do with the neglect into which the doctrine on this subject has fallen among strict Protestants.

II. Evil Spirits, Devils, or Demons.

These are as plainly revealed in the Bible, and perhaps as widely testified to by the belief of mankind, as are good angels.

1. Concerning their origin little is known. It seems to be understood by inspired men that God would not create any evil being, and that therefore the demons, or devils, are "the angels that sinned," of whom Peter writes [2 Peter 2 : 4], "the angels which kept not their first estate," according to Jude [Jude 6].

2. Their chief is Satan. Although many hold him to be a copy of the Persian Ahriman, he is at least abundantly recognized in the Bible. Others suppose him to be a personification of the principle of wickedness; but this does violence to the uniformity of the Scripture's representation of him as a being with the attributes and names of personality, such as "the adversary," "the tempter," "the accuser;" it gives quite too little weight to the Saviour's recognition and rejection of him in the wilderness, and to the terrifying designation of him as lord over the region to which all the wicked shall be consigned.

3. Concerning the activities of the devil we know that—

(a) The most formidable is his opposition to the truth [Matt. 13 : 19, 25, 39; 2 Cor. 4 : 4], and his effort to entice men into sin [Luke 22 : 31; Acts 5 : 3; Eph. 6 : 11; 1 Peter 5 : 8].

(b) He had some not clearly defined "power of death,"

now destroyed through the part which our Lord took in flesh and blood [Heb. 2 : 14].

(c) Some even suggest that, as demoniacal possessions were once allowed in punishment of gross sin, suffering of the same kind may not be unknown to our times. It is an opinion equally difficult to substantiate or disprove.

(d) Jesus predicted that false Christs and false prophets would "show great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they should deceive the very elect" [Matt. 24 : 24]. Paul, having apparently the same events in mind, ascribes to "the working of Satan" the "lying wonders" which were to appear [2 Thess. 2 : 9]. Accordingly, the practice of magic and witchcraft was formerly attributed to alliance with Satan, and not a few are satisfied that the mystifying and mischievous performances of modern "mediums" are due to a power not less hostile to man than that of "the Evil One." It is wise to suspend judgment so long as the alternatives of expert trickery, or of some obscure but not superhuman means of communication between the spirits of living persons, remain a possible explanation of these equivocal doings.

PART III.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 22. *The Nature of Man.*

An account of the powers which distinguish man from the brute will be of service in the further study of anthropology. Of the many definitions which have been proposed, perhaps the best is that man is a rational animal. Reason includes or involves all which sets up an ineffaceable distinction between man and other animals.

(a) Reason is the faculty of knowing abstract truth, of forming and weighing general notions. By memory and comparison a brute is able to recognize that a sensible object is like other objects of the same class, as a man, a dog, a whip. But there is no evidence that a brute can carry about a general notion of the class itself; for example, man, dog, whip; even less that it can abstract from concrete instances the qualities of which it has had experience, such as cruelty, kindness, courage; less still that it has any idea of moral difference; least of all, that it can rise to a synthesis of ideals in God.

Man, on the contrary, can mentally analyze and synthetize; can test his results inductively by comparison with single instances, or deductively by reference to still more general notions; amongst these he can intuitively know first principles as true; among first principles he can use for self-judgment the idea of moral distinctions; finally, he can ascribe all infinite excellencies to a Person of whose existence he is assured as the moral complement of himself, and whom, therefore, he

feels bound to worship and serve as his own Archetype and Lord.

(b) The possession of reason excludes all limit to the possible improvement of the human mind short of the infinite; but, however surprising the tricks or the service which beasts can be trained to perform, their intelligence never passes from reasoning into reason, nor their susceptibility to fear and shame into a sense of moral wrong.

The three pre-eminent faculties, or powers, which man is seen to possess, reason, will, and conscience, are all mutually inclusive. If asked what is highest in man, we must assign this rank to the capacity of moral self-judgment, and its attendant sense of obligation to obey an all-holy God; if sentient creatures, which lack consciousness of self, are to be distinguished, *quoad hoc*, from man, we adduce his personality, of which will, or the faculty of conscious self-determination, is the nucleating element; but if his claim to supremacy over animate and inanimate nature is demanded, this prerogative can be found only in his reason.

The question of the elements in his constitution is quite distinct from that concerning his powers, and will be separately considered.

§ 23. *The Creation of Man.*

1. The Scriptures accord to man a different origin from that of the beasts. The waters and the earth were called upon to bring forth all living creatures below man; but man was made by a special act of the Creator.

Of the two passages in Genesis which give an account of the creation of man, 1:26, 27 states after what pattern he was made, and gives his rank among creatures: he was made in the

image of God, and set as lord over all earthly beings. Genesis 2 : 7 intimates in part the method of his creation : taking care not to import into this simple story distinctively modern ideas, we find in it the primitive notion that God moulded the human body from earthly materials and then caused it to live. That the soul, or immortal principle, was thought of by the writer [cf. "breath of life," in 7 : 22], or that he regarded it as an efflux from the Godhead, are common but doubtful interpretations.

2. Natural science has not only failed to make out a purely natural origin for man, but is really favorable to his special creation, for it is unable otherwise to account for him.

(a) No trace is found of an ancestor for man among living or extinct species of simians.

(b) The differences in the bony frame-work of these types is marked. In man the natural posture is erect, in the ape it is prone. The arm of man is not adapted to locomotion, nor has his foot a thumb, like the ape's. Even admitting that these and other differences might be gradually produced by evolution, there is no evidence whatever that this has taken place.

(c) It does not seem possible that a human brain could be developed from the simian. The largest measured brain-capacity in the skull of an ape is thirty-four cubic inches ; the least in a human idiot is forty-six inches ; that of the lowest type of man is sixty-eight inches ; while the largest known is one hundred and fourteen inches. That is, a brain ample enough for the formidable gorilla, or for the amiable and clever chimpanzee, is one quarter too small for a human idiot, and one half too small for the most degraded savage. It is unthinkable that nature could protect an imbecile transition-race through ages of struggle for existence.

(d) The development of brute intelligence into reason is not alone without any facts to support it, but is really inconceivable.

How serious this difficulty is felt to be finds illustration in the plausible but unscientific conjecture that nature produced the brain, while God bestowed the soul of man. When nature furnishes an organ we must ascribe to her the functions which the organ is fitted to perform. Especially ought the evolutionist to acknowledge the force of this objection, since he holds that organs rise to higher functions by the exercise of the highest they are capable of. If, then, nature evolved the human brain, it evolved the thinking inhabitant of that brain.

The considerations which favor the descent of species from species, with the exceptions above noted, are applicable to man. Especially indicative of a genetic relation to some unknown simian is the general correspondence of the human body to that of apes, and the presence in it of many abortive organs. It is probable that God specially guided the rapid transformation of some humbler animal's body, and at the same time lodged in it a human soul. This probable conjecture does not antagonize the Biblical account of our origin, providing that we accept that account as pictorial and primitive,—the view perhaps generally taken of the whole Biblical cosmogony.

§ 24. *The Unity of the Human Race.*

The book of Genesis seems to teach that the entire race is descended from one pair. Paul declared to the race-proud Athenians that God had made of one every nation (Acts 17 : 26). He also traces sin and death to Adam as the common father of all men [Rom. 5 : 12-19; 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22].

Natural science has as yet found no means of determining whether the race is of dual or plural origin; yet it does not accept the existence of varieties in the human species as disproof of a common parentage. On the other hand, anatomy, physiology, psychology, philology, and comparative theology, demonstrate that men are of one species, and raise a strong presumption in favor of descent from one pair.

§ 25. *Constitution of Man.*

The Scriptures ordinarily represent man as consisting of soul and body; but Paul and Luke together with the Pauline writer to the Hebrews, distinguish in man spirit, soul, and body (*πνεῦμα, ψυχή, σῶμα*). What is meant by the threefold distinction? And is man dichotomous or trichotomous?

I. What is the difference between spirit and soul?

1. The dichotomous view is ordinarily accepted in our day. According to this view a human soul is the spirit regarded as dwelling in a body; a human spirit is the soul not contemplated in its relations to a body. Accordingly, when the words soul and spirit (*psyche* and *pneuma*) occur together either in the Scriptures or elsewhere, soul is the immaterial part of man engaged in those offices to which the body introduces it; while spirit is the same immaterial part concerned with realities which are beyond the reach of sense; such as God, heaven, and holiness. Thus Luke 1:46, 47; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12, include both our lower and higher powers, and so give a comprehensive view of man.

2. According to trichotomists, the soul, or *psyche*, is the seat of animal life, intelligence, and feeling; while the spirit, or *pneuma*, is a distinct immaterial substance, to which alone all the higher and Godward functions of man pertain.

As to the relations between the soul and spirit, trichotomists differ. According to some the *psyche* is the principle of animal life, and perishes at death; while the *pneuma* is the rational principle, and will be reunited with the body at the resurrection. Others take the *psyche* to be a product of the *pneuma's* union with the body; and Delitzsch holds that the *psyche* is the forth-breathing of the *pneuma*, as the Holy Spirit is breathed forth by the Father.

II. Is man dichotomous or trichotomous ?

In favor of the dichotomic view we notice :

1. The few New Testament writers who use trichotomic language do not necessarily intend to teach an authoritative psychology different from that common to other writers of Scripture, and to the greater part of mankind.

2. Paul does not use soul and spirit, psychical and pneumatic, with uniform meanings. In 1 Cor. 2 : 14 the psychical is the unregenerate, the pneumatic is the regenerate; but in 15 : 46 the psychical is the mortal, the pneumatic the immortal. Or if, in order to secure uniformity of meaning, we identify the unregenerate with the mortal and the regenerate with the immortal, then—

3. We must accept an unscriptural view concerning the nature of regeneration; namely, that this change consists either in imparting or in awakening the immortal spirit. That is, either man is not immortal until after regeneration, or the very part of his nature which deals with God needs not to be purified, but only aroused—precisely the reverse of the scriptural teaching [Eph. 2 : 3].

4. Man's Godward functions cannot be ascribed exclusively to the *pneuma*. Understanding and affection, psychical powers which we share with the beasts, are directly engaged

in our relations to God. The beasts themselves show to a master the reverence and fidelity which men owe to their Maker. In Luke 1:46, 47 Mary's *psyche* magnifies the Lord, as her *pneuma* rejoices in God; and in 2 Cor. 12:15 Paul declares his willingness to spend and be spent for the *psyches* of the Corinthians [ὅπερ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν], assuredly not for the animal in them, but for the religious part, if for any mere part. That distribution of offices which is indispensable to the trichotomous theory cannot be made out.

5. Consciousness notifies us of the absolute unity and indivisibility of the personal self. Psychological analysis detects no trace of a duality in the immaterial part of man.

Nor does the consciousness of the Biblical writers contradict ours. If we are to take literally Paul's statement in Rom. 7:17 [cf. ver. 25], "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me," if we are to accept this as affirming a partition in the immaterial part of Paul, then we must take literally his other saying in Gal. 2:20,—“I have been crucified with Christ; and I no longer live, but Christ liveth in me,”—and must hold it to teach that the personal Paul had been destroyed and his body occupied by the personal Christ. But this view, to which some devout people make a near approach, is a doctrine of the annihilation of Christian souls, and a pan-christic conception of the regenerate, which has all the faults without any of the recommendations of pantheism.

§ 26. *The Origin of Souls.*

Three views are held concerning the origin of the soul; namely, that it enters the body from a pre-existent state; that it is specially created in the case of every person; that it is propagated together with the body.

It is admitted that no direct scriptural evidence can be

cited for the theory of pre-existence. It is advocated as the only solution of the paradox that man is sinful by inheritance, and yet responsible, and is further recommended on the ground that it secures a probation in time for spirits that fell in a timeless state. But the advantage to a fallen spirit of subjection to the temptations of sense is not obvious.

The theory of propagation of souls, or traducianism, is preferable to creationism for the following reasons:

1. It is more scriptural. While mediate creation through traduction will justify the title "Father of spirits" [Heb. 12 : 9], immediate creation of individual souls is excluded by the statements that God finished his creative work in six days [Gen. 2 : 2; Ex. 20 : 11]; that the unregenerate state of man is something propagated [John 3 : 6]; that all men actually, not virtually, sinned in Adam [Rom. 5 : 12]; that in Adam all die [1 Cor. 15 : 22]; and that Levi, while in the loins of Abraham, paid tithes to Melchisedec [Heb. 7 : 9].

2. It is not unjust that the evils caused by the fall should be incurred by a race seminally engaged in the fall; but it is not easily reconcilable with justice that the primal sin should be visited upon a race of beings who, if severally created, had no real connection with that sin.

3. The mental and moral characteristics of men as a race, as tribes, and as families, indicate propagation of souls as unequivocally as physical characteristics indicate propagation of bodies.

4. Analogy teaches that the fertilized human *ovum* contains in embryo all, whether body or soul, which develops into a full grown man.

5. Physiology is demonstrating with ever-increasing distinctness the close connection of soul and body. A man is the

synthesis of both. Because the body is indispensable to the soul's full equipment, it will be restored at the resurrection; and because the soul is the only animating principle of the body, to propagate the body alive is to propagate the vitalizing soul.

If traducianism seems to imply a materialistic division of soul, we answer that the same objection holds against the undisputed propagation of animals and vegetables. The vital principle in these is immaterial; and yet it will not be pretended that it must be specially created in the case of every beast and plant.

Propagation is so mysterious that the evident facts with regard to it ought not to be denied on the ground that they are not understood.

§ 27. *Image of God in Man.*

Different theologies find this in human personality, in original holiness, in dominion over the beasts. Neither view taken alone is satisfactory; for something of likeness to God can be found in each of the alleged particulars.

1. Fundamentally the image of God resides in personality. Accordingly, that the divine image survived the fall is taught by Gen. 5 : 1-3, as interpreted by 9 : 6, and also by James 3 : 9. Therefore—

2. The original moral excellence of man did not constitute the image of God in him. It was, however, a particular in which man was made like his Maker. The likeness was defaced, though not effaced, by the fall. A sinful person is a marred image of the Creator.

But the original innocence of man must not be mistaken for an original holiness. Holiness is positive, innocence is

negative. And while we may ascribe to the unfallen Adam positive moral excellence, holiness involves devotion to righteousness of the whole moral energy, and is a condition of fixity which, even in the faultless, only trial can bring about [John 17 : 19 ; Heb. 2 : 10 ; cf. Matt. 4 : 1].

3. Man's dominion over the beasts is a faint copy of the divine lordship [Gen. 1 : 26]. But since the ascendancy of man is due to the powers which distinguish him from mere animals, it is a product and sign of the divine image, rather than itself that very image.

§ 28. *Original Condition of Man.*

The elder theologians taught that man possessed before the fall the highest refinement and an ideal civilization. Evolutionists, on the contrary, generally insist that our race has painfully struggled upward from a state of brutal savagery. Neither view is supported by conclusive evidence.

1. The testimony of Scripture is that Adam was neither a savage nor highly civilized. The practice of husbandry, which he followed in Eden, is neither the lowest nor the highest of occupations [Gen. 2 : 15, 19, 20].

2. The earliest fossil remains indicate a development of body and of mind decidedly above the most degraded type of savages. These latter then are probably degenerate wanderers, not aborigines. But if the earliest men, as judged by their known remains, were above the lowest, they were below the highest, of the historic races.

3. The history of civilization is of the same purport. On the one hand, civilization is not indigenous, but is borrowed, at least in germ. This process may be traced back with considerable certainty to the not ignoble arts of Western Asia, the earliest known habitat of man within historic time.

On the other hand, culture is a product of cultivation. The beginnings of a civilization may be traceable to an earlier people until the earliest traditional peoples are reached ; but a high state of civilization is the elaborated product of the society in which it is found. It is not then conceivable that modern knowledge and modern arts belonged to our first parents ; while it is equally improbable that God created the primal pair but little above the brutes.

§ 29. *The Law of God.*

I. The Idea of Law.

1. Definition. Law was originally a political term, and meant a rule of conduct prescribed by authority. To modern science, law is an order of facts determined by their nature.

2. Distinctions. A true idea and correct use of the term are secured only by careful discrimination in several particulars.

(a) Law is an order of facts, not efficient force, nor a force regulative of efficient forces.

(b) Law is an existing, not merely an observed order, for order or law existed before it was observed. Nor is law, strictly speaking, the statement of an order which has become known ; the statement is one thing, the fact stated is another.

(c) Law belongs to the nature of facts, and is not imposed on them by a restraining will. Hence—

(d) Law is fixed, for to change the nature of a thing is to make it something else. The observed order may change ; but this only reveals more fully the nature of the thing observed. It is a further discovery, not a repeal, of its law. For instance, the successive modes of existence in a butterfly.

(e) Sentient beings normally exhibit a varying order ; because their bodily, mental, and volitional powers contain a structural provision for more or less choice of action.

(*f*) Sentient beings may violate law, for their organs are not perfectly co-ordinated; and each, while acting according to its own form, may either repress or strain another organ.

(*g*) It is the office of reason to recognize the proper relation of organic functions, and to preside over their exercise. The lack of structural exclusion of disorder is met, in rational beings by a provision for its voluntary exclusion; so that for reason to rule is still to secure an order of facts prescribed by the nature of the facts.

3. Inferences. The conception of law as determined by the natures of things, involves momentous results.

(*a*) To know the laws of things is to know the innermost and the utmost that can be known.

(*b*) The scientific conception of law is applicable to all spheres, for all things possess some definite nature, some essential constitution. In geometry the facts are continuous, and their law is the constant ratio between them; for example, between the angles and sides of a triangle. In mechanics and chemistry the facts may be successive, and their law is the method of the force which produces the changes observed. In organisms, or living things, a law is that order of processes, whether vital or voluntary, which the structure of the organism prescribes. Social laws are the constitutive methods of the social faculties. Statutes or positive laws, whether of divine or human government, are, if just, merely a publication of laws grounded in the nature of man at a given stage of development. Ceremonial requirements in religion represent either a transient state of pupilage which looks toward its own termination, as in the case of Levitical rites, or a permanent dependence of mind upon the suggestions of sense, as in case of the Christian institutions and ordinances. Even God is under the law of his own nature, so that whatever he does for us must

be done in harmony with law, or it is a violation both of our nature and his own. If any theological theory fails to illustrate law in the simple but searching idea of it common to all sciences, then the theory is inadequate or even false, and the nature of the case but meagerly understood.

II. The Source of Law.

1. Since law is a constituent of forces and things, its origin is in their Creator. In appointing their natures he fixed their laws.

2. But in what sense is God the source of law? May it be traced to his will, to his benevolence, or to his nature? Undoubtedly to his nature. His will is the immediate source of law, and benevolence certainly guided his will; but both will and benevolence belong to his nature, must be exercised in harmony with the entirety of his nature, and therefore the primary and determinative source of law is the perfect nature of God.

3. All laws then which God has instituted are "transcripts of the divine nature,"—moral laws, of its moral aspect; mental laws, of its intellectual aspect; physical laws, of the wisdom of God in creating physical objects fitted to his designs.

III. The Obligation of Law.

1. The moral obligation. This is found in the fact that laws are the normal mode of action. For a rational being to use his powers in harmony with their norm is to attain the true end of his existence. This is the ultimate obligation in ethics, an obligation due even from the divine Being to himself. Conversely, for a rational being to violate his norm is a crime against nature, an ultimate evil, requiring no analysis, and admitting of none.

2. The religious obligation. Since the all-perfect Being is *per se* the ultimate standard of right, the ethical obligation to normality, which our own nature prescribes, rises into the religious obligation to normality, in order that we may conform to the divine nature.

In accepting the holy nature of God as the supreme standard of right we have not rendered the antithesis between right and wrong more complete; right is not more certainly that which ought to be done, nor wrong more essentially that which ought not to be done. No right deed can be cited on the part of man or of God which is not a normal deed, or which is right for any other reason than that it is normal; no wrong can be found which is not abnormal, or which is wrong for any other reason than that it is abnormal. To question the intrinsic rightness of the normal in man would be to raise the same question against the intrinsic moral excellence of God, whose changeless normality is his holy perfection.

What we have gained in accepting the divine as the criterion of human goodness is the impressiveness of the obligation to be good. The high worth of moral excellence is felt when it is witnessed in a good man; its boundless importance is felt when it is witnessed in an infinitely holy God. It is the function of reason to know the truth of the abstract idea of right; but it is the function of moral sensibility to be stirred by the concrete exhibition of righteousness in a person.

§ 30. *Sin.*

I. Definition.

We have seen that any violation of the constitutive laws of a rational being in the view of ethics is wrong, and in the view of religion is wicked. The word *sin* belongs to the termi-

nology of religion, and the usual definition of it may be accepted: Sin is want of conformity to the law of God.

If this definition, as interpreted by the idea of law, seem inapplicable to violations of ceremonial or merely positive requirements, it should be borne in mind that these are ordained by God because they are suitable to man as they find him, and therefore to break them is *per se* sinful.

Since the law of God corresponds to the constitution of the ideal man, sin takes as many phases as there are forms of departure from that ideal. Consequently, to begin with the concrete, sin is—

1. An act of disobedience to the law [1 John 3 : 4 ; *ἀνομία*, lawlessness, iniquity, either of disposition or acts]. But an act of transgression is the fruit of a bad ruling principle; hence sin is—

2. A principle of self-willed opposition to God [John 8 : 34 ; Rom. 6 : 12–14 ; 7 *passim* ; Eph. 2 : 3]. But a controlling principle of conduct reveals a corresponding moral state; hence sin is—

3. A state of moral unlikeness to God [Matt. 15 : 18 ; Luke 6 : 44, 45 ; Rom. 7 : 14 ; Eph. 2 : 3].

II. The Essence of sin.

Various theories have been proposed, and are still current upon this subject. The more important are—

1. The essence of sin is sensuality. But—

(a) The normal indulgence of appetites is not sinful; while the abnormal, ascetic restraint of them is certainly a blunder, and of doubtful morality.

(b) Sensuality does not account for vices of the mind either in men or demons.

(c) Paul cannot be quoted in support of this theory; for,

although he uses the word "flesh" as a bold symbol for sin, he includes among its works witchcraft, hatred, etc., offences not distinctly sensual [Gal. 5.: 20].

2. The evolutionist view is that we inherit from brute progenitors not only vices of sense, but those of the mind, such as vanity, deceitfulness, malice, revenge. These propensities are regarded as immoral in man, because experience shows him that they are injurious alike to himself and to others. Evolutionism thus declares the essence, by accounting for the origin of sin. Both phases of the theory must be considered, if either.

A. As an account of the origin of sin we note that—

(a) The evolution of man from the beasts is an unproved speculation; but a divinely guided evolution it is a probable speculation.

(b) The theory can relieve the problem of the fall only by modifying the doctrine of original innocence. But if the Scriptures teach that man was originally good, they teach that the beasts, with their rudimentary vices, were also "good." And since the beasts could become human only as changed by the Creator, it is not certain that the first men would inherit any further proclivity to sin than they unquestionably possessed in desires which could be solicited to evil.

B. As a theory of the essence of sin evolutionism is open to a more serious objection that misconduct is not wrong because it is injurious, but is both injurious and wrong because it is abnormal. What is normal in a brute may be abnormal in a rational being.

3. Finiteness or limitation is said to be the essence of sin, because the Infinite alone is perfect.

(a) But it is not the privilege of the Infinite alone to be good. A finite being that spontaneously fulfills the ends for which he was created is without fault.

(b) Sins are not mere limitations, but the active expressions of a perverse nature.

(c) This is essentially the pantheistic doctrine that "evil is good in the making," that the distinction between good and bad is one of quantity rather than quality, and hence, as pantheists show a marked disposition to hold, that might makes right.

4. Selfishness is the essence of sin. This is probably the most widely accepted theory. It is, however, open to the objections:

(a) It is maintained on the ground that love is the essence of obedience, as well as a motive to it, and is subject to the criticisms which hold against resolving holiness into benevolence.

(b) Selfishness is a principle of conduct, and cannot be the essence of sin as a state.

(c) Even as a principle of conduct selfishness is not an unresolvable essence, but may be further analyzed. Selfishness is excessive self-love. The wrong element in it is its excess. But self-love is excessive only when it goes beyond the bounds set for it in the constitution of man as a being fitted for social relations

Or, since enlightened self-love would lead one to exercise his high social faculties, selfishness might be defined as a misdirected self-love, and the evil element in it would be its irrationality.

From either point of view the evil in selfishness is seen to be its want of conformity to the law, or method of conduct, prescribed by the constitution of the ideal or typical man. Hence we conclude that—

5. The essence of sin is its abnormality. It is essentially a violation of the nature which God gave to man, and of the divine nature after which man was patterned. In the case of

rational beings, capable of recognizing the relations of conduct to constitutive law, moral quality, good or bad, inheres in such relations. This we know by intuition, and therefore cannot prove. The enormity of sin is its abnormity.

§ 31. *The Fall of Man.*

God made man faultless [Gen. 1 : 31; Eccl. 7 : 29; Rom. 5 : 12]. He was spontaneously correct in all relations. Toward God his natural relation was one of reverence, submission, trust, and love; toward human beings it was one of love, respect, and helpfulness; toward inferior creatures one of kindness and authority; for himself it was the proportionate exercise of all his powers, and distaste for excess in the use of any.

Deliberate and repeated choice of right would have tended to fixity in righteousness; but, when subjected to the inevitable test, he fell.

I. The Scriptural Account of the Fall.

The account given in Gen. 3 : 1-6, whether taken literally or symbolically, is luminous and intrinsically probable. The tempter suggested that there was a conflict between the natural demands of human nature and the known inhibition of God. The lower appetites of the palate and the eye, with the higher longings of the mind [3 : 6], were incited against fidelity to the highest function of man, confiding submission to God; self-will was provoked; distrust of God followed; and sin was outwardly consummated in an act of disobedience.

II. The Problem of the Fall.

The scriptural account of the process through which man was led into sin does not make it possible to understand how a

rational and upright being could do himself the extreme violence of setting his will against the will of God. Nor does it make it plain how God could permit the fall.

(a) The ethical difficulty is that every determination of the will actually and, so far as we can see, necessarily corresponds to character. The dilemma is obvious: either the primal sin shows that Adam was sinful before the fall; or his previous innocence shows that the fall was innocent.

(b) The theological difficulty is that God foreknew what man would do. He knew that the entire human race would fall victim to the evil which he most compassionates and most abhors. The problem of the fall is insoluble.

III. Theories of the Fall.

But the insolubility of the problem has not deterred either philosophers or theologians from renewed attempts upon it. The objections to ascribing the fall to carnal appetites, to bestial inheritance, or to finiteness, were involved in the discussion of corresponding theories as to the essence of sin. It remains to notice the following proposed solutions:

1. In morals as in physics nothing is achieved except by overcoming resistance. Without actual sin, therefore, there could be no positive righteousness.

But the idea of something which ought to be avoided is the only necessary condition precedent of choice, and the forbidden fruit supplied this condition before the fall. It is true that full knowledge of either good or evil can be obtained only by experience of its opposite, so that the "tree of knowledge" stands for something ethically real. But, whatever it stands for, it cannot mean that our first parents had no knowledge at all of good or evil until they fell; for they knew that divine

commands ought to be obeyed, and to have an idea of duty is to have an idea of the right and of its opposite.

2. The Calvinistic theory that God decreed sin either efficiently or permissively.

But the moral perfections of God forbid us to believe that he actively caused sin [James 1 : 13]; while to say that he permitted it, is still to leave open the question how it was efficiently caused.

§ 32. *Penal Consequences of the Fall.*

Some theologians distinguish between the natural consequences and the penalties of the fall. They may be distinguished in idea, but are not distinct in fact.

(a) All penalties are natural consequences. The wrath of God is as natural as the reproaches of conscience; and the suffering which he inflicts is as natural a result of his wrath as any harm which the sinner does to himself.

(b) All the natural consequences of the fall are penalties. They are the sanctions which belong to law as an element in the constitution of moral beings; so that inwrought evils are as manifest agencies of the divine government as are statutory punishments.

Indeed, law appears all the more sacred, and penalty the more solemn, when we consider that sin inevitably draws a penalty upon itself from every source, and that such penalties are in no case arbitrarily imposed.

Of the penal consequences of the primal sin the following are the more important :

I. Death.

This was the penalty expressly threatened for disobedience

of the sole restraint imposed in Eden [Gen. 2 : 17]. Death as a consequence of the fall is both physical and spiritual, but pre-eminently spiritual.

1. Spiritual death is loss of harmony with God. That man was naturally mortal and death chiefly spiritual is assured by the facts :

(a) The tree of life was provided in order to secure the unfallen Adam from physical death.

(b) Christ removes the penalty of sin. In so doing he restores the soul to union with God [Rom. 5 : 17 ; 6 : 23 ; Eph. 2 : 4-6 ; Col. 1 : 21, 22], but does not prevent its severance from the body.

(c) Geology teaches that physical death long preceded the creation of man, and physiology affords no reason for supposing that the body of man was ever deathless.

2. Physical death, or separation of the soul from the body, is also a penalty of the fall.

(a) Access to the tree of life was cut off in consequence of the fall.

(b) The sting of physical death is sin ; and so far as this is removed, the penalty of physical death is removed [1 Cor. 15 : 55-57].

(c) In the end, Christ will deliver his people from physical death [1 Cor. 15 : 22]. As man is dual, so life in Christ is dual. The resurrection of the body is peculiarly associated with a vital relation to Christ [Rom. 8 : 11 ; Phil. 3 : 11, 12].

(d) If it be objected that physical death cannot be a penalty of sin, for the reason that the threatened penalty was to be suffered on the day when the forbidden fruit was eaten ; we reply—

Death is twofold. Spiritual death was suffered at once, physical death was at once made certain ; precisely as life is twofold, and the promise of Christ, " Whosoever liveth and

believeth in me shall never die" [John 11 : 26], is fulfilled at once for the spirit, but is not yet applicable to the body.

II. Native Depravity, or Original Sin.

Recalling the distinction between sin as an act, principle, and state, we may define Native Depravity as an inborn state of moral debasement, marked by an irresistible proneness to acts of sin. Because this debasement belongs to every man from the beginning of his individual existence, it is not improperly called Original Sin. It is an inherited penalty of the fall.

1. Extent of Depravity.

Is native depravity partial, or is it total? The doctrine of Total Depravity is often understood to be that there is only wickedness in man. It has even been argued that he is continually as wicked as possible. But such opinions defy the common conscience, and the doctrine which they misrepresent shares their disrepute. It is not true that the motives and acts of the unregenerate are entirely wrong. Possibly no act or motive is utterly wrong. Conscience approves in oneself, and the noblest sentiment of mankind unstintedly lauds many of the acts and, so far as they appear, the motives of men whom no one regards as regenerate. We must not conclude that the common conscience is in error, or that God entirely condemns what men thus unite to honor and love.

At the same time, a defensible meaning can be found for the conventional title, Total Depravity; to wit,—

(*a*) No unconverted man loves God supremely, and his motives are always wrong by defect. But he loves his own

way supremely, and when the law of God demands the surrender of his will, he finds his will perverse [Rom. 7 : 7-24].

(b) All his powers are disordered by sin. This is so familiarly true of the appetites that "the flesh" in scriptural and in popular language is used concretely for sin. The "understanding also is darkened," men are "alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them" [Eph. 4 : 18], "the things of the Spirit of God . . . are foolishness unto them" [1 Cor. 2 : 14]; and the judgment against them is that they even "loved the darkness rather than the light" [John 3 : 19].

2. Theories of Native Depravity.

Sharp conflict of opinion has long prevailed over this theme. The following views require notice:

A. The Pelagian, that the posterity of Adam are born as he was created, neither good nor bad, that they severally determine their own moral state, and receive from the fall of Adam no other injury than the influence of an evil example.

But this theory is openly opposed to the teaching of Scripture that we are "by nature," that is by birth, "the children of wrath" [Eph. 2 : 3; cf. Rom. 5 : 12, 19].

B. Semi-pelagian, Arminian, and New School theologians agree that men inherit a bias toward sin, but deny that Adam's sin is imputed, that depravity is a penalty of the fall, or that it is reckoned as sin until the will yields to the propensity sinward.

To the Semi-pelagian, depravity is a sickness, not a sinfulness. To the Arminian, it is a sinful vitiosity and disables man from turning to righteousness; but, on the other hand, it is not punishable, and the disability it causes is corrected through the atonement by the restoration of the Holy

Spirit to all men. To the New School theologian, the vitiosity is sinful, because it leads to sin, but is not itself sin, for sin is a voluntary violation of a known law.

Against these kindred views it must be urged that—

(a) An inborn state which turns our wills against God is itself a state of sin.

(b) Our consciences condemn what we are, as well as what we do. We repent, not indeed of Adam's sin, but of the moral condition into which it brought us.

(c) That condition is not only a penal consequence of the fall, but itself offensive to God—a penalty all the more grievous because itself punishable. The mischiefs wrought by sin increase by multiplication into themselves.

C. The Federalist theory that a covenant of works was formed with Adam, according to which he was appointed federal head of the race, and the race was granted a probation in him. The covenant stipulated that, if Adam continued in obedience, the race should be maintained in righteousness; whereas, if he fell, his sin should be imputed immediately to his posterity, and as a consequence they should be born depraved. Sufficient objections to this view are:

(a) It involves the creationist theory concerning the origin of souls.

(b) The Scriptures say nothing of such a covenant.

(c) They do not reveal so violent and entirely arbitrary an arrangement as that God by sheer exercise of sovereignty imputes to Adam's posterity an act in which, as the theory insists, they had no share.

(d) Nor do the Scriptures warrant the harsh idea that we are condemned to depravity in consequence of the imputation by legal fiction of another's sin. The texts quoted for the federalist view more readily suggest another:

D. The theory of Natural Headship in Adam. All human

nature was in our first parents when they fell, and was subsequently propagated in the state to which they had brought it. This view involves the traducianist theory as to the origin of souls. That native depravity is a consequence of the natural headship of Adam is supported by—

(a) The Scriptures. It was in consequence of the germinal inclusion of the race in its natural head that Paul could say, in Rom. 5 : 12, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," adding at once the explanatory statement, "And so death passed upon all men because [ἐψ' ᾧ] all sinned" [aorist, ἡμαρτον]; could in ver. 19 repeat the explanation, "By one man's disobedience the many were made [κατεστάθησαν=constituted, not reckoned] sinners"; and in 1 Cor. 15 : 22 could curtly trace the all-inclusive penalty of sin to the first man, "In Adam all die" [cf. Ps. 51 : 5].

(b) Historical evidence. The universality of sin as distinctly testifies that depravity is inborn, and, if inborn, inherited, as it is possible for experience to testify to any native and hereditary peculiarities of mankind.

III. Loss of Moral Freedom.

Man possesses formal freedom, because he prefers the course which he follows; but he has lost real freedom, because the preference for sin is a bondage which he cannot break. Some inquiry as to the nature of the will and of its freedom is necessary, in order to show the correctness and the importance of this distinction.

1. Theories of Will and Freedom.

(1) The Will is that faculty of conscious self-determination which belongs to every rational being.

(2) Concerning Freedom of the Will two views only require examination.

A. Self-determination is a function of the will itself; that is, the will is able to decide between rival motives, uncontrolled either by external restraints or by personal preferences. This is the so-called "power of contrary choice."

Sufficient objections to this view are:

(a) Since the will is the *ego's* power of self-determination, self-determination belongs to the *ego*, not to the will. In other words, volitions are not self-determined, but are self-determinations.

(b) Volition executes choice; choice is net preference; preference invariably conforms to character. A volition not determined by character is without example, is inconceivable, and would be irresponsible.

These objections suggest the alternative view:

B. Freedom of the will is self-direction, or freedom of the mind in willing, and consists in the very fact that a being can will. To will unfreely would be not to will at all.

That freedom inheres in the capacity of conscious self-determination is apparent from the process of forming volitions. The idea of ends may be forced upon the mind through the senses; but it furnishes only the occasion, not the cause of motives. Motives are the conflicting desires or repulsions which arise within the mind upon the contemplation of ends among which to choose. Choice is predominance of a single or a complex motive; that is, choice is net preference. Volition is decision to act for the chosen end.

Now in every step of this process after the first—the rise of the idea of ends—the mind is self-moved. To have motives is for the mind itself to desire or dislike various ends. To make choice is for the mind itself to prefer on whatever account one end rather than any alternative end. To form a volition is for

the mind to purpose the attainment of what it chooses. At each step of the process it is the mind itself that acts, and it acts from itself. **Man** is a first cause in willing.

2. Objections.

A. On the part of Necessitarianism.

It is urged that to ascribe to man self-determination, or primary causation, is to violate both the necessary conviction that every event must have a cause, and the induction of physics that energy is never created, but only transmuted. It may be replied :

(a) Inasmuch as the only real cause is a first cause, the causal judgment fully stated is, Every event must have a first cause. To hold that the mind is self-moved in willing is not merely in harmony with the causal judgment, but it indicates the very experience through which an idea of causation becomes possible.

(b) Mechanical laws are not applicable alike to the material and the immaterial. We have already noticed that the law now under consideration, that of the convertibility of energy, is inapplicable to the mental sphere; in other words, physical motion is not interchangeable with states of consciousness. The case should be restated from the present point of view.

(aa) Physical energy through all its transmutations is theoretically, and to some extent practically, measurable in foot-pounds; but no state of consciousness can even imaginably be reduced to foot-pounds, or otherwise expressed in terms of physics. Thoughts are not so many linear feet deep, or square feet in surface; feelings are not literally so many pounds strong, or liquid measures full.

(bb) Changes in states of consciousness may accompany

physical changes, but co-ordination is not convertibility. Thus, when impact upon the body is attended by an idea or emotion, the entire energy applied to the body is taken up in producing physical results; none of it is abstracted and converted into an idea or emotion. The body reacts upon the impinging agent, and transmits an impulse to the objects which form its own support; but the idea or emotion does not in strictness react upon the body, and is not transmitted to any object behind itself.

(*ce*) Conversely, the will may release energy stored in the nerves and muscles, but it does not add to the energy so obtained.

(*dd*) If the volition were caused by the impact, if physical energy were converted through perception into volition, through volition into action, then the circuit up the afferent nerves and down the efferent nerves would always be a closed circuit, and the impact would invariably be followed by a proportionate release of muscular energy; but it is admitted that the will may or may not cause a responsive movement.

In other words, the mind, in being subjected to impressions, is a *terminus ad quem*; in forming volitions it is a *terminus a quo*.

B. On the part of Libertarianism.

Against the position that choice always corresponds to character it is argued :

(*a*) Adam must have had power of contrary choice before the fall, because he then decided contrary to the whole bent of his nature.

(*b*) Fallen men retain power of contrary choice within certain limits. The will, considered as the general movement of the soul, cannot be changed by us; but the will, as faculty of single volitions, has power of contrary choice in indifferent

matters, and even in moral concerns is sufficiently free to modify character.

(c) The will can control motives by directing attention to one rather than to another motive.

(d) Consciousness distinctly testifies that we can decide either for or against any given motive, however strong.

In reply, we note :

(aa) The theory of the will must describe the conative powers of man as he now is, not as he was in a state from which he has lapsed, and which is confessedly inexplicable. An account of the will which accounted for the fall would undo the fall, and thus would prove its own undoing.

(bb) However indifferent an action may seem to be, it remains for one voluntary act to be pointed out which in no way corresponds to what the agent was when he decided upon it. On any theory, acts which express character intensify the characteristics they express.

(cc) In holding the attention to one motive rather than another, the will must be acting under the influence of some motive, and be exhibiting a marked difference between man and man.

(dd) The mind is not conscious that it is free to like what it dislikes ; it is conscious that it can have a preference. Its consciousness that it can decide for or against any given motive is found, when attentively considered, to be a consciousness that it could so decide if it had sufficient motive for so deciding ; that is, it knows it can effectually resist any given motive, providing it prefers to. Anything else would be a consciousness that it can now prefer what it cannot now prefer,—for likings and dislikings are not at our command.

This review of theories leads to the following—

3. Conclusions.

A. The ego is self-determined, and *ipso facto* free. It can form, and knows it can form, a preference.

B. All free self-determinations or volitions are conditioned by the capabilities of the self, and, in moral quality, represent the moral state of the self. This is the reign of determinism, or inherent necessity.

C. Necessity and freedom coincide in the fact that volitions correspond to character. Necessity is seen herein, that a moral being *must*, freedom herein, that he *may*, will conformably to what he is. No stricter necessity can be conceived than that a man's volitions are determined by his character; and yet no larger liberty can be imagined than that a man can have choices distinctively his own.

D. As to formal freedom we now see that, if a moral being is depraved, right volitions are impeded by wrong desires, and wrong volitions are opposed by conscience, by reason, indeed by the very constitution which he would violate. In this case he is still formally free, since his volition follows his actual preference; but he is not really free, because some aroused faculty ever resists his choice.

E. As to real freedom we may feel assured that, in the state of innocence lost, or of holiness to be attained, all desires are normal and all functions harmoniously fulfilled. This is real freedom, not merely because it is morally good, but because moral goodness involves exemption from restraint, and full co-operation of all one's powers toward a preferred end. The "law of liberty" is spontaneous obedience to law. [James 1 : 25 ; 1 Cor. 9 : 21].

IV. Derangement of Conscience.

In depraving the affections the fall has impaired the function of moral self-judgment. Every step in the process is disordered.

The following steps are recognizable: Intuition that there is a difference between right and wrong; moral standards furnished by the normal requirements of our own constitution, by the sacred Scriptures, by social convention, by the instructions of parents or of priests; judgment, or comparison of moral states, desires or acts with the accepted standard; a feeling of duty, or sense of obligation to take the course, whether of action or inaction, which the judgment has pronounced to be the right course; and, subsequent to conduct, a verdict that we have observed, or have violated the recognized standard, together with a correspondent feeling of complacency or compunction.

Theology is not concerned with deciding whether the name conscience should be given to this entire congeries of faculties and functions, according to popular usage, or is more strictly applied to the faculty of moral self-judgment and feeling of duty; we are here concerned to observe that—

The fall, and the sins which the fall has entailed, have disordered every element in the case. The intuition that right and wrong are contraries cannot be annulled, but it may be obscured; the standard accepted is often vitiated; the judgment is generally confused, the feeling of obligation more or less dulled, and compunction for evil correspondingly enfeebled.

§ 33. *Inability and Responsibility.*

If man is born without ability to obey God, is he responsible for disobedience?

New School theologians answer that responsibility is no greater than ability; but that man is responsible because, although morally unable, he is naturally able to obey. Old School theologians answer that responsibility is greater than ability, because our inability is due to the sin which the entire

race committed in Adam as either its federal or natural head.

The issue can be more readily decided after some further consideration of the terms inability and responsibility.

I. Inability.

The doctrine of the New School, or New England theology, rests on the proposed distinction between natural and moral ability. By natural ability is meant the ability to obey God if one chooses; moral inability is the inability to choose. But the weakness of this position is that—

1. The converse is equally true: a man cannot obey without choosing to obey. If then he cannot choose to obey, his hypothetical natural ability is actually natural inability.

2. This theory mistakes ability to choose some alternative, that is, to form a preference, for ability to choose or prefer either of opposite alternatives. Inborn likes and dislikes but make the choice more decided. The New School vindication of responsibility is therefore inadequate.

The Old School view finds support in the nature of—

II. Responsibility.

The usual defense of the Old School position, namely, that the race is responsible for the issue of its probation in Adam, is a sound defense; but the ethical element is so prominent in the case as it stands that it is more satisfactory to take it as it stands. From this point of view we may argue that men are responsible for the sinfulness from which they cannot free themselves, on the grounds that—

1. Men actually choose evil. If they are so wicked that they cannot help so to choose, this does not neutralize the wickedness of such a choice.

2. Men are responsible for wrong choices precisely because these choices represent their characters. "Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree corrupt, and its fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by its fruit" [Matt. 12 : 33]. If human nature is helplessly evil, its condition is not only the more pitiable, but morally the worse.

3. If the fact that the propensity to sin cannot be entirely checked destroys responsibility for sin, then the fact that God cannot escape his preference for good destroys the merit of goodness so exalted [James 1 : 13, 17].

4. If law were but precept and all penalty were imposed, if right and wrong were merely what the divine will exacts or forbids, then we might well ask whether it is not arbitrary to lay an impracticable law upon men born depraved, and to punish them for sin which they cannot avoid. But if law is in the nature of being, and if penalty is the natural consequence of violating law, then responsibility must be interpreted from the point of view which these facts supply. We notice, therefore, that—

5. While responsibility or answerability literally means liability to be called to account and punished, it is really a figurative term, and that which it stands for is, in the last analysis, the fact that consequences are inseparable from character and conduct. An evil nature entails misery both by force of its abnormal, self-injurious activities, and through the repugnance which it cannot but awaken in moral beings, above all in a holy God. Responsibility then resides in the nature of the case, and cannot be lifted from the race, so long as the race is depraved [Ps. 51 : 5; Eph. 2 : 3].

6. To say that it is not right for consequences so immeasurably evil to follow the fall of the first pair, is to forget that right is conformity to the natures of the things concerned. It is precisely because law belongs to our nature,

that penalty is provided for in the same way. If then it is unnatural and wrong to sin, it is natural and right to be punished.

7. But if the question is asked, why God allowed the race to be propagated after it fell, no answer can be given until one is found for the question why he created our first parents, foreknowing that they would fall. The problem of human responsibility thus merges into the insoluble moral enigma of the existence of evil, and the solemn but faith-inviting mystery of the decrees of a personal and righteous God.

§ 34. *The Salvation of Infants.*

If infants share a depravity which necessarily leads to acts of sin, are dying infants saved? The Scripture does not state that they are saved, but it justifies such an inference.

1. It recognizes the inability of children to distinguish between right and wrong, and permits us to believe that this places them under the favorable judgment of God [Deut. 1 : 39 ; Jonah 4 : 11 ; Rom. 9 : 11].

2. Our Saviour warned his followers that, unless they became as little children, they should not enter into the kingdom of heaven [Matt. 18 : 3], and on another occasion blessed the little children, saying, "of such is the kingdom of heaven" [Matt. 19 : 14]. He did not say "of these is the kingdom of heaven," but "of such" as these. In both instances he referred primarily to the necessity of attaining the childlike virtues of love, trust, and docility. But it is not easy to believe that he could take the children in his arms, bless them, and promise heaven to those that become like them, if he had known that dying infants go to perdition.

3. The parallel in Rom. 5 : 12-21 between the effects of Adam's sin and of Christ's obedience ; especially the intimation

in ver. 14, that as Adam brought death upon some who did not sin as he had sinned, so Christ, in conferring benefits, would be found the antitype of Adam; and the distinct statement of ver. 20, that "where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly," warrant the conviction that any harm which Adam did to those who do not themselves choose the ways of sin is a harm for which Christ has provided a remedy.

4. As a view of Jesus at death entirely transforms into his likeness those that already love him [1 John 3 : 2], so the Holy Spirit may change the heart of a child as he goes hence by a vision of him who won the trust of children while upon the earth.

PART IV.

SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 35. *Preparation for the Coming of Christ.*

Our Saviour came in the fullness of time [Gal. 4 : 4].

I. Preparation to accept the Gospel.

1. Judaism.

(a) The Hebrew people had acquired and were propagating faith in the unity and the perfections of God.

(b) The Law had taught how strict and how hopeless were the requirements of God. A soulless legalism would have remained as its shrivelled fruit, had not help come.

The strongly symbolical character of the Levitical institutions was already degrading even legalism into formalism, until only fulfillment of types by the Antitype could lift the Jews out of an half-conscious hypocrisy or a quite conscious disobedience.

(c) Prophecy pointed to this period, and gave rise among many beside Jews to an intent expectation of the Messiah.

2. Heathenism.

(a) As a religion, heathenism had lost its power to encourage virtue, and had sunk into a vicious superstition, rejected by the wise. At an earlier period heathen religions were local and the national gods were tenaciously adhered to as a point of patriotic duty and pride; but even the popular regard for them had now become weakened by the intermingling of peoples and customs.

(b) As a philosophy, heathenism had passed its creative period without giving any clear assurance as to God, virtue, or immortality; was now expending its strength in wild conjectures or in vain disputes, and giving over the greater part of its disciples to pride, to luxury, or to despair.

II. Provisions to extend the Gospel.

1. The Roman Empire was in its early prime, and the world was at peace. Attention could now be given to the religion of peace, and security was afforded for the journeys of its messengers.

2. The Greek language had been despoiled of its purity by the Macedonian ascendancy, by Egyptian and Oriental use, and especially, for the writers of the New Testament, by the inroad of Hebraisms; but these very changes rendered it a better vehicle of Christian ideas, while its wide diffusion assured to the gospel an adequate medium for publication.

3. As usual upon the introduction of new and needed truth, existing beliefs and institutions antagonized Christianity. The very advantages with which it began its work speedily turned into formidable obstacles. Yet, in so doing, they but afforded a higher service. Jewish bigotry hastened the spread of the Good News among the Gentiles; the contempt of philosophers stimulated the development of Christian evidences, and by necessity of doctrine; Roman tyranny, while demonstrating the vitality of the new faith, purged and compacted the church.

§ 36. *Humanity of Christ.*

All who saw Christ knew that he was a man.

(a) He possessed and exercised both the bodily and spiritual faculties of a man.

(b) He ran a man's career. He was born of a woman, grew as a child [Luke 2 : 52], and died as men die.

(c) That all this was not illusion is assured by his calling himself both "man" [John 8 : 40], and "Son of man" [Matt. 8 : 20].

But Christ was so superior to other men as to suggest some mysterious difference from them. Although the ideal man is a miniature image of God, yet when that unique image appeared in Christ, it could not but raise the question now to be considered, whether he was no more than a man.

§ 37. *Divinity of Christ.*

I. Method of Inquiry.

1. Textual method. Belief in the divinity of our Lord underlies the entire New Testament representation of him. Numerous texts, when interpreted without prejudice, declare some special aspect of his divinity. Yet reliance upon proof-texts alone is open to the objection that each one of them can be made to mean something else than the deity, or proper divinity, of Christ.

2. Historical method. But we may adopt the method by which the followers of Christ in his own and every subsequent age have reached their persuasion that he is very God. It is the method of becoming acquainted with him, the critico-historical method upon which all recent portrayals of his career and estimates of his character have been formed. It is not limited to citation of passages that offer direct evidence to his proper divinity. It studies every hint which will help to place us among his immediate followers, and open our minds to the impressions they received.

(a) Its results. An idea concerning Christ formed in this way will not be wavering and vague. While romancers are fated to rob their heroes of reality in proportion as they exalt them, and while laudation of historical characters provokes doubt, the perfections of Jesus give us a clear conception of him, and make his image as substantial as it is unique. But as our conception of his personality grows clear and firm, insight into his nature deepens, and his divinity is revealed before our eyes.

(b) Its facility. It is not a hard method to apply. Any attentive reader may share the daily wonderment of the disciples, their efforts at insight, their consultations, and sometimes rapidly crystallizing convictions, as they saw the proofs that their leader could not be less than the church since that day has steadily held him to be.

This advantage is fully experienced only upon detailed study of the Master's life. The most that can here be attempted is to classify the more important data which such a method of study brings to view.

II. Evidence for the Divinity of Christ.

(I) Mary knew that Jesus was divine.

She knew that God was his father; she was aware of the marvels that attended his birth; had learned from his own lips, when he was a lad of twelve, that he was himself conscious of an unique relation to God; "kept all these sayings in her heart" [Luke 2: 51], and was ready, when he attended the wedding at Cana, for some extraordinary occurrence.

Yet her officiousness both then [John 2: 3, 4] and later [Matt. 12: 46-50] shows that, having grown familiar with Jesus in ordinary relations, and not yet knowing how his

divinity bore upon his mission, she did not appreciate his divinity as a fact. Possibly this explains why Mary's knowledge seems not to have been for any one of his disciples the basis of belief in Christ. Although at a later date felt to be of the deepest importance, it is doubtful whether her testimony to the miraculous conception would at first have been accepted.

(II) The Disciples became satisfied of his divinity :

1. From what they witnessed in him :

(a) The impressiveness of his personality was felt by his immediate followers from the beginning, and drew them after him at his call.

(b) His original knowledge of God, with the boldness and evident truth of his teaching, astonished even chance hearers [Matt. 7 : 28, 29] ; while his own claim but gave form to the conviction that he had such knowledge as only the Son of God could possess [Matt. 11 : 27 ; John 6 : 46 ; 7 : 15, 16 ; 9 : 5 ; 16 : 30]. The Master showed habitually an understanding of man too complete to be regarded as merely human [Matt. 9 : 4 ; John 2 : 24, 25 ; 6 : 64], and which became especially impressive when it was exercised upon the disciples themselves. Witness the cases of Nathanael and Peter [John 1 : 48, 49 ; 21 : 17].

(c) His power to work miracles, although used under the Father's direction [John 5 : 19, 30 ; 6 : 38 ; 10 : 18]. was inherent, not derived [Luke 6 : 19 ; 8 : 46 ; John 10 : 18 ; 11 : 22, cf. 25]. Some who did not recognize this fact were led by his miracles to wonder at him [Mark 4 : 41 ; 6 : 2], others to acknowledge that he was a prophet [John 2 : 23 ; 3 : 2], and his disciples at length to worship him as the Son of God. Compare

the effects on their minds of the first and second stillings of the tempest [Matt. 8 : 27; 14 : 33].

(d) The sinlessness of Jesus, which he challenged men to deny [John 8 : 29, 46; 14 : 30; cf. Matt. 27 : 4; 2 Cor. 5 : 21], was never before seen in man, won even from demons the title "the Holy One of God" [Luke 4 : 34], from his disciples that of "the Holy One and the Just" [Acts 3 : 14; cf. 2 : 27; 7 : 52], and must have deepened profoundly the conviction that he was more than man.

(e) Three of his disciples witnessed his divine glories at his transfiguration, and were charged by a voice from heaven to listen to him as the beloved Son of God [Matt. 17 : 1-5; cf. John 1 : 14; 2 Peter 1 : 16-18].

(f) The superhuman dignity as well as extremity of his sufferings deeply impressed the centurion and the soldiers [Matt. 27 : 54], and made it easy for believers afterward to glory in the cross.

(g) The resurrection was the supreme attestation of his divinity [Rom. 1 : 4]. His followers so accepted it, and worshipped him [Matt. 28 : 9, 17; Luke 24 : 52]. Thomas, when satisfied that Jesus had really risen, hailed him as Lord and God [John 20 : 28]. See Alford's Greek Testament, *in loco*, for a thorough refutation of the attempts to belittle this confession].

The ascension visibly completed the process of the resurrection, and was regarded as an enthronement of Jesus [Acts 2 : 33, 34].

2. What Jesus from time to time asserted concerning himself strengthened and justified the impression made by his character and acts. He claimed—

(a) The divine attributes of eternity,—and in the words, "Before Abraham was I am," he assumed the divine title re-

vealed unto Moses [John 8 : 58; cf. Exod. 3 : 14; John 1 : 1; 17 : 5], of omnipotence [Matt. 28 : 18; John 5 : 21; 10 : 28]; of omnipresence [Matt. 28 : 20];

(b) The divine prerogatives of lordship over the Sabbath [Mark 2 : 28], of forgiving sin [Matt. 9 : 6; Luke 7 : 48, cf. Ps. 130 : 4], of answering prayer [John 14 : 13, 14], of sending forth the Holy Spirit [Luke 24 : 49; John 15 : 26; 16 : 7];

(c) Oneness with God not reducible to mere agreement of purpose [John 10 : 30; 14 : 9; 16 : 15; 17 : 10];

(d) Unique relation to his followers. In his own person Christ was Christianity, its means of access to God, its doctrine, its vitalizing energy [John 14 : 6, cf. 6 : 35; 10 : 7; 11 : 25].

(III.) Evidence to the Apostolic Church.

1. The Holy Spirit testifies that Christ is divine. It was his special office to do this [John 15 : 26; 16 : 14]; and this office he accomplished—

(a) By his miraculous gifts, an attestation which Christ had promised [John 14 : 12; Acts 2 : 33; 3 : 16; Heb. 2 : 4];

(b) By imparting life in Christ, and thus witnessing at once to the divinity of Jesus and the sonship of believers [1 Cor. 12 : 3; 1 John 4 : 2; 5 : 9–11, cf. John 16 : 14, 15; Rom. 8 : 16, 17].

2. The Offices of Christ evidently involved divinity.

(a) This was felt to be the case with his redemptive offices. Thus, his service as a ransom [Matt. 20 : 28; 1 Tim. 2 : 6], the sufficiency of his sacrifice [Heb. 7 : 25–28; 9 : 13, 14], and the efficacy of his intercession [Rom. 8 : 34; Heb. 7 : 25], alike imply his divinity.

(b) It was clear that his more general relations as creator [John 1 : 3; Col. 1 : 16; Heb. 1 : 2], sustainer [John 1 : 4; Col. 1 : 17; Heb. 1 : 3], ruler [Matt. 28 : 18; 1 Cor. 15 : 24,

25], judge [Matt. 25 : 31-46; John 5 : 22; Acts 10 : 42; 2 Cor. 5 : 10], by whatever means they become known, must be regarded as prerogatives of Deity.

3. Now the Old Testament yielded its hidden meanings, and was constantly appealed to in support of the claims of Christ.

(a) The "Angel of the Covenant" was referred to by the Pentateuch in a way which must have perplexed the monotheistic Jews, now as a messenger of Jehovah, now as Jehovah himself [Gen. 16 : 7, 13; 18 : 1-3, 13, 14, 17, 20; Ex. 3 : 2-6, 14; 13 : 21, cf. 14 : 19; Josh. 5 : 13-15; Isa. 63 : 9-14]. Both Malachi [3 : 1] and Paul [1 Cor. 10 : 4, 9] identify him with the Messiah.

(b) Certain of the messianic psalms exalt Christ as divine [Ps. 2, 110]. Passages in Isaiah [9-11], Micah [5 : 1-5], and Daniel [7 : 9-14] are quoted by the New Testament for the divinity of our Lord.

Having received so varied and progressive evidence that their Master was divine, it was quite naturally and significantly that they applied to him the titles of Deity, such as God (John 1 : 1; 20 : 28; Rom. 9 : 5; Titus 2 : 13; Heb. 1 : 8; 1 John 5 : 20), Lord, the Septuagint equivalent for Jehovah [Mark 1 : 2, 3, cf. Mal. 3 : 1 and Isa. 40 : 3; John 12 : 38, 41, cf. Isa. 53 : 1; Rom. 10 : 13, cf. Joel 2 : 32; Rom. 14 : 11, cf. Isa. 45 : 23; Heb. 1 : 10, cf. Ps. 102 : 25], Son of God [Matt. 16 : 16; Luke 1 : 32, 35; Acts 9 : 20, the Gospel and First Epistle of John with the epistles of Paul *passim*], Alpha and Omega [Rev. 1 : 8, 11, 17; 21 : 6]. Such titles, used unhesitatingly by those upon whom the personality of the man Christ Jesus had made its impression, cannot be refined into emptiness, but were quite as unmistakably meant, when used by them as when used by us, to exalt him as divine.

(IV.) Evidence to the Post-apostolic Church.

1. In all ages the church has received from Christ those redemptive offices which assured the apostolic church of his divinity.

2. In all ages it has felt bound to render him a faith, love, and obedience which may lawfully be yielded to God alone. Unmistakably the Christian consciousness has always deified Christ, and has been persuaded that in honoring the Son, it honored also the Father who sent him [John 5 : 23].

This persuasion, renewed in every generation, the church passes on to successive generations, constantly re-inforced by its experience, and embodied in its confessions, preaching, and hymns.

(V.) The "Christ of History" is divine.

Assurance of the divinity of Christ, which grew up and has been justified in the ways above described, is confirmed by the fact that, from beginnings so obscure and with a life so brief, Christ could introduce and largely control a new era in the history of mankind. It is unhistorical and even irrational to ascribe to delusion the benefits which Christendom has enjoyed, and now sees steadily increase, in proportion as our Lord is acknowledged and obeyed.

III. Theories concerning the Nature of Christ.

The more important theories concerning our Lord will be noticed in connection with that phase of Christology to which they specially pertain. Heretical doctrines as to his nature are—

1. Docetism, which denied the humanity of Christ, and

asserted that his body was only a phantom. The First Epistle of John indicates that this opinion was attracting notice even in his day [1 John 1 : 1-3 ; 4 : 2, 3 ; 5 : 6, 20]. The decision at Nicea in favor of the proper divinity of our Lord so emphasized this side of his nature as practically to disparage his humanity ; and with such effect that even Anselm could take the essentially docetic position that our Lord did not really increase in wisdom, but only seemed to.

2. Humanitarianism, the doctrine that Christ was in nature exclusively human, although exceptionally endowed with divine influence. This view was held under various forms by the early Jewish-Christian sects of Ebionites and Nazarines, by the Socinians of the Reformation period, and is adopted by most modern Unitarians,—although Unitarianism as such denies only the Trinity, not necessarily the divinity of Christ.

3. Subordinationism, the doctrine that Christ was more than man but less than God. This doctrine has taken the following forms :

(a) The doctrine of Origen, that the Son was eternally generated from the substance of the Father, hence was dependent and subordinate ;

(b) Arianism, the doctrine that the Son was created out of nothing, and was of different substance from the Father ; that he was subordinate to the Father, but above all creatures ; divine, but not Deity ;

(c) Semi-Arianism, that the Son, although created out of nothing, was of like substance with the Father.

§ 38. *Relations of the Two Natures in Christ.*

No theme has been more fruitful of over-bold dogmatizing, both heretical and orthodox. This is the result of an *a priori* method. Accepting the true humanity and divinity of Christ, theologians have inferred the relations of his natures. But the

divinity of our Lord, on the one hand, is too large a matter to be handled *a priori*; while, on the other hand, although the human nature of Jesus was subject to well known, and to-day more considered laws, little account of these has been made in framing the familiar doctrines upon this topic. If we strictly apply the inductive method, if we make our appeal to facts, and interpret these by the accepted canon that an event is not to be regarded as miraculous unless expressly declared or unmistakably implied to be such, then the venerable dogmas of the church, as well as the theories of heretics, will be found more or less at fault, and a tentative modification of the current view will be suggested.

1. Apollinaris undertook to reconcile the differences between Arians and Athanasians as to the divinity of Christ by compromising about the relation of his natures. To the Arians he would concede that the Logos took the place in Jesus of a rational human spirit; and with the Athanasians he would hold that the Logos was very God. The theory had the merit of simplicity, and has been repeatedly revived. It involved a trichotomous view of human nature, and was open to the objections:

(a) It provided for an incarnation, but not for an assumption of our nature. This objection is curiously reinforced by—

(b) The known laws of propagation. Apollinarism could be true only on the supposition that the rational element in men is derived solely from fathers, and the animal element exclusively from mothers. But children owe as much of the higher as of the lower elements of their natures to mothers, and as much of the lower as of the higher to fathers.

2. Nestorianism, arising in the proposal to call Mary the

Mother of Christ instead of the Mother of God, was probably at first not very different from the opinion still frequently heard, that the two natures of Christ were so far independent as that it was now the divine and now the human that spoke or acted; but the orthodox saw, and the Nestorians presently admitted, that this virtually made Christ to consist of two persons. The objections are obvious:

(a) Christ was visibly as compact, single-minded, and totally engaged a being in all he did as is any being of one personality.

(b) Physiology raises the objection that one brain can serve for but one person.

3. The heat of the Nestorian controversy hastened the development of a theory already proposed in germ by Cyril of Alexandria, to wit, the theory of Eutyches, or monophysitism, that Christ had but one nature, the human being at once absorbed by the divine.

This proposal went so far toward docetism as to find the facts in the career of our Lord arrayed against it, and quickly to incur the reproach of heresy. But some of the early Lutherans approached nearly to this point in advocating consubstantiation as a theory of the Eucharist.

4. The council of Chalcedon in 451 decreed that the one person of Christ was formed by the union of two complete and distinct natures, the divine and the human,—the doctrine of diophysitism. The council held 680–1 in Constantinople added that each nature in Christ had its distinct will, the human will being held in constant subjection to the divine,—the doctrine of diothelitism. The decision of Constantinople is but the logical completion of that formulated at Chalcedon; and the Chalcedonian decree, thus rounded out, is still regarded as

orthodox. But the unflinching exegetical and historical methods of our day have re-opened the problem, and grave objections are felt to accepting the elaborate formula of Chalcedon and Constantinople.

(a) To modern psychology, will is the core of personality; consequently, to affirm two wills while denying two persons is to sink the deductive exposition of Christ's nature into a contradiction in terms.

(b) Evidence that each nature in Christ was perfect and entire is abundant and conclusive; but to conceive each as distinct from the other is to ascribe to Christ two souls.

(c) In addition then to the first objection, modern physiology protests that one human body can serve but one soul; and no insufficiency or extra sufficiency peculiar to our Lord's physical organism is hinted in the New Testament.

5. A realistic modification of the Chalcedonian doctrine is that, while Christ possessed two complete and also distinct natures, his human nature was generic and impersonal, so that he had but one will. This theory emphasizes the distinction between nature and person.

The main difficulty connected with such a theory is psychological; namely, that, convenient as it may sometimes be to distinguish in thought between nature and person, they are never separated in point of fact. Indeed, it is perhaps as unthinkable that a complete human nature should exist without a human personality, as that a human personality should exist apart from a human nature. For how can that human nature be complete which lacks the personal faculties of intellect, sensibility, and will, or either of these? To affirm, then, a generic human nature so contrary to all that we know about human nature is tantamount to denying that Christ was in reality a man.

6. An overstrained theory of Kenosis ; namely, that the Logos surrendered at the incarnation either (according to Thomasius) his relative attributes, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, or (according to Gess) all attributes of divinity, including the moral ; and that the Logos, thus depotentiated and become essentially human, was united to a human soul, as Thomasius held, or, as Gess taught, took the place of a human soul in a human body which he derived from Mary.

(A) In the form which this theory received from Thomasius, it is open to the objections, that—

(a) While the New Testament represents the Logos as accepting limitations upon the exercise of his powers, it shows with equal distinctness that they existed and were employed upon occasion under direction of the Father.

(b) The humanizing of the Logos would lodge two finite souls in one body, and all the objections from the data of the Gospels and from the evidently applicable laws of psychophysics, as heretofore noticed, apply at this point.

(B) In the form which Gess gave to the theory it is open to the special objections, that—

(a) While we cannot know *a priori* that a suspension of infinite powers, including the moral, is impossible, the presumption is that to lay them aside, or put them to sleep, would be equivalent to surrendering the divinity of the essence in which these attributes inhere.

(b) This theory allows no place to the immaterial element in Jesus which mothers bestow, and the New Testament gives no intimation that it was suppressed by miracle.

(c) In consequence of this defect, the theory does not provide for such an union of the Logos with our nature as the atonement requires.

7. Theory of progressive incarnation, of which Dorner is

to Americans the best known representative. Based on the assumptions that the Logos can neither be depotentiated nor grow in power, and that his cosmic offices were uninterrupted by the incarnation, this theory teaches that at the miraculous conception the Logos was hypostatically united to a human nature; that as the human in Jesus developed, the Logos imparted himself more and more in the same proportion; and that at the resurrection the human threw off all imitations and the union with the Logos became complete.

(a) The ingenuity of this theory, especially its careful adaptation to supposed *a priori* demands of the divine, is too marked not to expose it to suspicion of being less suited to facts in the life of our Lord.

(b) We do not know that it was impossible for the Logos to accept limitation of attributes, as he certainly accepted limitation upon their exercise; consequently we do not know but that, as Kenotists teach, he gradually recovered the use of powers laid aside.

(c) The New Testament does not by so much as one word tell us whether the cosmic offices of the Logos were suspended during the life of Christ upon earth.

(d) The theanthropos grew, and in all things he acted as an unit. The theory is therefore confronted by the difficulty which it sought most of all to avoid; namely, so far as the incarnation proceeded, the Logos was subject to the limitations which the human still imposed until after the resurrection.

(e) As the incarnation progressed, was the personality of Jesus more complete one day than the day before? Is there any sign that it was ever less or more entire than that of an ordinary man? From the point of view of the relation of nature to person we look in vain for facts or laws which warrant this conjectured erection of a personality.

(f) What union could be more complete than a hypostatic

union formed between the Logos and the human in Christ at the conception? So far as the development of the human in our Lord was either physical, mental, or moral, so far the divine in him might find the human its increasingly facile instrument; but this no more implies the progressive incarnation of the Logos than training of a human body implies the progressive incarnation of an ordinary human soul.

8. Theory that the divine and human natures in Christ were perfect and complete, but not numerically distinct; or, since the theory takes its cue from the ordinary laws of human propagation, it may for convenience be called the physiological theory. The points covered by this view are the following:

(1) One person in Christ.

The Logos, having personally existed from eternity, necessarily formed the basis of the personal consciousness of Christ. The Logos thus knew himself as Jesus. But our Lord repeatedly testified that his consciousness reached back into the pre-incarnate state; therefore Jesus knew himself as the Logos.

(2) One species in Christ.

As to the qualitative relationship of the divine and human natures the following statements may be made with some degree of confidence:

(a) The divine and human spirits are similar in kind, for man was made in the image of God.

(b) Similarity constituted God and man, together with angels, a class of personal beings apart from all other orders of living things.

(c) Among personal beings God and man were akin, because the divine and the human could unite in Christ, as the father and the mother elements unite in men.

(*d*) This kinship was so close as to be indistinguishable from identity in species. Though the human and the divine factors were immediately from distinct sources, their specific oneness can be made out from—

(*aa*) The unequivocal testimony of Scripture on this very point. The purport of the statement in Gen. 5 : 1-3, that God created man in the likeness of God, and that Adam begat Seth in his own likeness, would seem to be that, as the image of Adam was reproduced by propagating his nature, so the nature of God was reproduced by creating his image. Clearly, this idea was not repugnant to primitive anthropomorphism; and is steadily winning its way in modern Christology. The same formula which Luke uses to state the relation of each son to his father in the genealogy of Jesus, he employs to declare the relation of Adam to his Maker [Luke 3 : 23-38]. We must not infer that Adam was actually the son of God, but it is plain that Luke did not consider the first man to be of alien species from the Creator. The angels also are called "the sons of God" [Job 1 : 6 ; 38 : 7].

(*bb*) The facts as to Christ himself. Jesus was not a hybrid, or monstrous offspring of two alien species. The divine could normally take on the human; the human was capable of hypostatic union with the divine. Therefore Christ never seemed the less divine for being the son of Mary, nor the less human because he was the Son of God.

(*cc*) If the powers of a holy human spirit could be extended out to infinity, such a spirit would be recognized as divine, for essences which have the same attributes are of the same nature. On the other hand, so far as the infinite powers of God actually came under human limitations, so far the Logos showed his specific identity with man.

(3) One soul in Christ.

Mary contributed to her son precisely so much as other mothers do, both of body and spirit; while God conferred the Logos in place of the usual paternal element in the soul of a child, and presumably created the paternal factor in the body of Jesus.

Thus our Lord was perfectly divine, because the Logos was such; and perfectly human, because his nature was derived from a human mother and from a Father not specifically different from human.

Yet these two complete natures were not also distinct, because each parent, like other parents, contributed only enough to constitute unitedly one body with one soul; whereas, they could not be distinct as well as complete unless each, contrary to all information, constituted a soul.

This view is both expanded and attested by the following data:

(a) The idea of the annunciation, as reported by the physician Luke [1 : 35], is distinctly physiological, and notified the virgin that a divine and spiritual would be substituted for a human and carnal generative act. At the same time the New Testament affords no hint that the mother's function was in any respect different from that of other mothers.

(b) The theocratic soul of Christ performed for his body the usual vital functions of a human soul.

(c) Since Christ had but one soul, one body was its sufficient organ; and this theory escapes the physiological objections to the current theory.

(d) Since he had but one soul, he had but one will; and the theory is free from the psychological objection to the usual view.

(e) The noteworthy quantitative effects of the incarnation

are thus provided for. As in all other cases so in this case the Father and the mother determined in some way the powers of their child. The union of elements which constituted the soul of Christ could not but equip him with powers greater than those of a mere man, but in exercise, at least, less than divine. It was because the divine enlarged the capacity of the human that Christ had insight into men's hearts and sympathy with their lot impossible to a mere man [John 2 : 24, 25 ; Heb. 2 : 17, 18]. On the other hand, he did not know all that God knew [Mark 13 : 32], nor speak aught than what God gave him to speak [John 12 : 49, 50], nor do anything except what God appointed [John 5 : 19, 20, 30 ; 10 : 18], nor, although one with the Father [John 10 : 30], did he ever claim as God-man to be equal with God [John 14 : 28].

(f) Since the very existence of the divine-human soul of Christ involved the inseparable union of the two natures, each took part in all the other did or bore. It thus became possible for temptation to address even the consciously divine in Christ [Matt. 4 : 3, 6, 9 ; Heb. 2 : 17, 18 ; 4 : 15], for the divine in him to suffer [Heb. 2 : 10 ; 5 : 8] ; and even for the divine to experience death in the only ways possible to a human soul ; namely, in the form of spiritual death, or conscious separation from God [Matt. 27 : 46], and in the form of natural death, or disruption from that organism which serves as its normal instrument and is essential to man's completeness [Phil. 2 : 8 ; Heb. 2 : 9]. That death in this latter sense was a real deprivation to the entire theanthropic soul of Christ is proved by the fact that his body was re-assumed.

While both natures took part in the entire life of our Lord, he not infrequently spoke of one or the other side of his nature [cf. Matt. 4 : 4 with 11 : 27 ; John 8 : 40 with ver. 58]. But how violent the fancy is of separate action on the part of either nature may be tested with the seventeenth chapter of

John, where the constant transitions required by such a theory would be incongruous and intolerable.

Cautions.

The physiological theory, like every other, may be made the basis of inferences which are contrary to the Bible. These might be due to errors in logic; or, a strictly logical deduction from a correct theory might be misleading, because the nature of Christ is too profound a mystery to justify speculation. In either case the proper corrective is found in the method on which the theory itself has been constructed; namely, the submission of every opinion concerning our Lord to the unmistakable data of the New Testament. Hence,—

(1) If the question arise how a human nature derived in part from Mary could escape depravity, it is not enough to respond with an *a priori* assurance that the Father would guard his Son from the taint of original sin; but these opposite demands are reconciled by the facts stated in the New Testament, that Christ was liable “in all points to be tempted like as we are,” while, on the other hand, he claimed to be free from sin.

(2) If the energy of the divine in him seem to invite the Eutychian inference that the divine absorbed the human as a drop of honey is absorbed by the sea, the safeguard to faith in the real humanity of Christ is the unequivocal testimony of Scripture that he was no less human than divine.

(3) If the fact that the two natures of Christ were not of different species seems to favor a pantheistic identification of all men with God, this tendency must be withstood by bearing in mind that the Bible always represents the divine essence as numerically distinct from that of created beings.

§ 39. *The Two States of Christ.*

I. His Humiliation.

This consisted in—

1. The acceptance by the Logos of human limitations. The most important Scripture upon this subject is Phil. 2: 6–8 [cf. John 1: 14]. According to this classic passage, before the incarnation the Logos was “in the form of God”; but by the incarnation he “emptied himself, taking the form of a servant.”

We cannot with entire confidence adopt either interpretation of the kenosis; to wit, that the Logos laid aside some, if not all, of his attributes; or that he retained them all, and incessantly repressed their exercise, excepting when the Father bade him use them. Against the first supposition stands the difficulty of laying aside divine attributes without relinquishing also the divinity in which they inhere. Against the opposite view is the apparent teaching of the passage above quoted, that the kenosis took place in, not after, the assumption of our nature; the unnaturalness of so constant and tremendous a self-suppression; especially the absence of any sign of constraint in the bearing of our Lord, and the presence of that spontaneity and freedom which constitute a large part of his charm and power.

But the passage above cited, taken in connection with other Scriptures, seems unequivocally to teach that—

(a) To be “in the form of God” was to follow a mode of existence precisely opposite to that of a servant; it was to exercise without restraint the divine attributes, and to enjoy in full the divine possessions [2 Cor. 8: 9].

(b) To empty himself was correspondingly to “become

poor," and to submit to some restraint at least of our nature, such as bodily weariness and sleep [Mark 4 : 38; John 4 : 6], the mind's ignorance of the future [Mark 13 : 32], and a moral need of prayer [Mark 1 : 35]. It was to live as a servant lives; that is, to subordinate his activities, as men should, to the divine direction [Matt. 4 : 4, 7, 10; John 5 : 19, 36; 7 : 28; 8 : 23; 12 : 49, 50]. In accepting human limitations,—

2. The theanthropos came under the conditions of growth from childhood to manhood [Luke 2 : 52], was subjected to earthly parents [Luke 2 : 51], and to the discipline of pain [Heb. 5 : 8, 9; cf. 2 : 10; Matt. 4 : 1; 26 : 39-44; John 17 : 19].

3. Devotion to the mission on which he was sent [Matt. 20 : 28; John 12 : 27] required him to accept what men account humiliation [Isa. 53 : 1-9; Mark 15 : 28], and even as a man to humble himself and become obedient unto the death of the cross [Phil. 2 : 8].

II. His Exaltation.

1. This included not only restoration to the glory which he had with the Father before the world was [John 17 : 5], but additional honor earned through submission to God [John 13 : 31, 32; Phil. 2 : 9, 10], and by his sacrificial death in behalf of men [Rev. 5 : 12-14].

2. The relation of his humanity to his exaltation is not entirely clear. Lutherans believe that the human in Christ received divine attributes, so that even his body is ubiquitous. This is thought to be assured by his promise to be with his disciples [Matt. 28 : 20], by Paul's explanation that Christ ascended to heaven, in order that "he might fill all things" [Eph. 4 : 10], and by his bodily presence with the bread and

wine in the communion. On the other hand, the final subjection of the Son to the Father [1 Cor. 15 : 27, 28] cannot be understood of his human nature alone, for all things are not "subdued unto" his human nature alone; nor of an intrinsic subordination of the Logos, for this is an inadmissible Arianism; nor of official subordination as Mediator, since his subjection is to follow the surrender of these offices. It must then be understood either of the subordinate offices which belonged to the pre-incarnate Logos, or to an eternal conditioning of the divine by the human in his nature.

This latter explanation would be in harmony with Paul's unmistakable and usual recognition that the Father is also the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, now as when upon earth [Rom. 15 : 6, Revised Version; 2 Cor. 11 : 31; Eph. 1 : 3, 17]. Especially ought it to be borne in mind that the New Testament never states that the human nature of Christ will cease to be finite; on the contrary, it promises that the bodies of the saints shall be like the glorified body of our Lord [Phil. 3 : 21], and it is unwarrantable to expect ubiquity for these. But as the passage which foretells the final subjection of Christ is unique, it is safer not to assert how his exaltation affects the relations in him of the divine and the human.

3. But the relation of his humanity to the offices of his exalted state is sufficiently plain. It is as God-man that Christ dispenses forgiveness [Acts 5 : 31], intercedes for Christians [Rom. 8 : 34], is Head of the church [Eph. 4 : 15, 16; Col. 1 : 18; 2 : 19], overrules all things in the interests of his church [Matt. 28 : 18-20; Eph. 1 : 22], and will finally put down all enemies [1 Cor. 15 : 25; Heb. 10 : 12, 13], including death [1 Cor. 15 : 26].

§ 40. *The Holy Spirit.*

I. His Divinity.

This is practically undisputed. If his personality were not insisted upon, his divinity would not be denied. Both Testaments abound in phraseology which shows that the Spirit of God, or the Holy Spirit, was identified with the Most High.

1. He is called God [Luke 1 : 35; Acts 5 : 3, 4; 1 Cor. 3 : 16].

2. Divine attributes are recognized in him: omnipotence [Matt. 12 : 28; 1 Cor. 12 : 11], omniscience [1 Cor. 2 : 10], omnipresence [Ps. 139 : 7-10; Acts 2 : 17; 1 Cor. 12 : 11].

3. Divine prerogatives and acts are ascribed to him: blasphemy of the Spirit cannot be forgiven [Matt. 12 : 31], he creates [Gen. 1 : 2], regenerates [John 3 : 6; Rom. 8 : 2], sanctifies [Rom. 15 : 16; 1 Cor. 6 : 11], raises the dead [Rom. 8 : 11].

4. Christian consciousness corroborates the testimony of Scripture. The change experienced in regeneration, the succor and aid afforded for sanctification would have to be ascribed to the recuperative powers of man's own will, if the Bible had not authorized us to look for such blessings from the Holy Spirit; but having this authorization, we joyously acknowledge the benefits to be divine.

II. Personality of the Holy Spirit.

This is denied by all who deny the divinity of our Lord. It is the latest and least explicit revelation concerning the Godhead, whether we consult the representations of the Bible, or the intimations of Christian experience.

1. Earlier Biblical Usage.

Under the Old Dispensation the Spirit of God was understood to be what the name Spirit, or breath, implies, an august and powerful influence which emanates from God. And this idea seems to have prevailed until the latter part of our Saviour's ministry. For example, in the angel's annunciation to Mary [Luke 1 : 35] the name "Holy Ghost" must be interpreted by the parallel title, "the power of the Highest." This interpretation is confirmed by the statement which follows, that Jesus should be "called the Son of God"; for the New Testament nowhere intimates, what any other interpretation would require, that Jesus was begotten by the Third instead of the First Person in the Trinity. Similarly, our Lord's denunciation of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit [Matt. 12 : 31, 32], if applicable only to a Third Person in a Trinity, would have been without meaning to those who heard it; but, when understood as referring to an obstinate defiance of that power or influence from God which evidently wrought in Christ, the rebuke became fearfully intelligible.

2. Later Biblical Usage.

The Master's assurance that another Comforter would take his place was the first explicit revelation of the Holy Spirit's personality. The evidence in fuller detail is as follows:

- (a) The title Paraclete, or Comforter, is expressly personal.
- (b) As one who was to fill the place of the personal Jesus, the Holy Spirit must be a person [John 14 : 16, 17; 15 : 26; 16 : 7, 13, 14].

(c) Although *Πνεῦμα* is neuter, the masculine pronoun *ἐκεῖνος* is used with it in the promise of John 16 : 13, 14.

(d) Christ and the apostles ascribe to the Holy Spirit the personal faculties of mind, for he teaches [John 14 : 26; 16 : 13; Acts 20 : 23; Rom. 8 : 16; 1 Cor. 2 : 10-13; 1 John 5 : 6]; of will, since he exercises authority [Acts 8 : 29;

10 : 20; 16 : 6, 7; 1 Cor. 12 : 11]; of feeling, because he can be grieved [Eph. 4 : 30].

(e) The Spirit's subordination in office to the Father and to the Son implies personality. He is sent by the Son from the Father [John 15 : 26]; he speaks only what is given him to speak [John 16 : 13-15]; he intercedes for the saints according to the will of God [Rom. 8 : 27].

(f) The Old Testament foreshadows this doctrine. See especially the prophecies of Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Joel.

(g) Christ promised that his disciples should know the Holy Spirit as dwelling in them [John 14 : 17]; Christian experience, therefore, finds in "the fruits of the Spirit" a corroboration of his personality. It is true that we cannot distinguish two persons in our breast; still less can we discriminate by tests found in consciousness between one and another Person of the Trinity. Solely by the activity of our own faculties can we know that the Holy Spirit is dwelling in us.

And these must be unquestionably normal activities. Fanaticism has rioted on the error that lively impressions are personal communications from God. Too often a strong impulse to a certain course is ascribed to the Holy Spirit, because no reason except the strength of the impulse can be found for taking such a course. It cannot be denied that the Spirit may sometimes guide us by unaccountable impressions; but the only certainty is that the Scriptures promise enlightenment and aid through a personal Spirit, and that our experience corresponds to the promise.

§ 41. *Offices of the Holy Spirit.*

This doctrine, more perhaps than any other of soteriology, lacks thorough investigation. Opinion among Protestants

ranges all the way from the Friend's mystical belief in "the inner light" to the frigid theory of some Disciples that the Holy Spirit comes to men through the inspired word alone, exactly as the spirit of a man is carried by his words; and from the extreme high church doctrine of a divinely guided episcopate to the disorganizing fancy of "the presidency of the Spirit," as taught by Plymouth Brethren.

I. The Dispensation of the Spirit.

All agree that the present is in some important sense the Dispensation of the Holy Spirit. This view is justified by the prophecy of John the Baptist that Jesus would baptize in the Holy Spirit and in fire [Matt. 3 : 11]; by the promise of Jesus that, when he had gone away, he would send the Comforter [John 16 : 7]; by the repetition of this promise after his resurrection [Luke 24 : 49, cf. Acts 1 : 4, 5, 8], and by the abundant and varied gifts of the Spirit to the apostolic church from the day of Pentecost onward.

Whatever the offices are by which the Holy Spirit gives pre-eminence to the New Dispensation over the Old, it is certain that those offices were not withheld from Israel when they might as well have been bestowed. Our Lord alone has intimated a reason why the influences of the Holy Spirit are so much more copious after than before his own mission: "If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you" [John 16 : 7]. While Christ was yet upon earth he could not send the Holy Spirit; first, because he was still himself a servant, and as such could not fitly send the Third Person in the Godhead [John 7 : 39; Acts 2 : 33]; secondly, because the redemptive work, to which the Holy Spirit was to testify, and which it was thus to crown, had not yet been completed.

II. General Office.

To minister the truth, that is to reveal and apply the truth, is the all-inclusive function of the Holy Spirit. The special form and the extent of the ministration depend upon the nature and the range of applicability in the truth to be administered.

III. Offices under the Old Covenant.

1. The people of God were in a state of pupilage, and habitually instructed by symbols. The effect of such instruction was two-fold.

(a) The immediate result was the limitation of a highly ritual religion to a ritually prepared people. The priestly race of Israel alone could participate in the Levitical rites. Mosaism in large part shut off the Gentiles from the truth, and so far from the ministry of the Spirit.

(b) The remoter consequence was that, for many of the chosen people themselves, the symbol displaced the truth it symbolized. The inherent weakness of a religion embodied in object lessons is that the better adapted they are to set forth truth, the worse adapted to keep it before the mind; the more the symbols show, the more they may hide. As there is less to dread in a simple cross than in the too significant crucifix, so the very expressiveness of the ancient ceremonial necessitated an abandonment of it.

(c) The trend of the priesthood which administers a ritual is not toward simplicity, but toward an elaboration which magnifies the priestly function, limits that of the people, and, alike for people and priest, requires of the mind the least possible share in religious observances. Quite the reverse is the tendency of—

2. The prophetic office. This deals in ideas, hence is suggestive, progressive, and radical. The prophet emphasized the reality, sometimes not hesitating to disparage the form [Ps. 50 : 8-14; 51 : 16, 17; Joel 2 : 13; Micah 6 : 6-8]. He turned the thoughts of the people toward the future, and prepared for a complete revelation in the Messiah.

3. But, whether by symbols or by prophecy, the Holy Spirit used the truth for the renewal of men's hearts under the Ancient Dispensation. In this way alone, then as now, could any become the children of God [Rom. 8 : 7, cf. John 3 : 3-10 with Ps. 51 : 10 and Ezek. 11 : 19, 20; 36 : 26, 27].

IV. Offices Under the New Covenant.

The work of our Lord by introducing the antitype, closed the period of types and restrictive ordinances. The truth as it is in Jesus, while first declared to the Jews, was of universal applicability. The graces of the Spirit were bestowed upon all believers; and, to mark this fact, the miraculous charisms were for a time conferred upon all [Acts 2 : 1-4, 17, 18; 10 : 47; 1 Cor. 12 : 11].

More specifically, the offices of the Holy Spirit under this Dispensation are—

1. To prove the claims of Jesus. The miraculous gifts of Pentecost and of the immediately following years, as well as more distinctively spiritual influences, were the Father's testimony to the resurrection of his Son.

This was the only practicable evidence. No good purpose would have been served, had the Lord shown himself to the world after his resurrection. If some had been convinced, others would have cavilled; and the direct evidence to future generations would be just what it is, that of his disciples. But in the lives of spiritual men the Holy Spirit is affording the

fittest and the most persuasive testimony that the Lord is risen indeed.

2. The Apostles were enabled by the Holy Spirit to recall the teaching [John 14 : 26], and interpret the mission [Acts 1 : 8; 1 Cor. 2 : 4, 10], of Jesus to converts of the new faith and to the world.

A permanent office of authoritative teaching has been only less important to later generations than to that of the apostles. Spiritual men have been enabled in every age to apprehend and to teach the substance of Christian truth.

3. The Holy Spirit used and still uses the truth thus taught for the renewing, enlightening, sanctifying, and assuring of believers.

4. Naturally allied by participation in a new faith, new life, and new aims, converts were organized into the church by the authority and under the direction of the Spirit [1 Cor. 12 : 28; Eph. 4 : 11, 12].

5. The church became "an habitation of God through the Spirit" [Eph. 2 : 22, cf. Matt. 18 : 20]. Beyond the mystery of the Spirit's relation to the individual [John 3 : 8], it is not necessary to believe that he holds a mystic relation to the church as an organic whole. Eph. 5 : 32, "This mystery is great; but I speak in regard of Christ and of the church," does not mean that the relation of Christ and the church is obscure, but that marriage is a mystic symbol of that relation.

But quite apart from a questionable mystery in the relation, we can see that the Holy Spirit makes use of the powerful agency of the social faculties for the mutual edification of believers through the truth [1 Cor. 12 : 13 f. 14 : 12, 26], and for the extension of the same privileges by the same means to all mankind [1 Cor. 14 : 24, 25, cf. Matt. 28 : 19, 20].

6. The resurrection by the Holy Spirit of those in whom he dwells [Rom. 8 : 11], is an essentially ethical phase of the

future life [Phil. 3 : 8-11], and the most satisfactory. Thus, in making us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light, it is also the office of the Holy Spirit to be "the earnest of our inheritance" [Eph. 1 : 14 ; 2 Cor. 1 : 22 ; 5 : 5].

§ 42. *The Trinity.*

The doctrine of the Trinity is not expressly enunciated by the Scriptures, but the data on which it rests are afforded in the biblical account of the divine offices in redemption. This economic aspect of the Trinity being early recognized, as we know from the Ebionite protests against the divinity of our Lord, the conviction began to form in many minds that the historical distinctions expressed by the titles Father, Son, and Spirit, correspond to eternal distinctions in the Godhead. In order to end the disputes on this subject, the Council of Nicea in the year 325 defined the doctrine of the Son, and in 381 the Council of Constantinople added to the Nicene creed the article concerning the Holy Spirit.

The doctrine of the Trinity aims simply to present in one view the facts revealed in the plan of grace concerning the mode of the divine existence. In this necessary effort of speculative Christian thought the conclusion reached is—

I. Definition.

In the one personal God there are three personal distinctions, or *quasi* persons. "Person" cannot be used of the Godhead and of the three hypostases in the Godhead in the same sense ; for it would be self-contradictory to say even of God that, without change of meaning in the word, three persons constitute one person. When used of the Deity as a whole, the word "person" implies self-consciousness, and substance

distinct from that of other persons; while, as applied to the three hypostases in the Deity, it means self-consciousness, with numerical identity of substance.

The ordinary formula for this doctrine, "three persons in one God," avoids using a term in two senses, but at the cost of ascribing to God only tripersonality; whereas, the doctrine which pervades the elder Scriptures, and is never in the least disguised in the new, is that God is one person, in the ordinary meaning of the term. The unipersonality of the Godhead then is the expressly taught doctrine of the Bible; while the doctrine of tripersonality is a valid, but purely human induction from facts given in the Bible. It is a metaphysic, and this metaphysic is peculiarly Christian; but it is the Christianity of the church, and not of the Bible in such a sense as to justify insistence that the theory of Tri-unity was fully developed to the mind of any New Testament writer in the standard orthodox way.

II. Evidence for the Trinity.

1. Evidence from the New Testament.

Besides the texts which have already been cited to prove the unity and personality of God, the divinity and personality of the Word and the Spirit, certain other texts associate the Father, Son, and Spirit as divine, yet distinguish them as persons. They are so associated and distinguished—

(a) By their several parts in the scheme of redemption. According to 1 Peter 1 : 2 the Father elects, the Son sprinkles with blood, the Spirit sanctifies [cf. ver. 17-22];

(b) By their relations to the individual believer. He has access through Christ, in one Spirit, unto the Father [Eph. 2 : 18]. He is exhorted, by praying in the Holy Spirit, to keep

himself in the love of God, looking for the mercy of the Lord Jesus Christ [Jude 20, 21];

(c) By their offices to the church. The church is built together in Christ Jesus for an habitation of God in the Spirit [Eph. 2 : 20-22]. It constitutes one body with one Spirit, even as it has one Lord, one God and Father of all [Eph. 4 : 4-6]. Its varied gifts are from the same Spirit; its different administrations are under one Lord; its diversities of operations are by the same God, who worketh all in all [1 Cor. 12 : 4-6];

(d) By the promise of Christ to send the Holy Spirit from the Father [John 15 : 26, cf. 14 : 26 and Luke 24 : 49];

(e) By the formula of baptism, according to which the believer assumes obligations alike to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit [Matt. 28 : 19];

(f) By the apostolic benediction [2 Cor. 13 : 14], which invokes blessings from each person of the Trinity as from God;

(g) By the baptism of Jesus, at which the distinctions in the Godhead were revealed to the senses. The Spirit was seen descending like a dove, while the voice of God was heard acknowledging Jesus as his Son [Luke 3 : 22].

2. Evidence from the Old Testament.

Strict monotheism was so thoroughly adopted by the Jews during the Babylonian captivity as to prove a serious obstacle to the spread of Christianity among them. And yet, read in the light of Christianity, the Old Testament not only pre-intimated the divinity and personality of the Word and the Spirit, but is thought by some to have associated the three persons of the Godhead somewhat after the manner of the trinitarian texts of the New Testament.

The more important passages which are believed to have this character are those in which the plural Elohim is used as

the name of God, with a corresponding plural pronoun in the account of the creation of man [Gen. 1 : 26], the three-fold blessings in Num. 6 : 24-26, the Tersanctus of Isa. 6 : 3, and even the prophetic saying in Isa. 61 : 1, as interpreted by our Lord himself in Luke 4 : 16-21. A trinitarian meaning may be latent in the Old Testament, and yet that fact not be made altogether patent by quotations in the New.

3. Psychological Evidence.

To many trinitarians human consciousness itself, bold as the suggestion is, seems to afford evidence that the Godhead is tripersonal. While the doctrine could not be erected upon so narrow a basis, it is not impossible that it may derive some real support from the facts which are thought by some to overthrow it altogether. Accordingly it is urged in favor of the Trinity—

A. Self-consciousness is possible only through distinction of self from not-self. Hence from eternity the self-consciousness of God required a self, to wit, the Father; a not-self who should still be in substance one with the Father, namely, the Son; and a medium of communication between these two, that is, the Spirit. But—

(a) While the argument is not without plausibility so far as it provides for duality, yet, when it requires a third person as a means of communication between the first two, the question arises why a fourth is not equally needed to mediate between three persons, and so on *ad infinitum*.

(b) Again, if the Father and the Son are identical in substance, the need of any means of communication can hardly be demonstrated; nor, without raising a presumption against the spirituality of the Godhead, is it easy to see how a third hypothesis could serve in such a way.

B. God is essentially love. From eternity he must have had an object to love not inferior to himself, yet neither personally identical with nor separate from himself. This object of love the Father found in the Son. But their common love to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from them both, was needed, in order to save their own personalities from being lost through the energy of a mutual self-surrender.

This argument has substantially the same merits, and is open to much the same exceptions as the former. Duality would obviously provide eternal employment for love; but that the divine love was either kept from doing the Godhead a harm, or, as others prefer to put the argument, was intensified, by the regard of two divine persons for their common offspring, provokes dissent by its assumption of insight into the profoundest mystery of the divine nature.

III. Relations within the Trinity.

The humanitarian and the subordinationist theories preclude inter-trinitarian relations by denying the proper divinity of our Lord. Doctrines which acknowledge his divinity, but offer different accounts of personal relations within the Godhead are the following:

1. According to Sabellius (about the middle of the third century) God before the creation rested in himself and was silent. In the work of creation he uttered himself and became the Word. But as Word the total Godhead presented himself in three consecutive aspects: during the Dispensation of Law he appeared as Father; withdrawing this relation, he reappears in the incarnation as Son; after the ascension he comes a third time as Holy Spirit, and, when sanctification of the church is complete, he will return to absolute unity forever.

Sabellianism was distinguished from the earlier patri-

passionism by recognizing a distinct manifestation of God as Holy Spirit. It has been variously modified by recent writers, but its essence in all ages is the denial of an immanent trinity, especially of eternal distinctions before the incarnation, while admitting the form or mode of successive personal distinctions during the course of God's relations to men.

In reviewing the evidence as to Sabellianism,—

(a) We admit that the title Father is used in both Testaments of the Deity as such; and that some passages which distinguish between the Father and Jesus Christ refer to the historical Christ, and not to the pre-existent Logos. For example, in the promise to send the Comforter, it is the God-man, and not the Logos that speaks [John 15 : 26].

(b) Nevertheless, there are numerous texts in which the pre-incarnate Logos is distinguished from the Father. Here belong the passages in which Christ speaks of himself as coming into this world from another sphere [John 3 : 17 ; 7 : 29 ; 8 : 42 ; 10 : 36 ; 16 : 28] ; in which the epistles refer to the end for which he came [Rom. 8 : 3 ; 1 Tim. 1 : 15 ; Heb. 1 : 6 ; 1 John 4 : 2, 9, 10], or give an account of his condition before the incarnation [John 17 : 5 ; 2 Cor. 8 : 9 ; Phil. 2 : 6].

(c) Several passages distinguish the Father, Word, and Spirit, not as successive modes in the existence of one divine person, but as three contemporaneous persons in one God. These passages have already been cited as evidence for the Trinity. How utterly modalism fails to interpret the facts of the Christian economy would appear on an attempt to translate in terms of modalism Paul's swift but comprehensive sketch of the three states of Christ before, during, and after his earthly life [Phil. 2 : 6-10].

2. The Nicene, or usual orthodox theory, is that godhead resides in the Father, that the Father eternally generates the Son from his own substance, and that the Father and the Son

eternally breathe forth the Holy Spirit from the same substance. Since the persons of the Trinity are of numerically identical substance, they are necessarily co-equal, and hypostatic distinctions do not involve tritheism. Accordingly, the so-called Athanasian creed tersely insists that "we worship the Trinity in Unity, neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance." As to this venerable and generally accepted view we notice:

(a) The eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Spirit are not facts of Scripture, but interpretations of scriptural facts by the Neo-platonic theory of emanation.

The Scriptures afford no proof that the Logos was a derived being. The title Son of God was assigned by the angel of the annunciation on the ground that God was the Father of the historical person, Jesus. The title once fixed was naturally carried back to the pre-incarnate Word, just as the name Christ Jesus was and is still carried back, although neither part of it is strictly applicable [Phil 2 : 5]. In Col. 1 : 15 he is called "the first born of every creature," in ver. 18 "the first born from the dead," and in both cases by way of "pre-eminence" [ver. 18, cf. Ps. 89 : 27]. "First born" certainly does not mean eternally begotten, and would not be so understood except under pressure of a theological exigency. If anything like a literal meaning is here insisted upon, it must be Arian, rather than orthodox.

In John 15 : 26 the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father; but this is so distinctly after the Old Testament conception of him as breath or influence from God, as rather to mark the use of familiar though impersonal forms of thought and speech, than to reveal an ontological relation of Persons.

(b) The ideas of eternal generation and eternal procession are not only extra-scriptural, but are incompatible with that

equality between persons of the Godhead which the doctrine of Nicea itself insists upon. They are ideas of subordination, because they represent the very existence of the Son and of the Spirit as dependent upon a process.

(c) This theory undermines the personality of the Son and the Spirit; since, in representing them as eternally becoming, it denies their real being.

The metaphysical element in the Nicene definition is thus seen to be a futile and self-contradictory effort to provide a philosophical explanation of matters necessarily above human understanding. Discarding, then, all ontological speculation, and consulting only the facts of Scripture, it is warrantable for us to hold and teach that—

3. The titles Father, Son, and Spirit are afforded by economic offices; the economic offices pertain to eternal distinctions of person; the offices are so appropriate to the persons, that they are not to be thought of as interchangeable. Essential equality with official inequality may be unhesitatingly affirmed; but as to ontological relations of the three persons in one God, the Scriptures reveal little, and speculation is worse than useless.

§ 43. *The Offices of Christ.*

1. The Offices.

Since the Reformation these have been distinguished as prophecy, priesthood, and kingship. As prophet, Christ imparts the truth, of which he was, indeed, the embodiment. As priest, he mediates between God and man, effecting a mutual reconciliation and establishing a covenant by offering himself in sacrifice. As king, he reigns in the hearts and orders the lives of his people, presides as head of the church, and will finally subdue all things unto himself.

2. Interdependence of Offices.

Some important school of Christian thought has constantly emphasized one of these offices at the cost of the others. Rationalism insists on the prophetic office, evangelical belief rests upon the priestly, and high-churchism knows no salvation outside the organized kingdom of our Lord. One-sidedness and misconception of the Redeemer's offices can be avoided only by recognizing their interdependence. But this relation, though somewhat discussed between Lutherans and Reformed, has never been thoroughly studied. Little, however, is risked, if proper scope be given to the meaning of terms, in holding—

(a) As to the prophetic and priestly offices, that Christ teaches by saving, and saves by teaching;

(b) As to the prophetic and kingly, that he teaches by ruling, and rules by teaching;

(c) As to the priesthood and kingship, that he saves by ruling, and rules by saving.

3. Doctrines Classified by Offices.

With the fact of interdependence in view, hard and fast lines cannot so readily be maintained in assigning to one or another office of Christ those acts of divine grace which form the subject of Christian doctrine. And yet the familiar distinction is not to be disregarded. We may say that the atonement included the prophetic and priestly functions, and aimed at the fulfillment of the kingly; that intercession is an office of royal priesthood; that election and justification in Christ belong to his priesthood; that calling, regeneration, sanctification, perseverance, and the entire series of eschatological events pertain more directly to the kingship which Christ exercises in sending the Holy Spirit, and in bringing on the final consummation.

§ 44. *The Atonement.*

The atonement is the provision made by Christ to deliver men from sin and its penalties. It is the task of theology to determine in what the provision consists, and to what its efficacy is due.

There is a marked tendency to accept the atonement as a fact while discarding all theories concerning it. But belief in the fact involves some recognition of its nature, and is so far a theory or view of the atonement. On the other hand, doubt of its meaning tends to shadow its reality.

It is not then untimely to review the theories which have been piously wrought, to classify the unmistakable data of Scripture, and to attempt an explanation of these data in the light of former investigations. Our inquiry will therefore be threefold: historical and critical, scriptural or exegetical, dogmatic and theoretical.

PART FIRST.

HISTORICAL SURVEY.

I. The Patristic Doctrine.

The Apostolic Fathers intimated without formulating their view of the atonement; they taught that Christ gave himself for our sins. Their successors until the beginning of the twelfth century held every variety of opinion, and on this subject variety was tolerated. The most popular view was that the atonement was a victory over Satan.

Origen (died 254) converted this idea into the theory of a ransom paid to Satan. On the one hand, men had surrendered to Satan, and could not be delivered from captivity without his

consent; on the other hand, Satan was deluded into accepting Christ as a ransom. The humanity of Christ was commonly spoken of as the bait, and his divinity as the hook by which Satan was caught. Fearing the effect on his captives of the life and teachings of Jesus, and seeing the divine glory of our Lord through the veil of his flesh so obscurely as to be deceived, —by divine intention deceived,—Satan undertook to rid himself of the danger by putting Christ to death. But to cause the crucifixion was to accept the ransom; the captives were released, and their Deliverer too escaped.

Although in harmony with the ancient usages of war, such a theory could be regarded as scriptural only because controversy had not yet secured a thorough study of the atonement. No one now imagines that Satan has rights over man; that his supposed rights would be conserved by cheating him; or that God would practice a strategic deceit upon the Father of lies.

II. The Doctrine of Satisfaction.

The patristic theory was confuted at the beginning of the twelfth century by Anselm, and afterward obtained but a modified support from Bernard and Peter Lombard. Anselm proposed the theory still called by his name, the theory of Satisfaction. In brief, his doctrine was that sin was a debt to the divine honor; that either vengeance or satisfaction must be exacted; that, adequate satisfaction being impossible from a being so inferior to God as man is, the Son of God became man, and, owing no debt on his own account, by his death paid ours, receiving as his reward the forgiveness of our sins.

In the way of affirmation, modification, or dissent the theory of Anselm has determined the course of all subsequent discussion. Abelard objected that the wrath not of God but of man needed

propitiating, so that the atonement, instead of being an offering to justice, was a winning exhibition of love. Stoutly denied by Bernard, the theory of Abelard founded no enduring school, but has often been revived and is at present widely influential. More acceptable to the Scholastics were the rival views of their greatest theologians, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Aquinas, denying, as against Anselm, the absolute necessity of the kind of atonement provided, and emphasizing the idea of merit, adapted the doctrine of satisfaction to the Romanist system. Christ, he held, is Head of the church, and his merit, both in keeping the law and in suffering for sin, avails for his body through the sacraments. According to Scotus, God might sovereignly forgive without any reparation for sins. The merit of the sacrifice depended upon the divine acceptance, not the divine acceptance upon the merit of the sacrifice. Yet the more gratitude is due to Christ for accepting pain which it was not needful that he should bear.

Without deciding the question at issue between Anselm, Aquinas, and Scotus, whether the atonement was necessary absolutely, relatively, or not at all, the Roman Church teaches that the crucifixion avails to delete or undo all sin, original and actual, previous to baptism; while as to sins after baptism, it enables the penitent to escape eternal punishment and make propitiation for himself by the use of other sacraments, and through the endurance of purgatorial fire.

The Reformation, discarding the notions of Anselm as to debt and honor, accepted the single fact of satisfaction as a basis for justification by faith,—orthodox Lutherans and Calvinists differing chiefly with respect to the purposed extent of the atonement.

The accepted view was developed by the Calvinist Cocceius into a formal scheme of covenants known as the Federal theory, and this theory has been insisted upon by most Pres-

byterians of the elder school in English-speaking lands as essential to orthodoxy. It claims that there was a covenant of works between God and Adam before the fall, and a corresponding covenant of grace with Christ or with the elect, or a covenant of redemption with Christ, and of grace with the elect. By the covenant of works Adam was made federal head of the race. This relation was due, not to the fact that Adam was father of the race, although that fact was a condition of federal headship, but to sovereign appointment. In Adam, the race had a probation under the most favorable circumstances. With his fall, the covenant of works ended, but left the race in ruin. The guilt of Adam's sin, not its moral turpitude but its liability to punishment, is imputed to his posterity. The penalty incurred is that men are born depraved.

By the covenant of grace and redemption Christ was appointed federal head of the elect, and undertook in their behalf to obey the law and to bear the penalty of their sins, so far as applicable to him, the sinless. His obedience, both active and passive, is imputed to the elect. In consequence of this imputation the Holy Spirit sovereignly regenerates them without the use of means; faith springs up in the regenerate heart, and they are justified.

(I) The doctrine of Satisfaction, uncomplicated with a doctrine of covenants, is an incomplete philosophy of atonement. That Christ was offered unto God in satisfaction for sins may be accepted as a fact, but not as a fact explained. To say with Anselm that he took our place by being both divine and human is true; but how is it true? Failing to explain, the Anselmic theory so far fails to vindicate, the actually representative or substitutionary position of Christ, and in consequence has been not unfairly charged with leaving unsolved the problem how

either justice could lay on the Innocent the curse of the guilty, or how it could benefit them if their curse was thus borne.

(II) The Federalist form of the theory, though logically complete, is more than negatively objectionable.

1. No such covenants are mentioned in the Bible.

2. Federalism makes the economies of law and of grace turn on sovereign appointment, instead of on the nature and relations of God and men. In point of fact, the calamitous results of the fall are incurred by our race, not because God decreed that it should be so, but through the inevitable transmission of moral qualities by descent; while blessings issue from the atonement, not in consequence of a gracious attachment of these results to such measures, but by virtue of the fundamentally real representation of sinners in Christ, and through an organic, not a factitious, means of communication with believers.

These objections hold against the Federalist account of the atonement's efficiency both Godward and manward.

3. Especial difficulties lie in the way of its alleged manward effects.

A. Here the first step is imputation to the elect of the active obedience of Christ. Such imputation neither has adequate support in Scripture, nor is to be inferred from the endurance by Christ of our woes. Participation in our woes would attend his acceptance of our estate; but the imputation to us of his active obedience would not naturally follow. If one does harm to another by his misdeeds, it is not a matter of course that he will be credited with the other's virtues.

B. The second step is the sovereign renewal of those to whom the active obedience of Christ is imputed. The atonement is not regarded as an instrument of that renewal; it only

impetrates or procures it. But in such case, the atonement does not do its proper work.

(a) The atonement is intended to remove the divine displeasure. But subjective penalties, incurred by the sinner according to divinely constituted law, are, equally with any objective inflictions, a mark of divine displeasure. According to the Federalist the atonement turns away the stroke of vengeance, but leaves the inwrought mischiefs of sin to be repaired in some other way,—namely, by a regeneration in which the atonement takes no part.

(b) Inwrought penalties cannot be set aside in consequence of a merely external event, like the fulfillment for us of a covenant; they must be counteracted by the remedial efficacy of an inward process. The atonement, applied by the Holy Spirit, must be appropriated through faith. But, according to the Federalist, regeneration is not by appropriation of the atonement, and precedes faith. Yet, until moral renewal is effected, conscience itself warns us that the atonement is only an antecedent provision, waiting to be applied.

4. The Federalist theory, by referring the establishment and the operation of the covenants to sheer sovereignty, while denying all participation to the known, the organic, the sufficient relations of the parties involved, incurs the grave charge that, not being according to nature and law, the atonement is against these, and must consequently be both injurious and wrong. Although chiefly urged by the unevangelical, this objection is often felt by evangelical Christians. It is not easy to see how its force can be escaped.

III. The Moral Influence Theory.

On the grounds which Abelard took against Anselm, the Socinians attacked the Reformers, and their arguments are

urged by rationalistic and kindred schools in our day. Justice, it is affirmed, demands merely that men should abandon sin, while love provides a Mediator who by instruction and example brings sinners to repentance and a new life.

Recent advocates of this theory among both Unitarians and Trinitarians find a deeper significance in the work and sufferings of Christ. According to Ritschl, the mission of Christ was to found the church, which would perpetuate a consciousness of the love of God to men. Maurice regarded the atonement as a perfect example of self-sacrifice to God, and at the same time as an invitation to believe that God had already forgiven human sin. According to Bushnell, Christ bore the burden of our sins upon his heart, and thus became a true sacrifice, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God by the persuasive influence of mutual sympathy. McLeod Campbell offered a mediating view: Christ, through the completeness of his sympathy with both God and man, makes confession unto God of human sins, is "a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man," thus expiating human guilt; and this service becomes available for any who accept it as their own confession, and are won by it to righteousness.

The real issue with the theory of moral influence is as to the necessity of an expiation for sin. If a sinner becomes righteous, justice, it is claimed, does not demand his punishment for past offences; in fact, moral penalties become wholly inapplicable, and no other penalties would be worthy of God. The theory then rests on ethical rather than on scriptural grounds. In reviewing it from this point of view, we notice:

1. The initial problem is not whether men already reconciled to God must furnish an expiation for past offences, but

whether without any expiation men can be reconciled. It may be unhesitatingly affirmed that—

(a) Sinners cannot hold themselves to the service of God while burdened with a sense of sins unforgiven;

(b) If any decree of conscience be practically universal and normal, it is that forgiveness ought not even to be accepted without reparation made;

(c) No present fidelity can cancel past obligations, for we can never do more than it is our duty to do [Luke 17 : 10];

(d) The clearing vision of the saintliest, as he passes hence, sees full well the sole sufficiency of that offering for sin on which, as a penitent, he first laid his trust.

This law of our nature assures us of—

2. A correspondent law in the nature of the Law-giver. Made in his image, we cannot but regard the necessary demand of conscience as the counterpart of an imperative requirement of God. He who feels the normal impulse to offer a sacrifice for his sins, readily admits that the divine justice yet more requires this.

But some deny that their consciences make such a demand, and they justify themselves by David's protestation: "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it. . . . The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit" [Ps. 51 : 16, 17]. But it should be borne in mind that—

(a) The vagaries of individual consciences under special influences do not shake the authority of the moral judgment of mankind;

(b) The law of Moses did not, in point of fact, require sacrifices but punishment for grave moral offences, and public punishment was visited upon David in this very case [2 Sam. 12 : 12]; so that, while he had no refuge except the mercy of God, his confident appeal cannot be quoted for the doctrine

that justice exacts for sin no other satisfaction than contrition;

(c) The evangelical justification of David's trust is furnished by Paul, when, with such cases in mind, he writes of "the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth . . . to show his righteousness because of the passing over of sins done aforetime" [Rom. 3 : 24, 25].

Thus both human conscience and divine justice require an atonement for sins that are past ; but furthermore—

3. Instead of repentance being a ground of forgiveness, the offer of forgiveness is the occasion of repentance. It is "the goodness of God that leads to repentance" [Rom. 2 : 4]; "we love him because he first loved us" [1 John 4 : 19; cf. Ps. 130 : 4]. But unless we believe in his abhorrence of sin, we have no measure of his love to sinners. A measure both of his holiness and his love is supplied in the propitiatory offering of his Son. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins" [1 John 4 : 10, cf. 3 : 16; Rom. 5 : 8].

4. Moral penalties are very far from inapplicable to repentant and reformed sinners.

(a) The power of temptation habitually yielded to is not often completely neutralized by repentance. As a rule, it sooner or later makes the reformed offender smart for his long-abandoned misdeeds. To his horror he finds that he must suffer again from the stress of temptations to which he no longer yields.

(b) Painful regret for past sins is peculiarly characteristic of one who has been delivered from the bondage of sin. It may not be difficult to believe that God can forgive, but a good man may well doubt whether he can ever forgive himself. Indeed, if he feels the exceeding sinfulness of sin, he cannot until

he has so identified himself with Christ that he can look upon the sacrifice of Christ as his own offering.

(c) God's displeasure too will be most keenly felt precisely when the heart is no longer hardened against God. This sense of one's own detestableness in the sight of God was heartily expressed by David when he awoke to the enormity of his crime against a fellow man [Ps. 51 : 4]. The cross, by assuring the penitent of divine forgiveness, removes a moral penalty of sin.

IV. The Governmental Theory.

1. Typical Form.

A theory devised against the Socinians by the publicist Grotius has been revived in New England against the Universalists and Unitarians. This theory holds that government is for the sake of the governed. It is in the interest of the governed themselves that the stability of the government should not be imperilled by the forgiveness of sinners without an exhibition of God's rectoral displeasure against sin. But such an exhibition was afforded to all moral beings in the crucifixion of our Lord. The ends of public justice, of benevolence guided by wisdom in the public interest, are fully met, and distributive justice, or justice proper, need not press its claims.

The atonement, according to the advocates of this theory, has a Godward efficiency, because it makes it safe for God to forgive sin; but as this safety is wholly due to an impression made upon moral beings, the efficiency of the atonement Godward reduces to an efficiency manward. On this account the theory has been pronounced by more than one critic a theory of moral influence. But it is not a theory of the same kind of moral influence as that to which the Socinian theory reduces the work of Christ. The latter is toward repentance; the former is toward a sense of the divine authority.

Socinians insist that the nature of God does not require an atonement ; Governmentalists urge that his character of ruler exacts what his nature does not demand.

2. Arminian Form.

This combines features of the Anselmic, Scotist, and Grotian views. With Anselm, it teaches that Christ was offered unto the offended majesty and holiness of God. With Duns Scotus, it holds that the sacrifice of Christ, like the Levitical sacrifices, owes its efficacy to the divine acceptance (acceptilation). It thus agrees with Grotius that Christ bore neither the penalty of human sin nor an equivalent to it ; while it dissents from his position that the crucifixion was a mere exhibition of rectoral displeasure against the sedition of sinners.

3. Objections.

(a) Distributive justice is the necessary reaction of divine holiness against sin, and to waive its claims would be to impair the moral integrity of God.

(b) In teaching that penalties may be set aside at the discretion of the Supreme Ruler, the theory disregards the indissoluble connection between law and its penal sanctions. By the constitution of moral beings subjective penalties inevitably attend the infraction of moral laws ; and it is unwarrantable to suppose that any ultimate objective expressions of divine wrath will be found merely discretionary and factitious.

(c) In proportion as it is made to appear that the sufferings of Christ were histrionic, or only intended to create an impression, they lose impressiveness. In other words, the better the atonement is understood, the less it is worth.

(d) The doctrine that the government of God is shaped to the interests of the governed, and not to the demands of holi-

ness, involves a utilitarian theory of morals demoralizing to the individual, and rejected by the general sense when society is affronted by gross misdeeds.

(e) The doctrine is essentially political rather than scriptural.

V. Realistic Theories.

To whatever the present tendency to realism is due, it unquestionably exists. The nominalistic doctrines of creationism and imputationism are giving way to the realistic conception of a community of nature between Adam, Christ, and the human race. This tendency is strengthened by natural science, as we shall see, and is in harmony with the general character of Schleiermacher's teaching that the native feeling of dependence is met by a new life historically traceable through the church to Christ.

While realism is especially in keeping with the idea that Christ saves men by imparting his own life, it is capable of embracing every conception of the atonement, from moral influence to expiation. Representative forms of realistic doctrine are the following :

1. The pantheistic. Pantheism regards man as the highest development of that universal substance which is at once God and nature. Christ was the first of the human race to become fully aware of his identity with God, and his gospel is the announcement that all men, like himself, are essentially divine. To accept this good news is to bring consciousness into harmony with fundamental reality, and thus to make an end of that imperfect and confused stage of development known as sin.

2. The realistic theory with subjective intention. This teaches that Christ was not *a man* but *man*; that he assumed

not personal but impersonal, generic, human nature, and by bearing up that nature against its liability, or even its tendency, to sin, purified and redeemed it,—his crucifixion being the sacrifice of that self-love which in men becomes selfishness. By faith, or by sympathy, or by enlightenment, the Christian recognizes and participates in the victory of Christ over evil.

3. With objective intention the realistic theory accepts and emphasizes the subjective view, but adds that Christ, in taking generic human nature, assumed all the penalties attaching to its fallen state, and these penalties culminated at the cross, on which human nature in Christ was offered as a sacrifice for sin, in Christ making atonement for itself unto God. Faith now enables the Christian to endure and to exhaust the inevitable subjective penalties of sin.

A. The realistic theory, in one or another of its forms, has the signal merits :

(a) Of seeking to ground the atonement in an ontological relation, instead of a factitious, or a merely sympathetic relation of Christ to men ;

(b) Of setting forth Christ himself as the immediate object of faith ;

(c) Of emphasizing the subjective value and validity of atonement.

B. Its defects correspond to its merits :

(a) Since realism cannot account for expiation without ascribing to Christ the totality of human nature, not merely in the sense that his humanity was complete, but in the sense that he took the whole race upon himself ; and since this summation of mankind in him is possible to the view of only the most highly speculative realism, the doctrine of *universalia ante rem* ; therefore, the alleged relation of Christ to the race

has no greater degree of certainty than can be claimed by a generally discarded doctrine of philosophy.

(b) In presenting the personal Christ as the object of faith, this theory in all its forms is apt to disparage the objective value of what he did and bore.

(c) In emphasizing the participation of the believer in the Master's victory over sin, the theory fails to show how such an advantage could be shared by the worthies who lived and died before our common nature had been rescued by the God-man. This defect is fatal when the atonement is declared to possess only a subjective efficacy, unless we adopt the Roman Catholic doctrine of a *limbo patrum*.

VI. Conclusions from Review of Theories.

1. All theories of the atonement vary with the philosophy of their times, metaphysical, physical, political, or military. Nominalistic philosophy underlies the Federalist view that the headships of Adam and of Christ were due not to relations of being, but to divine appointment. Realism is the basis of every theory which regards human nature capable of receiving Christ into the community of its ills, and of sharing in him a common life. Scientific conceptions of law give an ethical character to all recent views. Doctrines of political expediency shaped the Grotian and New England theory. The rigorous medieval demand of satisfaction for affronted honor was met in the Twelfth Century tenet of Anselm. The ancient law of war which gave a conqueror property in his captives begat the patristic fancy of a ransom paid to Satan.

Every man holds some sort of philosophy. Every thoughtful man perceives that his philosophy bears in some way upon the facts involved in the atonement. But the history of speculation on this subject warns us not to put undue con-

fidence in theories concerning it; for, until a final philosophy is reached and correctly applied, no theory can be more than tentative.

2. Closely allied truth and error are found in the fundamental assumptions of each theory; and, as a consequence, each provides for a special end, both scriptural and indispensable, while in nearly every case denying an equally valuable end proposed by some other theory. The mingling of true and false in fundamentals, together with the good ends contemplated by the several theories, may be illustrated as follows:

It was a fundamental error of the Fathers that Satan had a right to his captives; yet it was fundamentally true that he held men captive, and Christ achieved the end of "destroying through death him that had the power of death, that is, the devil." While we reject the Federalist's postulate that the relations of God to man turn on merely ordained headships of Adam and of Christ, he correctly teaches that Christ represents both God and man officially, and that he thus provided an expiation conformable to the claims of justice. We cannot assume with the Governmentalist that penalties are imposed and removed at discretion; yet he rightly takes for granted that moral laws and awards declare a personal demand of God, are administered in personal good will and wisdom toward the governed, and that the atonement aims to give play to the divine benevolence by magnifying the divine authority. The speculative Realist is unable to prove the existence of generic human nature, in the sense required by the peculiar phase of realistic theory; but he properly insists that the representative offices of Christ were grounded in a representative nature, and that the atonement affects, through faith, a vital relation between the believer and Christ. The Socinian denies without warrant the intrinsic necessity for an expiation of sins, but urges with truth a fact equally fundamental, that God will not

reject the sacrifice of a broken heart, and finds a purposed fruit of the atonement in the motives which it supplies to piety and virtue.

3. Since theories pretend to exclusiveness precisely on account of error in their foundations, suspicion is invited by any theory which fails either to recognize the fundamental truths, or to cover the ends which have found a wide and enduring acceptance with faithful students of the word of God. Our endeavor must be, by closest adhesion to the scriptural data, and by a minimum of theorizing, to reach a doctrine at once Biblical, comprehensive, and philosophically defensible.

PART SECOND.

BIBLICAL STATEMENT.

I. *The mission of Christ was pre-eminently a gift of the divine love.*

As a holy Being, God would necessarily wish to extirpate sin; but, as benevolent, he sought also to save the sinner. Prolonged discussion of the atonement has given to its fitness for meeting the claims of justice a prominence in dogmatics which the Bible accords to it as an expression of the divine love.

Characteristic statements are: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." [John 3 : 16]; "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" [Rom. 5 : 8]; "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins" [1 John 4 : 10].

But the love of God was employed, as we have just seen,

in furnishing a "propitiation for our sins" [cf. 1 John 2 : 2]. Hence we notice, as the further teaching of Scripture,—

II. *Christ was crucified in order that it might be consistent with justice for God to forgive sin.*

The Old Testament forecasts, and the New Testament progressively unfolds, this gracious provision.

1. Some at least of the Levitical sacrifices, especially the sin offering and the trespass offering, were declared to be a covering for the offences to which they were applied [Lev. ch. 4, 5; 6 : 1-7; 7 : 7; 16; 17 : 11; cf. Job 42 : 7, 8]. Whether or not limited to the purgation of ceremonial defilement, they bred in the Hebrew mind a conviction that "without shedding of blood is no remission" [Heb. 9 : 22]. Thus, both by typical significance and by inherent insufficiency, the Levitical expiations prefigured that adequate sacrifice which, at the end of the age, was to be offered once for all [Heb. 7 : 27; ch. 9, and 10 : 1-22].

2. What the law prefigured the prophets foretold. Isaiah said of the Messiah, "The chastisement of our peace was upon him" [ch. 53]; Daniel, that he shall "be cut off, and shall have nothing" [9 : 24-27]; Zechariah, that "the sword . . . shall smite the shepherd" [13 : 7], and that the people of Jerusalem "shall look unto me whom they have pierced" [12 : 10]. Certain messianic psalms are to the same effect [Ps. 22 and 41]. Finally, John the Baptist not only announced the kingdom, and, by a strangely significant rite, consecrated the King [Matt. 3 : 13-15], but pointed him out as "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world" [John 1 : 29, cf. ver. 36]

3. Jesus himself, when fully recognized by his disciples as the Christ, the Son of God [Matt. 16 : 16], began to declare

the necessity for his death and resurrection [ver. 21]. Somewhat later he interpreted this necessity by saying that he "came . . . to give his life a ransom for many" [Mark 10:45, cf. 1 Tim. 2:6]. On the eve of his betrayal he called the cup which he blessed "the cup of the covenant," and bade all drink of it, because "it is shed for many unto remission of sins" [Matt. 26:28]. Finally, after the resurrection, he again showed how "that the Christ should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day, and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name" [Luke 24:46, 47].

If the Gospels contain but few passages which declare that Christ must die for the remission of sins, these passages are sufficiently explicit. It may be said of them, as of proof-texts adduced from the same books for the divinity of our Lord, that we have little concern with the many meanings they can be made to cover, but much interest in the meaning they naturally convey. It is also worthy of note that, with the possible exception of the description of Jesus as "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world," every express attribution to his cross of an expiatory service is found in the Synoptists, with whom, according to popular opinion, we are not to look for the deeper truths of the gospel.

4. The epistles fully disclose the peculiar design of the crucifixion. The burden of the first five chapters in the epistle to the Romans is that we are "justified by grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, in his blood, to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of sins done aforetime" [3:24, 25; cf. 5:6, 8].

Why it was that Paul would know among the Corinthians nothing "save Jesus Christ, and him crucified" [1 Cor. 2:2], may be learned from his own words [15:3], "I delivered unto you first of all . . . how that Christ died for our sins." Quite

startling is his language in the second epistle [5 : 14], "that one died for all, therefore all died;" that is, all have in Christ borne the penalty of their own offences.

The epistle to the Galatians is an argument for justification through the sufferings of Christ. "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law" by becoming on the cross "a curse for us" [Gal. 3 : 13].

In the letter to the Ephesians [1 : 7, cf. Col. 1 : 14] Christ is said to bestow "redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses."

Peter, in his first epistle, bases an exhortation to patience on the ground that Christ "bare our sins in his body on the tree" [2 : 24], and "because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous" [3 : 18, cf. 1 : 18, 19].

The tersest putting of this doctrine is by John: "He is the propitiation for our sins" [1 John 2 : 2, cf. 4 : 10; 1 : 7].

The amplest statement, in terminology of the Old Testament, is afforded by the epistle to the Hebrews, which elaborately argues the superiority of Jesus Christ over all whom the Jews most honored from the complete sufficiency, among other things, of his high-priestly service in offering himself unto God once for all for sins [7 : 27; ch. 9; 10 : 1-22].

III. *The resurrection of our Lord had a share in procuring forgiveness.*

1. This is a marked peculiarity of the book of Acts. The reported theme of Peter's preaching is the Messiah, wickedly crucified, triumphantly exalted, and, as a magnanimous conqueror, graciously disposed to forgive those who repent of their rebellion. In none of his addresses does Peter in terms ascribe forgiveness to the sacrifice, but repeatedly assures it through

the enthronement of our Lord. Because the people had crucified him, they ought to repent; but because God had exalted him, let them accept him as their Prince and Saviour [cf. 2: 23 with 36, 38; 3: 15 with 19; 4: 10 with 11, 12; 5: 30 with 31; 10: 39 with 40-43].

Paul's addresses, as here reported, are almost as exclusively devoted to the procurement of forgiveness by the resurrection. In the earliest on record, that at Antioch in Pisidia, an historical review after the manner of Stephen leads to a statement of the crucifixion, a discussion of the resurrection, and an offer for the first time of justification by faith from all things from which men "could not be justified by the law of Moses" [13: 16-41]. The ground of justification is not stated, but the offer follows directly upon the exposition of the resurrection. The sole explicit reference in the Acts to the efficacy of the blood of Christ occurs in Paul's farewell at Miletus to the Ephesian elders, to whom he commends the church of God (or of the Lord) as "purchased by his blood" [20: 28]. Preaching at Thessalonica [17: 3], confronting the council [23: 6], accounting to Felix for the uproar in the council [24: 15], explaining his doctrine to Festus [25: 19], and defending it to Agrippa [26: 8-23], Paul ever, as at Athens, chooses for his theme "Jesus and the resurrection" [17: 18, 31].

It is no unimportant mark of historical veracity that the book of Acts does not represent the disciples as catching the import of the crucifixion during that early period when all minds were taken up with the resurrection of Jesus, and with its attestation of his claims.

2. The epistles furnish a more fully developed doctrine of the resurrection as well as of the crucifixion. In Rom. 4: 25 he who "was delivered for our offences" is said to have been "raised again for our justification." In 8: 34 escape from condemnation is assured by the fact that "it is Christ Jesus

that died, yea rather that was raised from the dead." In 10:9 salvation is promised to him who believes in his heart that God raised Christ from the dead.

To the Corinthians Paul argues, "If Christ be not risen your faith is in vain; ye are yet in your sins" [1 Cor. 15:17, cf. ver. 14; John 10:17],—a statement which can hardly be so interpreted as to deny to the resurrection all part in securing the remission of sins.

Again, Paul wrote to the Ephesians [4:8] concerning benefits bestowed by Christ, that it was "when he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men."

The intercession of Christ is provided by his resurrection, as Paul notices in Rom. 8:34; and it is the intercession of Christ which provides the hope "both sure and steadfast and entering into that which is within the veil" [Heb. 6:19, 20]. We are satisfied that he is "able to save to the uttermost . . . seeing he ever liveth to make intercession" [Heb. 7:25].

IV. *The atonement has efficacy for the moral renewal of believers.*

In this way the priesthood of Jesus most directly contributes to his kingship, and here too the prophetic office is seen to merge into the priestly,—relations little attended to in dogmatic inquiry, but brought into full view by the Scriptures.

1. The ancient Scriptures prefigure in Christ a subjective as well as objective service. Recognizing at the appointment of the burnt offering incidental reference to expiation through the shedding of blood [Lev. 1:4], we find that this sacrifice was pre-eminently an act of devotion, whereby a man offered himself, and wherein God accepted the worshipper. It was the nation's daily act of worship (See directions for the burnt offering in Exodus and Leviticus, also references to it in later

writings; e. g. Ps. 50: 8-15; 51: 19; 66: 13-15; Isa. 1: 11; 56: 7; Mark 12: 33; Rom. 12: 1). The passover also was to be explained to the children at its celebration as meaning that, because God had spared all the first-born of Israel when he destroyed all the first-born of Egypt, all first-born males of man or beast belong unto the Lord [Exod. 13: 14, 15]. This idea is brought forward by Paul, when he exhorts the Corinthians to purify themselves because "our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ" [1 Cor. 5: 7].

2. The frequent and ethically close association in both Testaments of repentance with forgiveness shows that forgiveness of sins and abandonment of sinning are inseparable, that change of a man's character is involved in a change of his relations to God.

3. Our Lord unequivocally claims that his teaching has power to transform men. He thus accords it a part in the atonement, and shows that he identifies salvation with righteousness of life [Luke 8: 12; John 5: 34]. Unhappily, orthodox theology has left this large and vital part of the Master's doctrine to be emphasized by heretics; apparently from a fear that to honor his teaching might be to disparage his cross, as has certainly been done. But this danger is averted for those who bear in mind that the Saviour's words do not claim to have, and could not have, a Godward or expiatory office, but an efficacy manward and renovating.

(a) In closing the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus held out a promise to those who keep his sayings, and a warning to the disobedient [Matt. 7: 24-29], which cannot be construed into a Pauline intimation that obedience is impossible and ruin certain. Even less admissible is it to find in the beatitudes, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled;" "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God"; or in that inimitable invitation, "Come

unto me take my yoke learn of me and ye shall find rest" [Matt. 11 : 28-30],—it would be intolerable to find here only the stern and almost mocking formula of the law, "Cursed is the man that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them" [Gal. 3 : 10]. We are rather to understand from these sayings of Christ a doctrine correspondent to the stage reached in the unfolding of his plans; namely, that to accept him as Master and Teacher was to do "the work of God" [John 6 : 29], to find peace, and to be in the way of receiving whatever good his mission might thereafter provide.

(b) The transforming power of the Saviour's teaching is an especial theme of the Gospel according to John. "The words that I have spoken unto you are spirit, and are life" [6 : 63]. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" [8 : 32]. In the end he could assure his disciples, "Already ye are clean because of the word which I have spoken unto you" [15 : 3]. He even said, "This is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou didst send" [17 : 3]. Clearly Christ did not restrict his sayings to the pedagogic service found by Paul in the law of Moses [Gal. 3 : 23, 24]. Instead, therefore, of the frequent explanation of these claims, that the teachings of Jesus fall under the ancient Dispensation of Law, and prepare for the gospel by deepening the sense of condemnation, it is better to recognize that they belong to the Dispensation of Grace, and that they avowedly promote the redemption of man so far as that consists in delivering him from sin. Still more noteworthy is it that—

4. A transforming power is claimed for the cross.

(a) This again is characteristic of John. Apart from the saying of John the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world" [1 : 29], and possibly with-

out excepting this passage, the Gospel according to John ascribes to the death of Christ the office, not of expiation, but of imparting spiritual life. The key to the entire Gospel is, "In him was life" [1 : 4, cf. ver. 12, 13]. The heavenly mystery revealed to Nicodemus was that, as the serpent was lifted up in the wilderness for a symbol both of sin and of suffering together put away, so the Son of man must be lifted up, and for the like purpose, to give eternal life [3 : 14, 15]. God gave his only begotten Son that believers might have life, not forgiveness [ver. 16]. Often styling himself the Bread of life, the Water of life [4 : 10, 14; 6 : 33, 35, 48-58; 7 : 37], Jesus claims for his cross this extreme moral influence, "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself" [12 : 32].

(b) The more important epistles also ascribe life-giving power to the cross. In the epistle to the Romans the kernel of the sixth chapter is, "Reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus" [ver. 11]. The first part of the seventh chapter, using the law of marriage for illustration, describes the believer as dead to the law by the body of Christ, and married to him who is raised from the dead [ver. 4]; while the second part of this chapter, after rehearsing with unequalled force and pathos the hopeless struggle against sin, breaks into a groan of despair, "Wretched man, who shall deliver me?" and in the next breath into an outcry of triumph, "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord" [ver. 24, 25]. The eighth chapter then follows with an unbroken song of joy that "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and of death" [ver. 2-4].

The testimony of the second epistle to the Corinthians is particularly significant. Chapter five, verse fourteen, presents the objective service of the cross in an extreme form: "That one died for all, therefore all died"; but the next verse assigns

a subjective purpose: "He died for all, that they who live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." Once more, ver. 19 declares that God was in Christ forgiving sins; ver. 21 that Christ vicariously bore our sins, being "made to be sin on our behalf"; and still the object was "that we might become the righteousness of God in him."

Paul nowhere else insists with so indignant emphasis upon the Godward sufficiency of the atonement as in writing to the Galatians; yet nowhere else expresses so complete and loving subjection of himself to its life-giving power. "I have been crucified with Christ, and I no longer live, but Christ liveth in me" [2 : 20, cf. 6 : 14, 15].

The epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians liken the moral results of the atonement to the naturalizing of aliens [Eph. 2 : 13-19; Col. 1 : 21, 22, cf. Titus 2 : 14].

The epistle to the Hebrews represents the work of Christ as the establishment of a new covenant by which believers are brought into a new alliance with God, the formal ratification of which according to ancient custom was in blood, the blood of our Lord [8 : 6-9 : 28]. Again, it contrasts outward purgations by animal sacrifices with inward cleansing by the blood of Christ, so that conscience is cleansed "from dead works to serve the living God" [9 : 14; cf. 10 : 14-17].

The well-known doctrine of James is that the gospel saves by securing good works through faith [2 : 14-26].

Even Peter's strikingly objective language always takes a subjective turn. Christ "bare our sins in his body upon the tree,"—an emphatically objective view of his work; but it was done in order "that we, having died unto sins, might live unto righteousness" [1 Peter 2 : 24]. "Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God" [3 : 18, cf. 1 : 17-19; 4 : 1, 2].

The First Epistle of John contains, as we have seen, that notice of expiation which is wanting in his Gospel; but its prevailing theme is still the same: "He that hath the Son hath life" [5 : 12].

5. The resurrection of Christ is an especially accredited source and support of the new life. Thus it is said that even when we "were dead through our trespasses, God quickened us together with Christ . . . and raised us up with him" [Eph. 2 : 5, 6, cf. 1 : 19, 20; Col. 3 : 1]. God "begat us again unto a living hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead" [1 Peter 1 : 3].

Accordingly in baptism, as submersion signifies being buried with Christ, so emergence is a symbol of coming into life with him [Rom. 6 : 4-11; Col. 2 : 12, 13; 1 Peter 3 : 21].

From this survey we infer that the teaching of the Bible concerning the atonement may be summarized as follows: *The Lord Jesus, by the totality of his service, by his teachings, his personal influence, his passion, resurrection, and ascension, has made every provision required by the holy nature of God and the fallen estate of man to deliver men from the punishment and the dominion of sin.*

PART THIRD.

DOGMATIC STATEMENT.

The distinguishing features of any theory concerning the atonement are fixed, in a synthetic scheme, by the doctrines already treated. It could not be otherwise, for these doctrines and that rest on common foundations. It is not, therefore, unwarrantable to announce as already settled certain postulates which will aid in determining what each factor in the atoning work effected, and how it was effectual.

These postulates are the following :

(1) The atonement is as distinctly the voluntary gift of a personal God as though no law were in the universe.

(2) It is in as strict accord with law as though there were no personal God. And, since law inheres in the natures of things, therefore—

(3) The possibility and the provision for an atonement must be looked for in the natures and relations of the beings immediately concerned, namely, Christ and man.

The method of redemption involves the following particulars: I. In nature and office Christ was the real representative both of God and man; II. As such he actually bore the sins of mankind; III. In bearing sin he made expiation for it unto God; IV. In bestowing expiation his atoning work effects, through the Holy Spirit, the moral renewal of believers.

I. *Christ was the actual representative of both God and man* : that is, what he did was to all intents the act both of God and of man.

1. That his words and deeds are to be accepted as those of the Father follows from his office as an ambassador of God. Jesus always made such a claim [Matt. 10 : 40; John 3 : 34; 5 : 23; 6 : 29; 14 : 9], and Christians do not dispute it. But this relation, though practically uncontested, offers the theory of atonement a light too little regarded, and of which we will presently seek to make use.

2. The always open question is how the works and sufferings of Christ may be construed as those of mankind. If, as above postulated, a real representation of us by Christ must be grounded in the relations of his being to ours, it should be looked for in both the elements of his being, the divine and the human. An ontological relation then is to be sought—

A. In the fundamental reality of the theanthropic nature, in the personal Word of God.

(a) The scope and variety of his relations are seen in the offices of the pre-existent Logos to the universe: by him all things were created [John 1 : 3, 10; Col. 1 : 16; Heb. 1 : 2]; in him all things subsist [John 1 : 4; Col. 1 : 17; Heb. 1 : 3]; through him God rules over all [Matt. 28 : 18; John 16 : 15; Eph. 1 : 22; Col. 1 : 18; Heb. 1 : 6, 8; 1 Peter 3 : 22]; summed up in him (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*) all things shall accomplish their final cause [Eph. 1 : 10; Col. 1 : 16, cf. Rom. 14 : 7, 8].

(b) These are connected relations. The originator of the universe is its proper support; having all things in his hands, he necessarily controls all; complete acceptance of his sway must be for his creatures, as well as for him, their final consummation.

(c) These relations are the closest that can exist. To depend upon the Logos for the origin and continuation of existence, to be subject to his will, and to find in him the goal and perfection of being, is to be represented by him in the fullest degree conceivable short of a pantheistic identification of substance.

One of the passages above referred to [Col. 1 : 14-22] sets forth all four relations; sums them up in the significant declaration, "it pleased the Father that in him should all the fullness dwell"; while, at its beginning and its ending, it connects these cosmic offices with "our redemption" and "peace through the blood of his cross." As Rom. 3 : 24-26 most completely sets forth what the atonement did for us Godward, so this passage is unique in showing the ontologic relations which made an atonement possible.

These relations between the Logos and the universe are all-inclusive up to the point of interposing for the redemption of man; is it possible that at this point they cease to be perti-

nent? Certainly they are deep and wide enough to furnish room for any service whatever which the Logos may undertake in our behalf.

Nor can they be excluded from consideration on the ground that they involve a pantheistic ontology; because we add nothing to the express and accepted doctrine of the Bible as to each of the four relations, when we claim them as a basis for the vicarious relation of Christ to beings whom he would redeem.

(*d*) In all these relations the Logos represents his creatures before God. It is for God that he creates and sustains; he directs and subjects that "God may be all in all" [1 Cor. 8 : 6; 15 : 24, 28]. He acts in all only as agent and viceroy of the Supreme Being.

We might hesitate to say that he is responsible to the Supreme Being both for his own proceedings and for the acts of those over whom he is appointed to rule; because it is possible for them as persons to choose what course they will pursue. Nevertheless—

(*aa*) We recognize a fitness in the appointment of the Second Person in the Trinity, instead of the First, or the Third, to the task of recovering a revolted province; and—

(*bb*) Presumably what our Lord said of the completion of his mission may be carried back to its assignment, "This commandment received I from the Father" [John 10 : 18]. Though not without his own acquiescence, he was "sent into the world" [John 3 : 17; 7 : 29; 8 : 42].

Most substitutionists have felt that the divinity of Christ was essential to his vicarious offices for men; they have ever insisted that, if he were only man, instead of taking our place, he would merely have accepted his own place; but that his representative relations depended upon his divinity has been felt, rather than adequately shown. Christ was further qualified to stand in our place before God—

B. By assuming our nature. In becoming man the Logos specialized relations already existing. What he now undertakes has particular reference to the race whose nature he has put on.

All-inclusive as those pre-existent offices were, there is no one of them which has not attained through the incarnation a higher significance, a completer efficiency. The Word was maker; in this more intimate relation he creates men anew. He sustained existence; now he *is* our life. He had a right to reign; but it is the Son of man to whom every knee shall bow, and whom every tongue shall confess as Lord. Lastly, those strange prophecies about the final consummation, which a pantheist might so easily understand of a re-absorption of the all into the One [Eph. 1: 10; Col. 1: 16-20], were written concerning him who bore the name of Jesus and undertook for men the office of the Christ. Thus the relation of the Logos to mankind was both drawn closer and enlarged when he became man.

How this was possible can be most easily understood from the fact that human nature is so organically one as to constitute every man a member of a corporate whole, much more to receive into oneness with all its members him who already stood as the ground and end of their being. This explanation need not be embarrassed with the profound and engaging, but altogether speculative and questionable, realism of the Middle Ages, which teaches that generic human nature exists so apart from individual men,—*universalia ante rem*,—that the Logos could take up the totality of it and enable it to offer itself on the cross for its own offences. Yet there is a scientific realism which sees in human nature the common basis of all human existence,—*universalia in re*,—a realism which finds in Christ's assumption of our nature the condition of bearing our evils and even of drawing more closely that earlier and divine bond,

by virtue of which, primarily, he might stand in our place before God. We notice then:

(a) Natural science is essentially realistic. The descent of individuals from a common origin testifies that species is more than a succession of individuals; it is an entity perpetuated through individuals. The real existence of species is testified positively by the persistence of type, negatively by the uniform inability of animal hybrids to perpetuate a breach of type. This physical evidence for the entity of race is corroborated by—

(b) The moral sentiment of solidarity. Instinctive in savages, it is highly developed in the civilized. Nor does it rest solely on the physical fact of a common origin. It would acknowledge as a man a creature just like ourselves from any world. It is also a prudent sentiment; because—

(c) The highest and best of our faculties as earthly beings are the social faculties whose activities knit us together. We are next to nothing except as parts of a whole.

In no hazy, speculative sense, then, but in conscious and felt reality, human nature is a vast unit, capable of receiving the divine Logos, and suitable for him to put on. As he did so, pre-existent relations of his being to ours made it impossible for Christ to be merely a specimen man, or less than the Son of man, the second Adam, the true representative of all human kind. Being therefore in deepest reality the representative of both God and man,—

II. *Christ actually bore the sins of men.*

1. As matter of history Christ bore the sin of the world. Coming to recover a revolted race, he first declared in full the law of God, and demanded submission to himself as the Anointed of God. Such demands drove rebellion to extremities. The

husbandmen said, "This is the heir; let us kill him, and the inheritance shall be ours." Then sin culminated in the crucifixion.

It was a bearing of all sin, not through a reckoning to Christ of our several acts of sin, but by virtue of the fact that sin, as a principle of antagonism to God, went all lengths against him whom God had sent [John 6:29; cf. 3:18]. Instead of the perplexing artifice of an immediate imputation, we meet here the deepest reality. The only impulse which drives any one into sinning, that common impulse which makes the breaking of one law the breaking of all law [James 2:10], the impulse of self-willed opposition to the holy God, broke forth in the hour and the power of darkness against Christ as the representative of God; and so, in the literalness of an historically-working principle, was "laid on him the iniquity of us all" [Isa. 53:6].

2. Ethically also Christ bore the sin of the world.

(a) As one of the limitations imposed by the human upon the divine in his person, Christ accepted whatever moral evils were compatible with his paternity. The only such evil of which we have evidence was the liability in all points to be tempted like as we are. "The likeness of sinful flesh" [Rom. 8:3] was not a likeness but a reality of flesh, and a likeness, not a reality, of sin. This likeness without the reality of sin was a participation in our moral liabilities.

How extreme was this constitutional penalty may be seen in the fact that temptation addressed Jesus as the consciously divine. Such were the temptations in the wilderness, renewed at the close of his mission, each corresponding to each, in the suggestion that possibly the cup might pass from him; in the knowledge that twelve legions of angels were ready to deliver him; and in the peculiarly Satanic challenge of priests and scribes, "Let him now come down from the cross and we will

believe on him " [Matt. 27 : 42]. That to be thus tempted was inconceivably painful, none can doubt. "He suffered being tempted" [Heb. 2 : 18]. But that the consciousness of divinity should expose him to such trials was possible only under human limitation of the divine. It was the dreadful penalty of union with our nature [James 1 : 3]; and so by the very constitution of his person he bore the sins of the race ethically.

(b) But that union which imposed limitations upon the divine so enlarged the powers of the human that Christ bore the burden of human sin upon his sympathies to an extent impossible for a mere man. Identifying himself with us, and undertaking to deliver us from sin, he felt the extent of the calamity which he sought to repair. Many recent thinkers find in his sympathy the only endurance of our guilt. We welcome the insight they offer into the heart of our Lord, but cannot limit the burden of sin to his grief at it.

(c) A woe for which we cannot with certainty account, and at which he was himself astonished, deepens the mystery of his death: he lost the sense of his Father's presence. The fact is not affected by attempted explanations. Whether from a consciously vicarious relation to sinners, or from completeness of sympathy with them; whether from horror at death as due to sinners, but violently unnatural to the Holy One and the Just, or from mere physical exhaustion; it is certain that at the last his soul was filled with the horror of "the outer darkness." In any case this was occasioned by the sins of men. Human guilt could lay on him no further burden. He had tasted of the second death, and the sacrifice was complete.

It is not necessary to suppose that the anger of God was poured out upon him, as many orthodox theologians, without warrant of Scripture, have overboldly asserted. On the contrary, the Father loved him because he laid down his life [John 10 : 17]. Nor was Jesus suffering remorse for our sins. Re-

morse is an extremely painful sense of personal wickedness. Yet the outcry of Jesus showed that consciousness of innocence did not save him from feeling that he was forsaken.

Now when the enmity of sinners broke forth upon the Son of God, it would seem that uttermost vengeance must fall upon our ruined race. The cross was in fact the condemnation of sin. This was uniformly proclaimed in the early preaching of Peter, Stephen, and Paul, and was understood by their hearers. It is therefore necessary to inquire how, in bearing our sins,—

III. *Christ offered an acceptable sacrifice for sin.* The inquiry is twofold: 1. How the bearing of sin could serve as an expiation; 2. Why the expiation may be regarded as complete.

1. The sin-bearing was expiatory. That it had not solely the effect of condemning sinners is assured by the facts that "God commendeth his love toward us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us" [Rom. 5 : 8, cf. 1 John 4 : 10]; and that, though in laying down his life Christ fulfilled a commandment received from the Father [John 10 : 18], he no less laid it down of himself. The voluntariness of the sacrifice may not show *how* the crucifixion was an offering for sin, but it assures us of *the fact*. He "came . . . to give his life a ransom for many" [Mark 10 : 45, cf. John 3 : 17].

How the crucifixion was an expiation as well as a condemnation is to be gathered from the doubly representative nature and offices of Christ. Primarily it condemned sin, because it was inflicted upon the representative of God; but it was also a sacrifice for sin, inasmuch as it was accepted by the representative of man. When Christ died for all, then all died [2 Cor. 5 : 14].

Though the effects of these relations are contrasted, they are inseparable. Christ acted and suffered in man's place, only when he acted and suffered as representing God. He bore for us historically the consequences of sin, the extreme outrage of wickedness, precisely in this, that wickedness was directed against the Anointed of God. The cross was therefore a propitiation by being a condemnation. The common factor of these contraries was the suffering for sin. It was a suffering for all sin, since all sin was summed up in the violent rejection of the Christ; and the evils thus borne were an expiation, because they came upon our actual representative.

2. Was the offering adequate? This is in every way assured.

(a) Since he came to give his life a ransom, it is incredible that the ransom should be insufficient. Before the crucifixion the disciples thought too highly of him to endure his own attempts to prepare them for his death; after the resurrection they thought so much more highly of him that they could not well regard the cross as less than an adequate sacrifice for the sins of the world. And in our day many who protest that the atonement is to them a complete mystery, yet so honor Christ that they gladly rest in the sufficiency of whatever he actually undertook.

(b) More specifically, if the dignity of his person deepened the outrage of the cross, it heightened the worth of the sacrifice. That the sufficiency of the sacrifice is due to the infinite worth of the sufferer is elaborately argued in the epistle to the Hebrews. We may affirm of the procuring cause in redemption as well as of the goodness which gave it, that "where sin abounded grace did much more abound."

(c) The Father's approval of the Son secures the acceptance of the offering. We are "accepted in the beloved" [Eph.

1: 6]. Those early Socinians were not altogether wrong who affirmed that God rewarded the obedience of Christ with the privilege of forgiving sinners. And quite at the opposite pole of theology, they who regard the active obedience of Christ as imputed to the elect cannot be mistaken thus far: to wit, that the approved person of the intercessor adds effect to his intercession.

(d) The resurrection of our Lord gives completeness to his propitiatory work. Had he sunk under the burden of our sins to rise no more, that result would have been fatal to sinners also. If Christ be not raised, our faith is vain, we are yet in our sins [1 Cor. 15: 17]. But "he exhausted the penalty." The pains of death could not hold him [Acts 2: 24]; and when "he ascended on high he led captivity captive" [Eph. 4: 8].

Thus we see that, while in laying their offences upon Christ as the representative of God, men have completed their own condemnation, Christ, in accepting that burden as the representative of mankind, has offered an adequate expiation. But whether the sinner shall be condemned or redeemed by the cross, depends upon his own attitude. If he persists in rejecting Christ, he identifies himself with the crucifiers; but through submission and trust he himself is "crucified with Christ" [Gal. 2: 20]. We note, therefore,—

IV. *The atonement is adapted to the moral renewal of believers.* The entire work of Christ is fitted to this end.

1. His teachings have a renovating power which did not belong to the ancient law. So long as the law but partially reveals God it has an appearance of arbitrariness, takes the form of positive requirement, and so far renders obedience constrained and irksome. On the contrary, the thorough-

going and heart-searching requirements of Jesus are felt to be the appropriate and necessary demands of a holy God, until now at length all men acknowledge their charm. The teaching and example of Christ, in thus furnishing the ideal and begetting the desire for righteousness, prepare the first condition and provide a fit instrument for the moral renewal of men. The truth makes the disciples free [John 8 : 32].

2. In thus fully and authoritatively revealing God, Jesus becomes the Master. It would be impossible to depend upon any one for instruction on so all-important matters, and avoid accepting his control. The disciples of Christ in all ages call him Lord, and joyfully accept his transforming power.

3. Both the teaching and the personal ascendancy of Christ culminate at the cross.

(a) Here, he completes the revelation, on the one hand, of the holiness and the grace of God; on the other hand, of the wickedness but also of the worth of man.

(b) Here, by making propitiation for sinfulness unto holiness the Crucified establishes himself in our hearts as Lord, fulfilling the deep and beautiful thought of the psalm: "There is forgiveness with thee that thou mayest be feared" [Ps. 130 : 4]. Every step of the process is of profound importance. The assurance of forgiveness heals the paralysis of guilt; detestation for sin crucifies the world unto us, us unto the world; gratitude persuades to obedience, and faith passes from a mere acceptance of pardon into a transforming energy.

4. Finally, we may understand in part how the resurrection of Christ is a source to us of spiritual life. Enthroning the Messiah [Rom. 1 : 4; Eph. 1 : 20; Phil. 2 : 9-11], it summons us to submission [Acts 5 : 31]; completing the atonement [John 10 : 17; Rom. 4 : 25; 8 : 34; Eph. 4 : 8], and showing that it is complete [Heb. 10 : 12, cf. 9 : 28], it invites our faith [Rom. 8 : 34; Heb. 6 : 19, 20; 7 : 25; 1 Peter 1 :

3]; assuring us of immortality in Christ [1 Cor. 15 : 20], it is a pledge of the always associated idea of a true ethical life in him [John 14 : 19, 20; Rom. 6 : 8-11; 8 : 2, 10, 11; Eph. 2 : 5; Phil. 3 : 10-12; Col. 3 : 3, 4].

We conclude in general :

(1) Since Christ, the actual representative of men, by bearing the penal consequences of sin made full expiation for it, God withdraws all objective marks of his displeasure from those who accept his grace.

(2) The subjective penalties of sin are removed by the remedial energy of a new life, derived from Christ through the Holy Spirit.

(3) The cross, considered solely as imposed upon the Anointed of God, demands the destruction of our guilty race; considered solely as accepted by the substitute of the race, it would ensure impunity for sin. Its counter demands are reconciled in acceptance of Christ and in the attendant submission to him.¹

§ 45. *Necessity of the Atonement.*

By this may be meant either that God was in some way constrained to furnish atonement, or that without an atonement men could not be saved.

I. If it be asked whether an atonement were due from

¹ Whether the four propositions in which an attempt has been made to set forth a theory of the atonement are satisfactory in that view or not, they call attention to facts a recognition of which is of moment to the preacher as well as the theologian. It is matter of fact that Christ by virtue of both his natures stood as our representative before God; it is matter of fact that he bare our sins; it is sheer fact that the cross which condemned all sin offers expiation for all; it is a fact that the atonement avails to transform our affections as well as to purge our guilt.

God, we may confidently reply that it was not due to man. Man can claim justice, but by justice he is condemned. Relatively to the sinner, atonement is a free gift [Rom. 5 : 15-17].

But was God under any obligation to furnish a means of redemption which men could not claim? To answer this question we must recollect that the ultimate standard of moral obligation is the nature of God himself. Thus the question becomes, Was God constrained by his own nature to give his Son? We reply,—

1. We know that God, self-moved [1 John 4 : 9], and in fulfillment of his own eternal purpose [Acts 2 : 23; 1 Peter 1 : 19, 20; Rev. 13 : 8], has provided an atonement which reveals his power, wisdom, holiness, and love. Justice also required atonement as a condition of forgiving sin; but did justice impel God to meet that condition by providing the atonement? When we recollect that what is well for any being cannot be anything else than what is fit for him, we are assured that benevolence and justice move under different impulsions toward the same end. But if the question arise,—

2. Would it have been compatible with the nature of God to withhold the atonement, we must reply that the Scripture is silent on this point, and conjecture would be hazardous, if not unlawful. The utmost we are at liberty to say is that, having undertaken to bring many sons unto glory, “it became him (*ἔπρεπε αὐτῷ*) for whom and by whom are all things (that is, it was suitable to his nature and relations) to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings” [Heb. 2 : 10]. If the atonement was costly, we are warranted in holding that to make a costly sacrifice was as appropriate in God as it was requisite for man.

II. That the atonement is indispensable for the redemption of man is evident from the facts :

1. An atonement was provided. Paul assures the Galatians that, "If there had been a law given which could make alive, verily righteousness would have been of the law" [Gal. 3 : 21]. And Peter says, "Neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved" [Acts 4 : 12]; that is, it is necessary to man to be saved by this name. Our Lord himself demanded of his disciples after his resurrection, "Behooved it not the Christ (*ἐδεῖ* = was it not necessary) to suffer these things and to enter into his glory" [Luke 24 : 26].

2. The claims of justice would still hold against the sinner, if Christ had not actually and adequately taken his place [Rom. 3 : 26 ; Gal. 3 : 13].

Now, in declaring the righteousness of God by means of a propitiation [Rom. 3 : 25], the atonement met the further difficulty that—

3. To forgive sinners without an expiation would be to imperil the divine government. But through the cross of Christ God "magnified the law and made it honorable" [Isa. 42 : 21 ; Rom. 10 : 4].

4. The purpose of God as a holy Being, as a sovereign Ruler or as a gracious Benefactor would remain unfulfilled, and human needs unmet, if believers were to continue in sin. The atonement is the only effective instrument to break, through the Holy Spirit, the bonds of sin [Rom. 6 : 1-11 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 21 ; Gal. 2 : 20 ; 1 Peter 3 : 18].

5. If the question arise how the needs of the Old Testament worthies were met in the atonement, we may reply that,—

(a) So far as the atonement has Godward efficacy, is an offering to the divine justice, it is retroactive. Paul says expressly that it had reference to "sins done aforetime" [Rom. 3 : 25].

(b) So far as its efficacy is manward, that is, serves to win

man from sin, the atonement cannot help those who never hear the Good News [Rom. 10 : 13-15], whether they be ancient Israelites or modern heathen. In this regard the greatest among them is less than "the least in the kingdom of heaven" [Matt. 11 : 11]. And yet those who, in any age and under any degree of ignorance, are persuaded of the divine love, may love God because he first loved us [1 John 4 : 19].

§ 46. *Extent of the Atonement.*

In the discussion of this topic, two questions are involved :
1. Was the atonement intended for all men? 2. Was it adequate for all?

1. In respect of the divine purpose, the atonement may be called either "general" or "particular." The New Testament declares with equal distinctness that Christ died for all men, and that he died in a special sense for some men. Thus, on the one hand, we are told that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son" [John 3 : 16, cf. 1 John 4 : 14]; that "he died for all" [2 Cor. 5 : 15, cf. ver. 19]; that he "gave himself a ransom for all" [1 Tim. 2 : 6]; that God "would have all men to be saved" [1 Tim., 2 : 4], and that Jesus, "by the grace of God, should taste death for every man" [Heb. 2 : 9]. On the other hand, Christ said "I lay down my life for the sheep" [John 10 : 15], and Paul wrote that Christ "loved the church and gave himself for it" [Eph. 5 : 25, cf. Acts 20 : 28]. Both aspects of the case are presented together in 1 Tim. 4 : 10; "the living God . . . is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe."

Without pretending to know how these different phases of truth harmonize, we conclude that the purpose of the atonement is general, in so far as God is "not wishing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" [2 Peter

3 : 9]; and that it is particular, in so far as human destiny "is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy" [Rom. 9 : 16].

2. As to the adequacy of the atonement for all men there can be no reasonable doubt. Recalling the nature of its provisions,—

(a) We do not find that the burden laid upon Christ was graduated to the number of persons who were to be saved. On the contrary, we are expressly assured of its sufficiency for all: "One died for all, therefore all died" [2 Cor. 5 : 14]; Jesus Christ "is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world" [1 John 2 : 2.]

(b) The gospel is as fit an instrument for the spiritual renewal of all as of any, who do not reject it.

The summary statement long familiar among Calvinists is therefore satisfactory; namely, that the atonement is sufficient for all men, efficient for the elect.

§ 47. *The Intercession of Christ.*

Having finished on earth the priestly function of sacrifice, Christ assumed in heaven the priestly office of intercession [Rom. 8 : 34]. He began to exercise this office while yet upon earth, although he had not yet completed the work on which the special efficacy of his intercession depends. He prayed for Simon that his faith might not fail [Luke 22 : 32], and the seventeenth chapter of John is his prayer of intercession for the church.

The epistle to the Hebrews elaborates this doctrine from the point of view furnished by the law of Moses. On the great Day of Atonement, while the high priest was making expiation in the Holy of Holies, all other sacrifices were suspended in deference to the sufficiency of that in which the high priest was

engaged, and no one beside him was permitted in the tabernacle [Lev. 16 : 17]. In like manner Christ, the perpetual high priest, alone and continually presents to God in the true temple the sufficient sacrifice which he had made once for all [Heb. 7 : 24-28; 8 : 1 to 10 : 22].

In 1 John 2 : 1 the intercession of Christ is represented as that of an advocate for his clients.

These various representations ought not to be taken literally. Christ is not to be regarded as incessantly making petition for his saints, all and each; nor as endorsing at the same instant to the Father the various prayers which are incessantly offered in his name; nor as perpetually recalling to the Father's notice the sacrifice made on Calvary. And yet his intercession is equivalent to all this. It may perhaps be best conceived as so complete an identification of Christ with believers that, on the one hand, he is their perpetual surety unto God; and, on the other hand, a sufficient assurance to them that God will accept the petitions which they offer in the name of Christ, as if he were offering them for himself [John 14 : 13, 14; 16 : 24, 26; Eph. 5 : 20; Heb. 7 : 22; 1 John 2 : 12].

§ 48. *The Ordo Salutis.*

Having studied the atonement and intercession of Christ, we have next to consider how these become available to the individual. The reply constitutes the Doctrines of Grace. The order of their presentation follows whatever is regarded as the true *Ordo Salutis*. Regeneration is often allowed precedence over justification, on the ground that it is impossible for the unrenewed heart to exercise faith, the chief condition of being justified.

But it would seem more natural for justification to clear away the ruins of the old life before regeneration lays the

foundation of the new life; particularly, since the chief objection urged against a moral influence theory of atonement is that the guilt of the past must be cancelled before future obedience can either be secured, or could be accepted; and until the sinner is justified, his guilt remains. The only imperative reason for giving the first place to regeneration is met, if the divine conditions of individual salvation, namely, election and calling, are placed before the human conditions, namely, repentance and faith.

For these and other considerations the best order of study would seem to be the following: *First, the conditions of individual salvation*: namely, election and calling, the divine conditions; repentance and faith, the human conditions; *secondly, the content of individual salvation*: namely, justification, regeneration, and the divine and the human aspects of edification, to wit, sanctification and perseverance.

§ 49. *Election and Calling.*

The salvation provided for all is apparently secured by but part of our race. This result is referred by the Scriptures to the sovereignty of God and the depravity of man. How these factors in the problem are related is the theme of sharply conflicting theories. No theory is free from difficulty, but a Calvinistic view of election and calling seems to be most comprehensive of the data which, however hard to work into a consistent theory, must all be taken into account.

I. Election.

1. As to the Elect.

Election is the divine choice of certain men to be saved. When contemplated as taking place in the eternal councils of

God, election is called predestination. The eternity of election is taught in Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9. Individual election is represented in the New Testament as—

(a) A direct inference from the sovereignty of God. "He hath mercy on whom he will" [Rom. 9:18]; he predestinates "according to the good pleasure of his will" [Eph. 1:5]. Paul did not hesitate to say that God might do as he pleased with his creatures [Rom. 9:10-24]. Paul here meant to close the mouth of an objector; but, when we take into account that God cannot choose contrary to his own nature, that is, either unrighteously or unlovingly, we may well rejoice that human destiny is controlled by the sovereign will of God.

(b) Election is used to prove that salvation is not of works but of grace. The question was not whether God elects, but whether salvation is purely his gift. Paul takes the election for granted, in order to satisfy his readers that they could not save themselves. Hence he writes, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy" [Rom. 9:16]; we are called and saved, "not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace" [2 Tim. 1:9].

(c) Conversely, as the Scriptures infer freedom of grace from election, so we may infer election from freedom of grace. A gift is ever bestowed upon a person chosen by the giver. Accordingly Jesus said to his disciples, "Ye did not choose me, but I chose you" [John 15:16].

(d) Election does not depend upon a foreknown belief, but belief depends upon election. Hence we are told that "as many as were ordained to eternal life believed" the preaching of Paul [Acts 13:48]; Paul calls the Thessalonian Christians "beloved of the Lord, for that God chose you from the beginning unto salvation in sanctification of the Spirit and belief of

the truth" [2 Thess. 2: 13]; and Jesus expects only those that the Father giveth him will come unto him [John 6: 37].

2. As to the Non-elect.

As to the incorrigibly wicked two views have been held among Calvinists:

A. Supralapsarianism taught that God, for his own glory, decreed in logical, not temporal succession: that some human beings should be saved, and some should be lost; that he would create the human race; that he would permit its fall; that he would provide an atonement for the elect. This doctrine is called supralapsarian, because it held that the decree of election logically preceded the decree to permit the fall.

B. Sublapsarianism (or infralapsarianism), that the decree of election followed the decree of the fall, is the usual doctrine of Calvinists, so far as the order of decrees now engages their attention. It takes two forms:

(a) Those who hold to particular atonement place the decrees in the following order: the decree to create, to permit the fall, to save some, to provide atonement for the elect.

(b) For those who contend that election is in Christ, and that the atonement is general, the following has been proposed as the true order: the decree to create, to permit to fall, to provide atonement, to secure its acceptance by some.

According to sublapsarianism in either form, God does not appoint any to sin, but his choice passes over some (*praeterition*), and justly condemns them to punishment (*reprobation*). The passages which seem to teach supralapsarianism have already been considered under the doctrine of decrees.

II. The Divine Calling.

The election of grace is carried into effect through the

divine call. "Whom he did predestinate, them he also called" [Rom. 8 : 30]. The call may be either general or special and effectual.

1. General or outward calling is conveyed by all the agencies that stir the conscience and the heart : by the voices of nature, of divine providence, of Scripture, or of the living preacher.

2. Special, inward, or effectual calling is such persuasion by the Holy Spirit as secures an acceptance of the gospel. That special calling is requisite is variously and abundantly shown in the New Testament.

(a) The carnal mind is averse to the acceptance of spiritual good. It minds the things of the flesh [Rom. 8 : 5]; the things of the Spirit of God are foolishness unto it [1 Cor. 2 : 14]; it is even enmity against God [Rom. 8 : 7].

(b) Christ said that none can come to him except the Father draw them [John 6 : 44, 65]; that it was given to some and not to others to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven [Matt. 13 : 11]; that "many are called, but few are chosen" [Matt. 20 : 16].

(c) Paul teaches that faith is a gift of God. Christians are to judge themselves "soberly, according as God hath dealt to each man a measure of faith" [Rom. 12 : 3], and to regard it as in some cases a distinguishing gift of the Spirit [1 Cor. 12 : 9]. It is recorded that Lydia attended unto the things spoken by Paul, because the Lord had opened her heart [Acts 16 : 14].

Three questions concerning the divine call require notice :

(1) Is the Holy Spirit concerned in the general call? Not a few contend that the Holy Spirit is given to believers only.

It is true, and it is natural, that the special gift of Christ to his church is rarely spoken of in the New Testament as

sent to the wicked; but its mission to the world is more than once declared. This is all that should be looked for, and is enough to assure us that the Holy Spirit has such a mission. Our Lord himself specifies what that mission is: it is to "convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment" [John 16 : 8-11]. But in performing this office the Spirit may be resisted and repelled. The martyr Stephen exclaimed against the council, "Ye do always resist the Holy Spirit: as your fathers did, so do ye" [Acts 7 : 51, cf. possibly Gen. 6 : 3]. The general call, therefore, like the special, is ministered by the Holy Spirit, but may be repelled; whereas, the special call effectually moves the will to accept the truth.

(2) May we then conclude that effectual calling is irresistible? While this is a natural and a common inference, the following considerations go to show that it is not a necessary, nor even a legitimate inference:

(a) The Bible often speaks of special calling as effectual, but nowhere describes it as irresistible; and in dealing with the profoundly mysterious relation of the divine Spirit to the human will, it is unwarrantable to affirm as truth any notion not distinctly revealed in the Scripture.

(b) To speak of irresistible influence being applied to the self-determining faculty in man is a contradiction in terms.

(3) May we then understand that certain texts make the efficacy of the call depend upon the favorable disposition of the called? An example is John 1 : 12: "As many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name."

But the origin of the favorable disposition is not explained in this text. It is apparently identified with belief; and this, as we have already seen, is a gift of God.

III. Objections to Election and Calling.

These doctrines have been objected to by all anti-Augustinian Romanists, and all anti-Calvinistic Protestants; by Pelagians, on the ground that every man has full power to choose, or to turn from sin; by semi-Pelagians, on the ground that, although weakened by the fall, man is able to attempt, and upon attempting, receives divine grace to achieve, his own conversion; by the council of Trent, on the ground that the human will co-operates with the Holy Spirit in regeneration; by Lutherans, on the ground that, though disabled by natural depravity from choosing righteousness, man is free to choose the means of grace; by Wesleyans, on the ground that the atonement has secured for every man the bestowment at birth of grace sufficient to accept the gospel, if he will; by all objectors, on the ground that God elects, individually or collectively, those who, as he foresees, will believe in Christ.

Special objections, irrespective of divisions in the church, are the following:

1. Election of some to life involves election of others unto death. We reply:

(a) Completely to reconcile the logical inferences from absolute sovereignty and infinite grace is impossible to a finite mind; but greater difficulties are met, unless both attributes are kept in view.

(b) While the Scriptures do not formulate the relations of the divine attributes concerned in election, they do teach that election is "the election of grace" [Rom. 11 : 5], and that the sovereignty of grace is shown in the effectual persuasion of some to accept the gospel [Eph. 1 : 11, 12; 2 : 7-9]; while the condemnation of any for the persistent choice of evil illustrates the equal supremacy of justice [Rom. 9 : 17, 22; 11 : 22].

2. The election of some, but not of others, implies partiality in God. We reply:

(a) God's choice is sovereign, yet not capricious. Al-

though the reasons for his choice are unknown, we know that they wrong no one.

(b) God has proved by the gift of his Son that the exercise of his will, however sovereign, and however incomprehensible, cannot be harsh, or unloving.

3. Effectual calling implies insincerity in the general call.

(a) If this objection proves anything, it proves too much. The law sincerely demands obedience, but inevitably provokes resistance [Rom. 7 : 5-16]. The gospel sincerely offers the grace of God, yet "the word of the cross is to them that perish foolishness," and will "destroy the wisdom of the wise" [1 Cor. 1 : 18, 19], "in order that no flesh should glory before God" [ver. 29]; to some it is even "a savor from death unto death" [2 Cor. 2 : 16]. And yet it does not follow that either the commandment or the invitation is insincerely presented to those who, it is foreknown, will reject them, and whose condemnation is but deepened by the call.

(b) If no one whatever were effectually persuaded to accept the general call, no one would venture to pronounce the call insincere. Is it then the less sincere if certain men are effectually persuaded to accept it? Or must the general call be thought insincere because the divine reasons for a special call in given cases have not been made known unto us?

4. Election and calling are incompatible with freedom of the will.

On the contrary, the divine influence is exercised in so entire harmony with the laws of the mind as to restore the freedom which was impaired by the fall. The divine and the human choices are so related that we may be consistently exhorted to "give the more diligence to make our calling and election sure" [2 Peter 1 : 10].

5. Calling and election are incompatible with human

responsibility, because according to these doctrines, it is hopeless to attempt serving God without his aid. But—

(a) In doing wrong man resists not alone the ordinary influence of the Holy Spirit, but also the law, which, whether he can obey it or not, cannot without disaster be violated.

(b) In doing wrong the sinner consciously follows his own choice.

The doctrines of sovereign predestination and effectual calling are not necessarily untrue because they belong to “the deep things of God,” or because they can hardly be profitable to “babes in Christ.” Luther, as quoted in Lange, on Rom. 9, wisely said, “Who hath not known passion, cross, and trial of death, cannot treat of foreknowledge (election of grace) without injury and inward enmity toward God. Wherefore take heed that thou drink not wine while thou art yet a sucking babe. Each several doctrine hath its own season and measure and age.” If treated at all, the doctrines must be presented in due relation to other truths. Set in their proper place, and before suitable persons, they promote loyalty toward God, humility and courage toward men.

§ 50. *Repentance and Faith.*

When election by the Father has become operative through effectual calling of the Holy Spirit, the sinner is enabled to meet the indispensable conditions of his salvation: he repents of his offences, and believes on the Lord Jesus Christ. The more obvious duty of repentance receives earlier prominence in the Scriptures, and will be first considered.

I. Repentance.

Of the two words in the New Testament for repenting, *μεταμέλομαι* is infrequently used, and signifies to feel an after-

care, that is, to change one's concern or interest, with regret for the earlier choice. *Μετανοέω* and *μετάνοια*, which occur many times, mean a change of mind about anything, in a moral sense a changed conception, together with contrition and a different course of life [see Cremer's *Bib. Thel. Lex. in loco*]. These latter words thus imply the three elements found in evangelical repentance; namely, a new view, new feelings, and new conduct,—acts of intellect, of sensibility, and of will.

1. Repentance normally begins with a fresh, even a surprised recognition of disregarded facts; the penitent is convicted "in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment" [John 16 : 8]. Conduct and aims are now surveyed in the light in which God sees them. David received a new view from Nathan's parable [2 Sam. 12 : 1-7]; the prodigal son came to a new view when "he came to himself" [Luke 15 : 17]; new light arrested Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus [Acts 9 : 1-9], and was so important as to be the only specified cause of the most momentous conversion in the history of the church.

2. Emotion attends the amended estimate. It may be alarm at the recognized danger of punishment, horror at the enormity of sin, or longing for righteousness unattained. An emotionless repentance is abnormal.

Yet a painful degree of fear, of self-reproach, or of yearning for righteousness may be fruitlessly, even hurtfully, suffered [Matt. 19 : 22; 27 : 3-5; 2 Cor. 7 : 10]. To penitence must therefore be added—

3. Amendment of life. Forgiveness is promised to those who so deeply regret sin as to abandon it [Ps. 34 : 18; Isa. 55 : 7; Ezek. 33 : 11; Mark 1 : 4; Luke 15 : 7; 24 : 47; Acts 3 : 19; 2 Cor. 7 : 10]. We have distinct assurances that the divine compassion is moved by thorough repentance [Ps. 51 : 17; Isa. 66 : 2; 1 John 1 : 9].

Yet it must not be imagined that forgiveness is earned by sorrow. On the contrary, the deepest grief for sin is possible only to one who has already experienced forgiveness. It is the goodness of God which leads to repentance [Rom. 2 : 4]. "Repentance toward God" springs from the same source as "faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ" [Acts 20 : 21].

II. Faith.

Faith appropriates the atonement. The doctrine of faith therefore shows how the atonement does its work. It is the key to soteriology. There is especial need in our day to show that faith can meet the demand for ethical results, without loosening our hold upon the Reformers' doctrine of justification by faith.

1. The Nature of Evangelical Faith.

There is no obscurity as to the meaning of the word *πίστις*, or faith, as it occurs in the New Testament. It signifies trust, or firm confidence in its object. But we cannot entrust ourselves to an unseen Being unless he seems real to us. Nor can we properly represent to ourselves as real a Being of whose existence we are not reasonably assured. Faith, therefore, can be analyzed into three elements, the first of which, in the synthetic order about to be followed, is indispensable to the second, the first and second indispensable to the third.

A. Faith is primarily a kind of knowledge. It is a discernment of spiritual things. A purely intellectual process cannot deal with such things, as it cannot with the right and beautiful. And yet faith is not credence without proof; for, like the right and the beautiful, spiritual things become objects of

knowledge through the use of an appropriate faculty. "Through faith we understand," *πίστει νοοῦμεν* [Heb. 11 : 3].

Faith in this primary sense is repeatedly distinguished by John from an acceptance of evidence addressed solely to the intellect. On the evidence of his miracles the intellect of many Jews accepted Christ as a "teacher sent from God" [John 2 : 23 ; 3 : 2]; but Christ distinguished this intellectual certitude from the faith which discerns spiritual things, for he "did not trust himself unto" those Jews [John 2 : 24]; on the contrary, he demanded of one of them, Nicodemus, how he could believe if he were told of heavenly things [3 : 12; cf. 4 : 39 with 41, 42, also 12 : 37-40].

According to Paul, it is the insight of faith into spiritual realities that delivers conscience from bondage to formalism [Rom. 14 : 1, 17, 22; 1 Cor. 8; Galatians, *passim*; Col. 2 : 6-23]; and to Timothy he asserts in memorable words that his own faith amounts to knowledge [2 Tim. 1 : 12; cf. 2 Cor. 4 : 2-4]. Because apprehended only in this way, Christian truth is often called "the Faith" [Eph. 4 : 13; 1 Tim. 3 : 9; 4 : 1; 6 : 21; Titus 1 : 13, 14; 2 : 2; Jude 3].

Although the spiritually minded alone can search and know "the deep things of God" [1 Cor. 2 : 9-16], the unregenerate to some degree exercise this element of faith [1 Cor. 14 : 24, 25]. They feel assured that God exists, and their assurance is ordinarily due not to arguments, but to insight through moral feeling. And so far they apprehend the existence of God as a spiritual reality, not as a merely provable fact.

We are not to infer that this cognitive element in faith is the act of a special faculty. It is the joint act of one or more among several faculties; namely, of reason, moral sensibility, aesthetic sensibility, and the affections. Thus the existence of a Creator commends itself to the causal judgment; an infinitely holy Being is the highest reality to conscience; the idea of a

Most High is true to the faculty which wonders and worships; one worthy of all love is both demanded and recognized by the heart. Obviously, faith here apprehends what is not cognizable by intellection alone; yet the intellect may reasonably admit the reality of knowledge through the aid of other faculties as unhesitating and persistent as itself.

B. A second element in faith is a vivid representation to oneself of those spiritual verities which are apprehended by the first element in faith. This is sometimes called "a realizing sense" of spiritual things. It is a religious use of the imagination, an imaging not of fancies but of facts already verified, yet which without being thus imaged would fail of their proper effect.

This is the element of faith defined in the epistle to the Hebrews [11:1] as "assurance of things hoped for, a conviction of things not seen." The entire chapter illustrates this element in faith; e. g., with Moses it was a "seeing of him who is invisible" [ver. 27]. It is when invisible things are clearly discerned by the mind's eye that "we walk by faith, not by sight [2 Cor. 5:7], can forget the things which are behind, and stretch forward to the things which are before [Phil. 3:13], and are able to "run . . . the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus" [Heb. 12:1, 2].

C. The spiritual realities which the Holy Spirit enables us both to cognize and realize become possible objects of trust,—the third and culminating element in faith. But this meaning of the word is so familiar and undisputed in the usage alike of the Bible and of the church, as to need no illustration.

2. The Offices of Evangelical Faith.

These correspond to its elements.

(1) As faith is primarily an apprehension of spiritual things, it offers, to begin with, every advantage that attends the knowledge of such things. And as Christ is the sum of Christian truth [John 14 : 6], faith secures first of all the inestimable knowledge of Christ. Thus its primary office is—

(a) To the penitent a necessary step toward “calling upon the name of the Lord” [Rom. 10 : 13, 14].

(b) To the believer it is a means of continual participation in “eternal life,” as found in knowing the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent [John 17 : 3, cf. 26]. Paul therefore might well “count all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus” [Phil. 3 : 8; cf. 1 : 17, 18; 2 Peter 3 : 18].

(2) The office of faith as a realizing sense is often very impressive :

(A) To the penitent. Not only his own sinfulness and the contrasted holiness of God, but also the offer of Jesus Christ as his Saviour strike him as almost unheard of realities. Indeed, the lively apprehension of these facts is his first treatment of them as real, and therefore his first opportunity to receive from them a due impression. This memorable experience of the “inquirer” it is the office of the religious use of the imagination—

(B) To render permanent for the believer. Faith as a realizing sense makes Jesus a constant companion and his influence perennial [2 Cor. 3 : 18]. It thus provides the three prime factors in Christian excellence :

(a) It keeps alive the highest sentiments or ideals. These it finds embodied in Christ himself. Such conceptions, when steadily held before the mind, become—

(b) Powerful motives to action, and thus the faith which sees fosters energy of life [Heb. 12 : 1, 2; 1 John 3 : 3; 5 :

4]. But transient energy is easy; the most difficult attainment made by the second element of faith is—

(c) Tireless perseverance. It achieves this result, not through extraordinary effort, but by virtue of the growing attractiveness of its objects. Religion is wearisome to those only who give it little thought; it fascinates such as dwell upon its aims, especially when they see these winningly embodied in our Lord [Phil. 3 : 12-14; Heb. 11 : 27; 1 Peter 1 : 5].

In times of trial, perseverance becomes patience for those who look unto Jesus, precisely as he “for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising shame” [Heb. 12 : 1-3; cf. 2 Cor. 4 : 16-18; James 1 : 3, 4].

(3) But the most characteristic and important offices of faith are discharged by its element of trust. These offices are twofold; namely, objective and subjective. In other words, trust accepts good for us, and works good in us.

(A) Its objective office is the acceptance of justification through Jesus Christ [Rom. 3 : 26, 28; Gal. 2 : 16; 3 : 24].

But trust is merely a condition, not a ground of justification. However imperative as a duty, excellent as a virtue, or energetic as a principle of conduct trust in God may be, it is not as a good work that faith justifies; “otherwise, grace is no more grace” [Rom. 11 : 6]. To accept a gift, especially to accept a confessedly undeserved gift, is not to assert, but to disavow a claim [Phil. 3 : 9].

And yet, trust was not arbitrarily appointed as a condition of justification.

(a) It is the only way to accept a spiritual gift. Indeed, the mind must accept a material gift before the hand closes upon it; and the mind’s acceptance is trust that the gift is both worth having and within reach.

(b) The trust of the weak and unworthy is fitted to move the heart of God. The power of such an appeal is understood, not by one who trusts, but by one who is trusted. Our Lord uses this fact as an encouragement to prayer [Matt. 7 : 7-11; Luke 11 : 5-13; 18 : 1-8].

(B) The subjective office of trust is to promote our spiritual transformation. The vigor with which this office is executed may be understood from the fact that what one unreservedly trusts in has complete ascendancy over him. He who trusts in God belongs to God; he who trusts in evil belongs to the devil.

In more particularly inquiring how a Christian is transformed through his trust in God, it is important, at a time when forensic justification is decried and only the ethical value of faith conceded, to note that—

(a) It is precisely in appropriating an objective justification that the renovating power of trust first appears. To be justified by faith is to “have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.” Paul significantly adds, “through whom also we have had our access by faith into this grace wherein we stand” [Rom. 5 : 1, 2]. To be at peace with God is to feel oneself a new creature in a new world [2 Cor. 5 : 17] and facing a new career. No longer bound to the past by conscious guilt, the believer may “reach forth to the things that are before” [Phil. 3 : 13].

(b) Trust in God claims novel privileges. It sees in every gift from the Father something allowed, not something prohibited. All things are ours, when we are Christ’s [1 Cor. 3 : 21-23]. We trust in “God, who giveth us richly all things to enjoy” [1 Tim. 6 : 17]. Thus faith cures the moral misunderstanding of asceticism [Gal. 4 : 9-11; Col. 2 : 16, 20-22], and puts the Christian in the only position where he can freely sac-

rifice a lower good for the sake of rendering a higher service [1 Cor. 6 : 12; 9 : 19; 2 Cor. 8 : 8, 9; Phil. 2 : 5-8].

(c) Trust boldly claims the highest spiritual good [Rom. 8 : 32]; and what it claims an active faith continually makes its own. Joyous trust is more invigorating than painful self-reproach, or grim resolution. To all Christians, as to gentle Timothy, the soundest exhortation is, "Fight the good fight of faith" [1 Tim. 6 : 12, A. V.]. It is faith that overcomes the world [1 John 5 : 4, 5].

(d) Trust is the appropriate channel for divine aid. It looks to God; it lays hold upon him; he will not put it to shame [Isa. 49 : 23; Ps. 27 : 14; Matt. 21 : 22; 1 Peter 1 : 5; James 1 : 6, 7; 1 John 5 : 14].

§ 51. *Justification.*

I. Nature of Justification.

Justification is an application of the atonement to the individual believer. Therefore the doctrine of justification must correspond to the doctrine of atonement. We have seen that the atonement provides alike for remission of sins and for moral renewal. Accordingly,—

Justification is the divine declaration that, the claims of the law having been met for the believer, he is relieved from its condemnation; in other words, he who accepts Christ is himself accepted as though he had not sinned. This is the fruit of a Godward efficacy in the atonement.

The inseparable manward result is that the acquittal and acceptance of the believer go into effect in the renewal of his nature.

The divine fiat of justification is one thing, and its moral effect in us is another; but neither aspect of the case must be

dissociated from the other. While each must be considered in its turn, they should not be thought of as separable in reality.

II. Evidence for Justification.

Justification is a forensic term. The verb *δικαίω* means to show or to declare righteous. The former meaning is occasional and not especially pertinent to our doctrine [Luke 7 : 29; 10 : 29; Rom. 3 : 4; 1 Cor. 4 : 4; 1 Tim. 3 : 16]; the latter meaning is constantly used by Paul in the technical sense of the divine fiat now under consideration. In his epistles, excepting the cases just cited, it has no other unmistakable meaning. [See an apparent exception in Rom. 6 : 7.] *Δικαιώσεις* occurs but twice [Rom. 4 : 25; 5 : 18], and means a declaring of approval. *Δικαίωμα*, in the sole passage [Rom. 5 : 16] in which justification is meant, is the act of judicial approval. *Δικαιοσύνη*, righteousness, used nearly one hundred times in the New Testament, refers sometimes to righteousness in character and conduct, sometimes to declared righteousness, or justification.

A detailed discussion of the passages in which these words occur is impracticable, and is needless. The very substance of the gospel is that a believer is pronounced just, or righteous, solely on account of the atonement which Christ has made for his sins. And this is the easily recognizable teaching of numerous passages:

(a) That one may be accounted righteous on other grounds than obedience to the law, see Rom. 3 : 20, 21, 27, 28; 4 : 2-5; 11 : 6; Gal. 2 : 16, 21; 3 : 11.

(b) That he may be pronounced righteous notwithstanding violations of the law, see Rom. 3 : 20-23; 4 : 5; 5 : 16.

III. Difficulties in Justification.

Two questions are raised against this doctrine:

1. How can God, even on the ground of the atonement, call a sinner righteous?

We reply that the term "justify" is figurative. God does not actually pronounce the guilty innocent, but he accepts them as though innocent. This is simply the familiar forgiveness of sins [Rom. 3 : 25; 4 : 6-8; 8 : 1, 33; Eph. 1 : 7; Col. 1 : 14].

Forgiveness, however, is more than pardon. Pardon is a relation to the law; forgiveness is a relation to a person. To be pardoned is to be released from legal penalties; to be forgiven is to be personally accepted or adopted as though one had committed no offence. Among men neither pardon nor forgiveness implies the other; but with God they are inseparable. What the law exacts he exacts; what he exempts he exempts according to law. Justification then is an act of personal grace [Rom. 3 : 24; 4 : 16; 5 : 15-18, 20, 21], but it is not the less a lawful grace [Rom. 3 : 21, 25, 26; 7 : 6].

2. It will still be demanded how God can accept the believer as though he had not sinned.

The answer is twofold: first, as to penalties which are directly caused by God's displeasure, Christ is the propitiation for our sins; secondly, the removal of inwrought penalties is provided for by the way in which justification goes into effect with the believer.

IV. Relation to Regeneration.

Justification goes into effect by transforming the nature of the justified. Thus it delivers him from that bondage to sin which is the extreme subjective penalty of sinning. While no one is justified on account either of righteousness which precedes or which will follow justification, it is variously evi-

dent that justification takes effect in, and is inconceivable without, a new righteousness of the believer.

1. The extreme Protestant view is that justification is a divine fiat. But the fiat which pronounces a sinner just, like every other word of God, is creative, and goes into effect by making the sinner to be what God calls him.

2. Justification is primarily forgiveness; but forgiveness would be futile if it did not remove the inwrought as well as any imposed penalties of sin [Ps. 130 : 4].

3. Justification includes adoption of the believer as though he had not sinned; but adoption would be a mockery if it did not involve deliverance from the wickedness which a holy God abhors.

4. The atonement is the procuring cause of justification; but we have seen that the cross condemns those who persist in sin, that it has sacrificial efficacy for those only whom it is efficacious to transform. Justification, or the imputation of righteousness, must involve the impartation of righteousness, "the righteousness which is of God by faith" [Phil. 3 : 9].

5. Faith is the formal, conditioning cause of justification; but faith can no more arise in an unrenewed heart than the heart can be renewed while its wickedness is yet unpardoned. Pardon and renewal, with faith, must take place together.

6. Certain perplexing Scriptures are explained by the fact that justification takes effect in a moral change; for example:

(a) Our Saviour's teaching that a forgiving spirit must rule in him who would be forgiven [Matt. 6 : 14, 15 ; 18 : 21-35]. It is not that by forgiving men we earn forgiveness from God, but that by refusing to forgive others, we make it morally unsuitable that we should be forgiven. Implacability and vindictiveness illustrate to the understanding of every one how incompatible with justification is persistence in wickedness.

(b) The passage in which James insists upon works as a

ground of justification [2 : 14-26]. James is not here discussing the justification of penitent sinners, but of alleged believers ; and of these he says that their faith is dead unless they show it by their works. That is, they cannot be pronounced righteous, unless their justification goes into effect in righteousness.

(c) Forgiveness of sin is closely connected even by Paul with release from its power in passages which fail to draw attention only because the apostle to the Gentiles is the recognized defender of the claims of faith. But with Paul to be justified is to be "dead to sin" [cf. ch. 5 with 6 : 1, 2] ; sin shall not have dominion over us, because we are "not under the law, but under grace" [ver. 14]. That is to say, a gracious deliverance from condemnation by the law involves becoming "the servants of righteousness" [ver. 18, cf. ver. 22 and 8 : 4]. In closing that exposition of justification which is the special doctrine of the epistle to the Galatians, he affirms that what avails for us is "a new creature" [Gal. 6 : 14, 15] ; and he says this where we would expect him to put forward justification, thus offering renewal of life as an equivalent fact.

While, therefore, we reject the Roman Catholic view that justification is, in effect, the making of a man righteous, and find only less objectionable the view of some Arminians and others, that we are justified in anticipation of a righteousness yet to be acquired ; and while we adhere to the distinctly scriptural teaching of the Reformers, that a believer is adjudged righteous solely on account of what Christ has vicariously done for him, we must recognize this element of truth in the theories rejected : to wit, that justification and regeneration are not separable acts, but are two aspects of one application of the atonement. Justification contemplates a relation to the broken law ; regeneration is concerned with the inward springs of future obedience to the law. We may say either that the atonement, in meeting the demands of the law, imparts a new

life; or that, while bestowing a new life, it discharges our obligations to the law.

§ 52. *Regeneration.*

The teachings of Scripture as to the change conventionally styled Regeneration are exposed to quite opposite perils: the nature of the change is apt to be either belittled or exaggerated. The sources of these liabilities will presently be considered; the doctrine is so momentous and the danger to it so serious as to demand of us a study which shall be alike devout and discriminating.

I. The Nature of Regeneration.

1. The Scriptural Doctrine.

The *fact* of regeneration was not first revealed in the New Testament. That it was known in Old Testament times was implied in the reproachful question of Christ to Nicodemus [John 3 : 10; cf. Ps. 51 : 10; Ezek. 11 : 19, 20; 36 : 26, 27]; and that experience confirms the teaching of Scripture is what our Lord meant in calling this change an "earthly thing" [John 3 : 12].

Concerning *the nature* of the change the Bible affords but little knowledge, and that little is attended by virtual warnings against a fancied knowledge.

(a) Jesus said the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration is like the journeys of the wind, something that cannot be told [John 3 : 8].

(b) The names given to regeneration by biblical writers are highly figurative and, if taken literally, are mutually incompatible. Peter and John call it a begetting [1 Peter

1 : 23; 1 John 2 : 29]; Jesus, John, and James call it a new birth [John 3 : 3-8; 1 : 13; James 1 : 18, R. V.]; John and Paul describe it as a passing from death unto life, a resurrection [1 John 3 : 14; Eph. 2 : 5]; Paul generally refers to it as a re-creation [2 Cor. 5 : 17; Gal. 6 : 15; Eph. 2 : 10; 4 : 24]; but he also speaks of it as a painful dying [Gal. 2 : 20; 6 : 14], and as an emancipation [Rom. 6 : 18], so does Christ himself [John 8 : 32, 36]; but Jesus elsewhere sets it forth as an enlightenment [Matt. 11 : 25-27], while to James it is in one case an engrafting [1 : 21]. It cannot be at once a begetting and a birth, a dying and a resurrection, a creation and an emancipation, an engrafting and an illumination. It is a change so momentous that it may be figuratively designated by any of these names, and so mysterious that it cannot be literally described by either of them.

As to the nature of regeneration we conclude that it is a moral, not literally a vital, change; that it is a change in the quality, not the quantity, of the soul; that it so far corrects the evil done by the fall [Col. 3 : 10] as to break the power of sin, and incline the heart to love God supremely.

The resultant turning of the heart to love of God and of the life to his service is conversion.

2. Errors as to the Nature of Regeneration.

A. That of the sacramentalists, who credit baptism with the power to regenerate.

(a) To ascribe such virtue to a religious rite is to subject Christianity to ordinances,—a peculiarity of Judaism from which Christ set his people free.

(b) To credit baptism with this power in the case of infants is to deepen the mystery of regeneration at cost of destroying its importance; an objection which is supported by—

(c) The fact that persons baptized in infancy give no sign that a real regeneration was received in that way.

B. That of the annihilationists, who hold either that the soul of man was created mortal, or has become mortal through the fall, and that regeneration alone imparts the immortal spirit.

This error must come up again under Eschatology ; but at this point it may be objected to on the grounds that—

(a) It involves a trichotomous theory of the human constitution.

(b) The fall did not take anything from man's substance, and regeneration does not add to the sum of being.

(c) The theory involves a literal interpretation of the titles used for regeneration, an interpretation which we have just found to be inadmissible.

C. That of the Plymouth Brethren, who hold that regeneration is literally the creation of a "new man," who is the real self and sinless; meanwhile the "old man" still exists in irremediable depravity, and must be destroyed at death, or at the coming of the Lord. This view is supported by a baldly literal exposition of such texts as, "It is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me [Rom. 7 : 20]; "I have been crucified with Christ, and I no longer live, but Christ liveth in me" [Gal. 2 : 20; cf. 6 : 14]; "That ye put away . . . the old man, who waxeth corrupt . . . and put on the new man, who after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth" [Eph. 4 : 22-24; cf. Col. 3 : 1-4; 2 Peter 1 : 4]; "Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin, because his seed abideth in him : and he cannot sin, because he is begotten of God" [1 John 3 : 9].

(a) If we are to understand Paul literally when he denies that "the old man" is any longer the self, we must take him literally when he denies that even "the new man" exists; as,

"I no longer live but Christ liveth in me" [Gal. 2 : 20]. Regeneration is thus annihilation of souls in the case of believers, and the re-incarnation of Christ in their bodies.

(b) If we must take John literally when he says that a regenerate man does not and cannot sin, we must take him so when he expressly contradicts this, and writes that if any one says he is without sin, the truth is not in him [1 John 1 : 8] ; and then we would have to conclude that, inasmuch as the same person cannot be both incapable of sinning and obliged to admit that he sins, no one ever was or ever will be regenerated.

(c) The doctrine that the centre of personality has passed from the former soul to a newly created essence which never sins, whatever the old man does, is morally dangerous and psychologically absurd.

(d) Especially objectionable is the fancy of Luther, which not a few unguardedly accept ; namely, that "the new life" is literally Christ living in us and constituting part of the self. This is a species of panchristism which should need only to be pointed out in order to be rejected by all who understand the objections to pantheism.

II. The Agent and Means of Regeneration.

1. The Agent.

A. That man does not regenerate himself is proved—

(a) By the inability of the carnal mind to submit to the requirements of God [Rom. 8 : 7], or to accept "the things of the Spirit of God" [1 Cor. 2 : 14] ;—

(b) By the titles which the Scripture gives to regeneration, all of which are inappropriate to an effect produced by a man upon himself ;—

(c) By the ascription of regeneration to God [Eph. 2 :

4, 5], to the Father and the Son co-acting [John 5 : 21], to Christ alone [Matt. 11 : 27-30], and to the Holy Spirit [John 3 : 5, 6; Titus 3 : 5]. These representations are not contradictory. Regeneration *proceeds* from the will of the Father, is *procured* through the mediation of the Son, and *wrought* by the operation of the Holy Spirit. It may with especial propriety be referred, as it usually is, to the Holy Spirit as the agent directly engaged.

2. The Means.

Many of the stricter Calvinists insist that the Holy Spirit regenerates creatively, without the use of means, because the unregenerate heart is insensible to the truth. This is at best but a bold speculation, for it is not supported by any explicit statement of the Bible. There are various grounds for preferring the view that the Holy Spirit employs the truth as a means of changing the heart.

(a) In all other cases God is believed to act upon the human mind in accordance with its laws; and its law as to all other changes in human character and conduct is that these are effected through the mediation of ideas.

(b) The person, teachings, and sufferings of our Lord are so well fitted to touch every heart, that the Holy Spirit constantly uses them, if we may at all trust the testimony of consciousness, in changing the heart.

(c) Paul testifies that "belief cometh of hearing" [Rom. 10 : 17], and even tells the Corinthians, "In Christ Jesus I begat you through the gospel" [1 Cor. 4 : 15]. Peter teaches that we are "begotten again . . . through the word of God" [1 Peter 1 : 23]; and James uses a similar expression, God "brought us forth by the word of truth" [1 : 18].

III. Necessity of Regeneration.

This may be gathered from the facts that—

1. Without regeneration the costly service of Christ is barren of advantage. Except through a moral transformation the objective benefit of the atonement would remain unappropriated and inappropriate. [Gal. 6 : 15 ; John 3 : 5-7]. Indeed, unless the heart is enabled to embrace the gospel, it proves "a savor from death unto death" [2 Cor. 2 : 16].

2. The fruitfulness of the evil corrected and of the good bestowed are so immeasurable as to make a change of heart indispensably necessary to man. "For the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the Spirit is life and peace" [Rom. 8 : 6].

IV. Evidences of Regeneration.

These are numerous, and are significant in proportion as they correspond to the nature of the change itself. Of this kind are—

1. A filial attitude toward God.

(a) The "spirit of adoption" claims God as Father [Rom. 8 : 15], and animates us with love, trust, and reverence.

(b) As children we love the works, the worship, and the name of God.

(c) The mind itself enjoys fellowship with God [1 John 1 : 3].

2. A corresponding regard for Christ. The Christian finds it easy to honor the Son equally with the Father [John 5 : 23]. The regenerate are drawn to Christ by an attraction which overleaps an unsettled, even an heretical, Christology [1 John 4 : 15 ; 5 : 1 ; 1 Cor. 12 : 3].

When all other evidences of regeneration fail, a Christian may still be able to look to Jesus with abiding faith, and to say, "Whether I have trusted in him before or not, I trust him now."

3. "The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are children of God" [Rom. 8 : 16]. The witness of the Spirit is not to be found in sheer confidence that we are regenerated, but—

(a) The Spirit bears witness in us to Jesus Christ, and in so doing testifies to our own sonship [1 John 5 : 7-9]. "The witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son" [ver. 11, 12].

(b) The Spirit animates us with the characteristic temper and purpose of a Christian. "For as many as are *led by the Spirit of God*, these are sons of God" [Rom. 8 : 14].

Such relations to God imply also—

4. Ethical fruits of regeneration. Love which secures obedience is the only love that the Master accepts [John 14 : 21]. This well remembered test is reaffirmed by John's first epistle [3 : 9; 5 : 3, 4], and in the pointed demand of James, "Show me thy faith apart from thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works" [2 : 18].

In offering this test, Jesus specified one commandment as peculiarly his own, and essentially new [John 15 : 10-12]. Hence a specially significant proof of regeneration is—

5. Love to the disciples of Christ [John 13 : 35; 1 John 3 : 14; 4 : 16, 20; cf. *per con.* 5 : 2]. To love the Christlike is to show love for Christ. So willing is our Lord himself to have love to him measured by love to his brethren, that what is done to the least of these is the crucial test by which he will judge all nations [Matt. 25 : 32-46].

Furthermore, as a common resemblance to Christ is a mark of kinship, mutual love among Christians is but a kind of family affection, instinctive in the household of faith. This sense of union in Christ constitutes the newness of the love which he requires [John 13 : 34], notifies the world that his disciples are a class apart [John 13 ; 35; 2 Cor. 6 : 14-16],

and even leads the world to believe that God has sent his Son [John 17 : 21, 23].

6. Insight into spiritual things. This especially distinguishes a well-developed Christian [1 Cor. 2 : 6-16]. In many cases general intelligence rapidly develops under the stimulus of the new relation to God, and of a new estimate concerning all things [2 Cor. 5 : 17]. A spiritual transformation which extends its influence so far, makes its own reality conspicuous.

These are the normal fruits and signs of regeneration. They are always present, at least in rudimentary form; but they develop and come to view in various, even abnormal proportions. The degree of fullness and symmetry which the elements of a renewed life present is dependent so largely upon native peculiarities, or upon early training as to demand careful discrimination and abundant charity from those to whom it may fall to test the spiritual condition of other persons.

§ 53. *Sanctification.*

Paul calls believers *ἅγιοι*, saints, partly because they are sacred to the service of God, being consecrated thereto by the blood of Christ; partly because they are inly purified by the Holy Spirit through the same means. In the case of persons an objective dedication would be meaningless, and even hypocritical [Matt. 23 : 27, 28], if it did not carry with it fidelity or righteousness of character and life. Correspondently, the noun *ἁγιασμός*, sanctification, has either the active meaning, not of an objective setting apart, but of the actual impartation of holiness or moral purity, or else the passive meaning of the imparted moral quality.

To theology the doctrine of sanctification is the doctrine of progress in holiness. Its problems are: What attainment is possible? How can that attainment be made?

I. The Possible Extent of Sanctification.

1. The Scriptures teach that sanctification is a gradual process, comparable in its human aspect to growth [Eph. 4 : 15 ; 2 Peter 3 : 18] and to transformation [2 Cor. 3 : 18], or on its divine side to the finishing of a work which God himself had begun [Phil. 1 : 6].

2. It must assuredly be perfected at death [Col. 3 : 4 ; 1 Thess. 5 : 23, 24 ; Heb. 12 : 14, 23 ; Jude 24]. Although death is not, properly speaking, "a means of grace," yet it is a complete arrest and an incalculable change ; so that we are not surprised to read, "He that hath died is justified [or freed] from sin" [Rom. 6 : 7]. And it is a change which brings those who already, with all their defects, love God supremely, into his open presence and under his full influence. "We know that if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him ; for we shall see him even as he is" [1 John 3 : 2].

3. Perfection is not attainable on earth. On the one hand, nothing less than righteousness without a flaw is required of every moral being. There is no violation of law which can be exempted from condemnation [Matt. 5 : 19]. To be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect, to be holy as the Lord our God is holy [Matt. 5 : 48 ; Lev. 11 : 44 ; cf. 1 Peter 1 : 16], are obligations which the Supreme Being could not relax without himself becoming less than perfectly holy. And there is no approach to moral perfection at which we must necessarily stop short in this present life. On the other hand, against the possibility of faultlessness on earth, we have to allege :

(a) The statement of John that there is no truth in the man who pretends to be without sin [1 John 1 : 8 ; cf. Ps. 119 : 96] ;

(b) The confession of Paul that he was not perfect [Phil.

3 : 12, 13], and this in close connection with a passage in which he implies that not a few Philippians were perfect in the sense of full grown or mature [cf. ver. 15 and 1 Cor. 2 : 6]. While it does not follow that none can be perfect because Paul was imperfect, the presumption is not light against those who claim to be better than he [2 Tim. 4 : 7, 8]. We are thus prepared to note:

(c) Observation shows that such as pretend to be free from sin are marked by insensibility to their own faults rather than by faultlessness; while the saintliest are alive, like Paul, to their own short-comings.

II. The Provision for Sanctification.

Sanctification is *in* Christ [1 Cor. 1 : 2; Col. 1 : 28], *by* the Holy Spirit [Rom. 15 : 16; 1 Cor. 6 : 11], *through* the truth [John 15 : 3; 17 : 17; Eph. 4 : 11, 12], *upon* faith [Acts 15 : 9; 2 Cor. 3 : 18; Eph. 4 : 13].

The edifying of believers, "the perfecting of the saints," is the primary reason for establishing the church [Eph. 4 : 16; cf. Rom. 15 : 2; 1 Thess. 5 : 11; Heb. 10 : 24], for appointing its ministers [Eph. 4 : 11, 12], and for conferring its spiritual gifts [1 Cor. 12 : 7; 14 : 12, 26].

III. Errors concerning Sanctification.

Antinomianism of some kind is an element of peril in every unscriptural theory of sanctification. This will appear in the special study of those theories. But the antinomianism which deliberately proclaimed that believers are released from obligation to obey the law by virtue of the fact that justification is a discharge from the claims of the law, is a doctrine practically extinct. It could not stand, for it outraged the vig-

orous ethical sentiment of Christianity, and virtually set aside those Scriptures which teach that holiness is the fruit of the Father's grace [Rom. 6 : 1-23 ; 7 : 4 ; 1 Cor. 9 : 21], of love to the Son [John 14 : 15, 21, 23 ; 15 : 1-17 ; 1 John 1 : 6 ; 3 : 6], and of the Holy Spirit's indwelling [Rom. 8 : 2-14].

The considerations which have been urged against the possibility of sinless perfection in this present life have not prevented the somewhat wide diffusion of errors with regard to sanctification, and chiefly for reasons which demand special notice. Two such errors alone need to be reviewed.

1. Perfectionism.

Romanism, holding that justification declares a righteousness infused from Christ, also teaches that the rigor of the law has been relaxed for the faithful, so that they are able to keep not only the commands, but the counsels of Christ, thus accumulating works of supererogation. Wesleyans claim that perfect love and perfect faith are attainable ; that they constitute evangelical obedience to the exclusion of sin ; and that, while infirmities may remain, these are not reckoned as sins, but are provided for in the atonement. A few Calvinists, like President Finney, argue that the divine requirement has been lowered to meet the capabilities of a race weakened by the fall. The singular theory of the Plymouth Brethren, that personality is transferred from the hopelessly depraved "old man" to the sinless "new man," also teaches that, while the "new man" is entirely fitted for heaven through the blood of Christ, it may be progressively sanctified, that is, developed, through "the washing of water with the word" [Eph. 5 : 26].

The more important arguments for perfectionism are : on the part of Calvinists, that it would be unjust to exact an impossible obedience ; on the part of Wesleyans, that without holi-

ness none can enter heaven, and that all things are possible to faith; on the part of Plymouth Brethren, that what God has begotten does not and cannot sin.

But these special arguments for perfectionism lay it open to corresponding objections. They involve misconceptions of—

A. Law. Perfectionism regards the requirements of the law as subject to extension or relaxation. But this is true only of statutory or revealed law. Since the law is itself a transcript of the unalterable nature of God, it cannot acquiesce in anything hostile to his nature. Especially is it to be noted that if, as Wesleyans teach, infirmities are provided for by the sacrifice of Christ, they must be accounted sinful violations of law.

B. Penalty. None enjoy immunity through inability. Penalty is involved in the very fact of being alien from God. If the alienation be so extreme as to be helpless, penalty is so far deepened, not removed. Otherwise the worst beings, like Satan, would avoid suffering from the divine displeasure by becoming utterly abominable to him.

C. Will. All ordinary forms of perfectionism assume that the will is capable of obeying the requirements of God. But real freedom was lost in the fall. Holiness must restore freedom, not be restored by it.

D. Faith. "All things are possible to him that believeth" was spoken of miracles, ought not to be applied without warrant to anything else, and is unwarrantably applied to prayer for spiritual good. No degree of faith can at once secure such fixity in righteousness as to render watchfulness and prayer unnecessary; no supreme effort of faith could imaginably secure on the instant the conversion of all one's dearest friends, of the whole human race, of Satan and his hosts.

E. Regeneration. This is manifestly mistaken by the Plymouth Brethren for sanctification, as the sinlessness of "the new man" is thought to be assured by the fact that it is a new

creation of God. The objections to this as a doctrine of regeneration, namely, that it involves a fantastic literalness of interpretation and an impossible psychology, have already been presented; as a theory of sanctification it is involved in the special difficulties that—

(a) It unites in the same being incurable depravity and stainless purity.

(b) It denies that believers ought to pray for forgiveness, and so sets aside the requirement that confession be made and forgiveness sought, as well as the many urgent exhortations to abandon sin and beware of a fall.

2. The Higher Life.

Not a few who reject the claim to sinless perfection hold that it is possible to attain a state of entire self-consecration and serene trust which is as distinct in species from the earlier state of the Christian, as this was from his unregenerate condition. This state is called "the Higher Life," and is believed to be conferred by a "second gift" of the Holy Spirit, upon a particular exercise of faith. In brief, the Higher Life is a special state, reached by a special process.

It is gladly conceded that the Christian may attain a cloudless assurance and approximate an unswerving fidelity. Nor is it uncommon to witness a rapid and large development of Christian graces without known preparation. On the other hand, the doctrine is open to the fatal objections:

A. If the highest practicable attainments are to be reached only by a process analogous to a second regeneration, the Bible would make a fact of such importance as plain as the need and the possibility of regeneration itself. Unless the Scriptures distinctly teach the doctrine, it is unwarrantable to hold it. But such warrant of Scripture is wholly wanting.

B. The doctrine is really based upon a misinterpretation of experience. So great a change in feeling, not less startling in many cases than regeneration, seems to the subjects of it to require an extraordinary cause. It involves so sharp a contrast with their earlier religious state as entirely to preclude the idea that it is merely a different stage in the same development. But to accept this view is—

(a) Pure and simple fanaticism. Fanaticism consists in ascribing to an extraordinary superhuman cause subjective changes which are due to the ordinary working of one's own mind or of the Holy Spirit. But—

(b) Moral changes as considerable take place in the unregenerate, and may be even more readily accounted for in one whose moral nature has been renewed, and who does not utterly resist the influences of the indwelling Spirit.

C. The end sought is most worthy, but the theory concerning the process is wanting in sobriety and truth, and as such is often fruitful of grave mischief. It tends to undue confidence in one's own merit, to a mistaken depreciation of the merit of others, and even to a subtle fancy that one's opinions are formed under peculiar enlightenment and are of special authority.

§ 54. *Perseverance.*

Perseverance is persistence until death of the life begun in regeneration. All truly regenerate persons, being divinely kept from apostasy, persevere unto eternal life. The entire case is stated by Peter: the elect of the Father, being sanctified of the Spirit and sprinkled with the blood of Christ, "are kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation" [1 Peter 1 : 2-5].

Regarded as the work of God, perseverance is the comple-

tion of sanctification; but since to human observation it is the fruit of steadfast faith, it is commonly called "the final perseverance of the saints"

It is a peculiarity of this doctrine that experience can do little either to confirm or unsettle it. Experience cannot prove the doctrine, because it cannot prove that those who die in sin were never regenerated; but neither can experience disprove the doctrine, because it cannot show that any who die in sin were ever truly renewed. We must depend upon the teachings of the Bible alone.

But the Bible, on the other hand, was manifestly written with a practical aim, and therefore treats the security for salvation in one or another way according as it contemplates the divine or the human factor in the problem.

1. It is always humanly possible, although improbable, that a good man may at last succumb to temptation, and close a holy life in sin. Certainly the end cannot be known until the end is reached. The Scriptures therefore fittingly appeal to the regenerate as those on whose "patience in well-doing . . . eternal life" depends [Rom. 2 : 7]; bid "him that thinketh he standeth" to "take heed lest he fall" [1 Cor. 10 : 12. See also Ezek. 33 : 13; Matt. 10 : 22; John 15 : 6; Rom. 11 : 22; 1 Cor. 9 : 27; 2 Peter 1 : 10; Rev. ch. 2 and 3]; and solemnly warns the vacillating against the remediless evil of apostasy from Christ [Heb. 10 : 26-29].

These exhortations and warnings do not justify the doctrinal inference that God will allow any to perish whom he has begotten again; but they imply that no one may regard himself as begotten of God and safe, except while he remains faithful. Jesus said to those Jews who had believed him, "If ye abide in my word, then are ye truly my disciples" [John 8 : 31]. "We are become partakers of Christ, if we hold fast

the beginning of our confidence firm unto the end" [Heb. 3 : 14, cf. ver. 6].

2. What is uncertain to men is certain to God. "The Lord knoweth them that are his" [2 Tim. 2 : 19]. That he will not allow his own to perish is variously assured :

(a) By the fixed purpose of God in election. "It is the will of him that sent me," said Christ, "that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing" [John 6 : 39; Rom. 8 : 29-39; Phil. 1 : 6; 1 Thess. 5 : 9; 2 Thess. 2 : 13].

(b) By the fidelity of God to his invitations. "For the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance" [Rom. 11 : 29; 1 Cor. 1 : 8, 9; 1 Thess. 5 : 23, 24; Heb. 10 : 23].

(c) By the ability of God to keep his children. "No man," said Jesus, "is able to snatch them out of my Father's hand" [John 10 : 29]. "If God is for us, who is against us?" [Rom. 8 : 31]. "I am persuaded that he is able to guard that which I have committed unto him against that day," is the conviction of Paul's old age [2 Tim. 1 : 12; cf. 1 Peter 1 : 5; Jude 24].

(d) By the vantage ground of a new relation to Christ. "For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life" [Rom. 5 : 10]. This is not merely Paul's assertion of final perseverance, but his argument for it.

How practical is the interest of Scripture in this theme is seen by the fact that it does not shrink from presenting together both phases of the doctrine in striking paradox. See for examples Phil 2 : 12, 13; 2 Tim. 2 : 19; 2 Peter 1 : 10. The disobedient well may doubt their regeneration; the faithful have a proof and a pledge of divine aid [Phil. 1 : 16].

PART V.

ESCHATOLOGY.

§ 55. *Conditions of the Inquiry.*

Less certainty rewards inquiry concerning the Last Things than concerning any other department of Christian truth. Historically or even physically attested data form the basis of theology proper, of anthropology and soteriology. Unfulfilled prophecy is practically the only source of eschatology. Science, which floods with light objects immediately about us, seems, like a torch in the hand, to deepen the darkness over things far away. If prophecy too is obscure, this is due to recognizable causes:

1. Some of its topics lie beyond the range of our experience, and therefore are necessarily incomprehensible. Such topics are the intermediate state, the spiritual body, the final coming of our Lord.

2. The obscurity of prophecies concerning the Messiah was a real and perhaps intentional safeguard against imposture. It certainly has prevented the success of any false Christ. Our Lord told his own disciples that they could not understand his predictions until fulfilled, and that these should then serve as his credentials [John 13 : 19 ; 14 : 29 ; 16 : 4 ; cf. 12 : 16 ; 13 : 7 ; 16 : 12]. The disastrous failure of Jewish interpreters to override this divine precaution in the case of predictions about the first coming of the Messiah, warns us against similar attempts upon outstanding prophecy [1 Peter 1 : 10-12 ; Matt. 24 : 44].

3. Prophetic perspective at once simplifies and perplexes the interpretation of prophecy. A single prediction covers, it may be, many events of the same type, each of which forecasts all the rest; while the last in the series is needed both for the fulfillment and the complete understanding of the original oracle. Thus in the Old Testament any momentous event was styled a "coming of the Lord" [Amos 4 : 12]. In the New Testament the parable of the tares and the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew are apparently applicable to more than one event.

4. Certain prophecies are contingent upon what men do. Nineveh repented, and the prophecy against her remained unfulfilled [cf. Jonah 3 : 4 with ver. 10 and chap. 4]. Jerusalem would not receive her king, and her house was left unto her desolate [Matt. 23 : 37, 38; cf. Zech. 6 : 15]. It is not improbable that the return of the Lord may be delayed or hastened by the church [Acts 3 : 19, R. V.; 2 Peter 3 : 12]. Prophecies which depend upon the will of men cannot be interpreted with certainty in advance.

5. Apparently it cannot be settled whether the book of Revelation referred only to the then present and impending relations of the infant church with pagan Rome, or to the ultimate destiny of the church and the world, or to both.

It is well to bear in mind that the unmistakable and the realized aims of prophecy are reformation and encouragement [Jer. 44 : 4; John 16 : 33]. Beyond this, curiosity is baffled and conjecture is hazardous.

§ 56. *Death.*

Does the soul die with the body? Dissolution of the body seems to involve the extinction of intelligence, affection, and will. It has not, indeed, been so regarded in any age by any

people; yet it is thought by some to be the teaching of the Bible. It is said to be involved in the statement of Paul that God "only hath immortality" [1 Tim. 6 : 16], and in many passages which speak of Christ as bestowing life upon believers.

But against the doctrine of conditional immortality we notice:

1. The testimony of Scripture.

(a) The meaning of 1 Tim. 6 : 16 is not that God alone is exempt from death, but that God alone is self-existent, essentially deathless (*ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν*), and therefore all other beings depend on him for existence. But it does not follow that God will permit any spirit, either an angel or the soul of man, to be extinguished.

(b) The New Testament sets forth thus the relation of Christ to death and life: he "abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel" [2 Tim. 1 : 10]. Three meanings are here possible for the word "life," and correspondent meanings for "death." By life may be meant, first, spiritual life, the holiness and happiness which befit a rational being; secondly, bare continuance of the soul's existence; thirdly, human entirety, the union of the soul and body either in the present or in a future state.

The second of these meanings, namely, the immortality of the soul, is that with which pagan philosophy was so seriously occupied; Christianity takes for granted the mere immortality of the soul, but emphasizes both spirituality and the resurrection as alike essential to its idea of life for human beings. Christ confers both the spiritual and bodily life, and confers them together [John 3 : 36; 6 : 40; Rom. 8 : 11; Phil. 3 : 9-11; Col. 3 : 3, 4]. Correspondingly, the death which Christ abolished is pre-eminently spiritual, consists in alienation from God and in misery, while the resurrection of the wicked, though real, is seldom referred to. To make death

consist in extinction of being would thus not only mar the New Testament's antithesis between life and death, but would be a lapse into the low, paganistic estimate of man, which failed to see in his deathless soul the image of God.

2. The testimony of Consciousness.

(a) The soul is consciously an indivisible unit. As such, it is presumably undecomposable and incapable of death.

(b) The operations of the brain and the mind are indeed parallel, but are not thinkably identical or interchangeable; mind is not then necessarily dependent upon the activity of the brain. On the contrary,—

(c) Since mental and physical energy are not convertible, if the soul perishes at the dissolution of the body, its energy has not passed into some other form, but become extinct; and nothing is more confidently affirmed by modern physics than that energy is subject neither to increase, nor to diminution.

(d) The instinctive unanimity, above referred to, with which mankind looks for existence beyond the grave, an expectation marked in simple savages, but most suitable to the thoughtful and the holy, is not without significance to those who believe that we are the creatures of One who is both good and wise.

§ 57. *The Intermediate State.*

Between death and the resurrection, human beings are in a state of incompleteness. A body without a soul, or a soul without a body, is an object of natural horror. Even Paul desired "not to be unclothed, but clothed upon" [2 Cor. 5 : 4].

We have already seen that the soul lives after its separation from the body. There is sufficient reason to believe that it retains consciousness, although it has not yet come into posses-

sion of the spiritual body. Consciousness in the intermediate state is taught in the case of—

1. The wicked, by the parable of the rich man and Lazarus [Luke 16 : 23-31; cf. 12 : 4, 5], and by Peter's reference to "the spirits in prison" [1 Peter 3 : 19], who are conscious and unhappy, or death would be no more a prison to them than to the righteous.

2. In the case of the righteous, the Lord's refutation of the Sadducees [Matt. 22 : 32] turns on a proof from Exod. 3 : 6 that the spirits of the holy dead are conscious before the resurrection; that is, they are in such a state that God can be God to them. The penitent thief was assured that, not in the uncertain future when the Lord should come into his kingdom, but that very day he should be with Christ where the holy are [Luke 23 : 42, 43]. For Paul to be "absent from the body" . . . was to be at home with the Lord" [2 Cor. 5 : 8]; and the "strait," of which he wrote to the Philippians, was between the conviction that "to abide in the flesh is more needful for your sake," and his "desire to depart," not that he might pass unto unconsciousness, but "to be with Christ" [Phil. 1 : 23, 24]. Perhaps the most explicit declaration that the pious dead are conscious and happy is found in the lofty assurance that we "are come unto . . . the general assembly and church of the first born who are enrolled in heaven, . . . and to the spirits of just men made perfect" [Heb. 12 : 22, 23].

Theologians who do not adhere closely to the scriptural teaching in eschatology, have inferred with some show of reason that the conscious spirit, while divested of its organ, the body, will be shut out from free relations to things, and shut in to the subjects of reflection which it finds in itself and in memory. But this is little more than a conjecture. We do not know enough about the mode of life which is possible to a disem-

bodied human soul unreservedly to accept or to deny such a conjecture. If we may infer from the relations of the angels what is possible to bodiless souls of men, capacity for external relations is entirely probable in the intermediate state.

§ 58. *The Second Coming of Christ.*

I. The Advent.

It is the plain teaching of the New Testament, and perhaps essential to the complete fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy, that Christ will return in heavenly glory to the scene of his earthly humiliation.

His advent will be bodily [Acts 1 : 11], visible [Matt. 24 : 30 ; Titus 2 : 13], even audible [1 Thess. 4 : 16], and, although not without premonitory signs [Matt. 24 : 29, 30], it will be sudden [Matt. 24 : 37-44 ; Luke 12 : 35-40].

It is generally agreed that this event must be preceded by a proclamation of the gospel in all lands [Mark 13 : 10], by a falling away of nominal Christians [2 Thess. 2 : 3], and by a revelation of Satan's power, possibly in the domination of a personal antichrist [2 Thess. 2 : 8, 9, 1 John 2 : 18].

The final coming of our Lord will prove to be not only an epiphany [2 Thess. 1 : 10], but the overthrow of his enemies [2 Thess. 1 : 8, 9], the establishment of his kingdom, and the consummation of all things [Matt. 19 : 28 ; Acts 3 : 21 ; Rom. 8 : 19-23 ; 2 Peter 3 : 12, 13].

II. Relation of the Advent to the Millennium.

Whether the second coming will precede or will follow a prolonged period of righteousness and peace known as the Millennium, was a point in dispute with the post-apostolic Fathers, and has been more or less under discussion ever since their day.

1. The Rival Opinions.

(a) Premillenarians contend that the righteous shall rise "from the dead" at the coming of the Lord, and reign with him upon the earth throughout the millennium; that the general resurrection will occur at the close of the millennial period, and be followed at once by the final judgment, unless, as some hold, the Millennium itself is a long day of judgment.

(b) Postmillenarians generally look for the conversion of the world as a result of the gradual spread of the gospel; hold to but one resurrection; maintain that it will attend the coming of the Lord, will take place at the close of the millennium, if any, and be immediately followed by the last judgment.

2. The contrasted Histories.

(a) The premillenarian, or chiliastic, view has re-appeared in times of commotion and trial. It was advocated by the Montanists in the second century; was widely diffused during the disorder and gloom that closed the first thousand years of our era; continued to be rife until a thousand years had elapsed from the conversion of Constantine, and was enthusiastically preached to the crusaders, who regarded Mohammed as anti-christ. At the Reformation it inspired the mad Anabaptists of Münster, and in the next century the Fifth Monarchy men among the English Puritans. In the United States William Miller began in 1833 to preach the speedy re-appearance of the Lord, and founded the sect of Second Adventists; here too premillenarianism has furnished a plea for the strangely contrasted fanaticisms of the Shakers and Mormons.

Extravagance of opinion and disorder of conduct have been so commonly associated with the premillenarian doctrine, as to account in part for its general condemnation; but in

recent years it has found advocates among sober-minded and devout exegetes of Germany, England, and America. It is often marked by zeal for a peculiar form of the missionary enterprise: its messengers hasten from village to village, announcing the gospel, but not delaying to make converts, still less to train them. It is believed that, by "witnessing for Christ" to all peoples, they hasten the coming of the Lord, by which alone the world can be converted.

(b) Except during limited periods, for instance from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, postmillenarianism has been the accepted doctrine of the church. Since it ascribes the future triumphs of Christ to the agencies now employed, it is congenial to the temper of the church in times of real or fancied prosperity.

3. The counter Arguments.

A. The chief arguments for a premillennial advent are: Rev. 20 : 1-10 obviously teaches that the Lord will come and the holy rise at the opening of the thousand years; if he is not to come until the close of the millennium, we cannot fulfill his command to be always watching for his advent [Matt. 24 : 42; 25 : 13; Mark 13 : 32-37; 1 Cor. 1 : 7; 1 Thess. 5 : 2; Titus 2 : 13]; the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning a literal kingdom of Christ upon earth, and the strong messianic anticipations of the apostles, would not be fulfilled by a post-millennial advent; the New Testament does not promise the conversion of the world under the present dispensation, but forecasts a wide growth and general decay of the church. It will be seen that these arguments are exclusively exegetical.

B. The arguments for postmillennialism are both exegetical and theological.

(a) On exegetical grounds it is urged: that the general

tenor of the New Testament, with the exception of a single passage in an obscure book [Rev. 20 : 1-10], is to the effect that there will be but one resurrection [John 5 : 28, 29; Acts 24 : 15]; that Christ will visibly re-appear only to close the history of the earth and to sit in judgment upon mankind; that therefore the rising and reigning of the martyrs must refer to the reanimation of the church by their spirit, as Christ said that Elijah had already come [Matt. 17 : 12], because John the Baptist had appeared "in the spirit and power of Elijah" [Luke 1 : 17]; that the exhortation to expect momentarily the coming of the Lord is fulfilled by those who are constantly in readiness for manifestations of his spiritual power, and for his coming to us at death; that the regeneration of the earth which attends his coming may be that which is to follow the last judgment and final catastrophe [2 Peter 3 : 11-13]; and that when the last enemy has been destroyed by the resurrection of the saints, Christ will at once deliver up the kingdom, and therefore cannot reign on earth after the saints arise [1 Cor. 15 : 24-28].

(b) On theological grounds the objections to Chiliasm are: that it disparages the gospel by teaching that Christ can prevail only by presenting himself again to the senses; that it makes his kingdom a kingdom of this world [John 18 : 36], the weapons of its warfare carnal, and sets it wrestling against flesh and blood [2 Cor. 10 : 4; Eph. 6 : 12]; finally, it is irreconcilable with the fact that, so long as we are in the flesh, it will continue expedient for us that our Lord's bodily presence should be exchanged for his spiritual presence through the mediation of the Comforter [John 16 : 7].

4. The suspended Verdict.

As to the matters so long in debate we conclude:

(a) Neither party has made out its case. The conditions of eschatological inquiry, emphasized by the pitiful failures to override them, forbid the hope of understanding in advance prophecies all but contradictory in terms.

(b) The signs of the times which so often seem to portend the speedy manifestation of the Lord, may actually have that significance, and yet the impending event prove to be only one of a series, the last member of which cannot be distinguished until it arrives. Thus, as John said that "even now have there arisen many antichrists" [1 John 2 : 18, cf. 4 : 3], so since that day any conspicuous opponent of Christ may be a prophesied antichrist, and yet not the final embodiment of Satan's rage.

(c) We may feel assured that Christ will come and fulfill the prayers of his church. Meantime the duty of the faithful is to be "like unto men looking for their Lord" [Luke 12 : 36].

§ 59. *The Resurrection.*

I. The Scriptural Teaching.

1. Fact of the Resurrection.

At the final coming of Christ the dead and the living [1 Cor. 15 : 51-53] shall be invested with spiritual bodies.

2. Subjects of the Resurrection.

The reanimation of the body is in nearly all cases represented by the New Testament as the privilege of the good. This is because first it completes the victory over death, but death remains as the wages of sin [Rom. 6 : 23]; secondly, because it is secured by Christ [Rom. 6 : 5; 1 Cor. 15 : 20-23; 2 Cor. 4 : 14; 1 Thess. 4 : 14], but Christ assures no benefits to those who finally reject him [John 3 : 18]; thirdly, because

our mortal bodies shall be quickened through the Holy Spirit that dwelleth in us [Rom. 8 : 11].

In three passages, however, the New Testament teaches that the wicked also shall rise [John 5 : 28, 29; Acts 24 : 15; Rev. 20 : 13; cf. Dan. 12 : 2].

3. Nature of the Resurrection-body.

(a) The future body will not in all respects be identical with the present body. "Thou sowest not that body which shall be" [1 Cor. 15 : 37]. Yet it shall be—

(b) Organically connected with the present body; "to each seed a body of its own" [ver. 38].

(c) The connection is to be more than organic; it is in some respects one of identity. Neither Enoch, Elijah, nor our Lord laid aside his body; their bodies were changed, as will be the case with the saints who are alive when the Lord returns [1 Cor. 15 : 51].

(d) The resurrection body will be spiritual. "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body" [1 Cor. 15 : 44]. The name "spiritual body" must be interpreted with caution. It assures us that the future body will conform to the nature of the spirit, and be its perfect instrument, and therefore incorruptible [1 Cor. 15 : 42]. But if we seek to penetrate further into its nature, we are at once baffled by the facts:

(aa) "Spiritual body" taken literally involves a contradiction in terms. Spirit and body have no property in common. Indeed, the spirit which has only spirit for its body, has not yet any body at all.

(bb) The condition of our Lord's body during the forty days between the resurrection and ascension is not well enough understood to explain the nature of the spiritual body. If he retained the natural body, no information is afforded as to the spiritual body; and if he had the spiritual body, misleading

miracles repeatedly occurred. Thus he bade his disciples notice that he had flesh and bones [Luke 24 : 39]; but "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" [1 Cor. 15 : 50], and so far his condition would invite error as to the nature of the spiritual body. Again, he ate in their presence [Luke 24 : 41-43]; but food implies bodily waste.

Apparently, the period between the resurrection and ascension was one of transition, its processes suspended processes, and its phenomena characteristic both of the natural and the spiritual bodies. We know too little of our Lord's body during the forty days to justify an inference as to the nature of the spiritual body.

It is remarkable that a doctrine which makes immortality easily conceivable should itself prove especially perplexing; but no tenable theory of the resurrection has been proposed.

II. Theories of the Resurrection.

1. That the substance of the spiritual body will be the same as that of the natural body, except that it will be incorruptible [1 Cor. 15 : 42, 53]. Until comparatively recent times this theory was identified by friends and foes with the fact of a resurrection. Curious speculations were indulged on the points involved. Tertullian thought that sufficient material to equip a spiritual body would be found in the indestructible teeth. Augustine argued that it would contain all that had ever been part of the natural body, hair-clippings, nail-parings, and the like. Or, according to Aquinas, it would retain just so much material, and so many members as it possessed at death.

Sufficient objections to this venerable fancy are the following:

(a) In the ceaseless round of decomposition and recomposition between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, it is

entirely probable that successive human bodies contain at death the same particles of matter.

(b) The notion that the same materials can be at one time corruptible, at another incorruptible, involves the speculative fancy on which the doctrine of transubstantiation rests; namely, the separability of substance and accidents,—a philosophy which has no support in known facts.

(c) Paul seems to teach that the present and the future bodies are not identical in material: "Thou sowest not the body that shall be" [1 Cor. 15 : 37].

2. The rationalistic notion that the spirits of the dead shall arise for judgment, and afterward be remanded bodiless to their final estate, finds no scriptural support.

3. The theory that the soul already possesses, or receives immediately at death, an "enswathement" of materials so tenuous and ethereal as to be insusceptible of decay. The resurrection is thus immediate, and not future. Two elements in this theory require notice:

A. That the spiritual body is received at death is thought to be supported by the statements of Paul that "if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens" [2 Cor. 5 : 1]; and that he did not wish to "be unclothed, but . . . would be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life" [ver. 4]. This scriptural evidence is reinforced by the use of the brain in all our mental activities. But it must be objected:

(a) That the resurrection is connected by Scripture with the future coming of our Lord;

(b) That the full joy of the saints is correspondingly deferred [Col. 3 : 4; 2 Tim. 4 : 8; 1 Peter 5 : 4; 1 John 3 : 2];

(c) That the passage quoted in support of an immediate assumption of the spiritual body does not necessarily mean

more than that the spiritual body belongs to our heavenly and eternal estate; whereas, this very passage intimates that to be "absent from the body" is to find a compensation, not in the immediate assumption of a better body, but in being "at home with the Lord" [2 Cor. 5 : 8].

(d) If a physical organism is necessary to the operations of the mind, bodies would seem to be indispensable to the angels, and even to the Deity.

B. Objections to a body composed of ether are :

(a) The ether is a hypothetical substance, the existence of which is assumed because some medium is necessary to convey the vibrations of heat and light unhindered through space. But a substance which does not arrest motion, cannot accumulate energy. An ethereal body could not store energy, and—

(b) It could not release energy. According to the doctrine of correlation every exhibition of energy is secured through disintegration of material. A spiritual body too ethereal to decay would be too ethereal to use.

4. Theory that the organic power of the soul, which maintains the identity of the body through ceaseless and complete changes of its materials, will at the resurrection organize about itself the materials which constitute a spiritual body.

But this theory overlooks that the organic process is a process of nutrition, and is carried on only by means of organs already in possession. No light is thus thrown upon the resumption of a body by a disembodied soul.

The facts appealed to assure us, however, that the body, when resumed, will be recognizably the same as at present.

III. Conclusions from Theories.

1. It is a safeguard to belief in the resurrection to hold no theory concerning it. The attacks upon the fact of the

resurrection have been attacks upon pretended explanations of the fact.

2. It is a mark of exaltation in the spiritual body that its nature cannot be understood. Paul's account of its advantages contradicts present experience, because what he affirms far transcends experience [1 Cor. 15 : 42-44 ; Phil. 3 : 21]. The resurrection could not be explained without degrading it. We ought to be satisfied that it is "not yet made manifest what we shall be," since "we know that if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him ; for we shall see him even as he is" [1 John 3 : 2].

§ 60. *The Last Judgment.*

1. The fact of judgment.

At the general resurrection the entire fallen race of mankind [Matt. 25 : 31-46 ; Acts 17 : 31 ; Rom. 14 : 12 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; Heb. 9 : 27 ; Rev. 20 : 12] together with the fallen angels [2 Peter 2 : 4 ; Jude 6 ; cf. Matt. 8 : 29 ; 1 Cor. 6 : 3] shall be assembled for judgment and the award of their final estate.

2. The Judge.

The judge will be the Son of man [John 5 : 22, 27 ; Acts 17 : 31 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; 2 Tim. 4 : 1]. It is fitting that he who is at once the Saviour and the Lord of men should hold the office of Judge [John 5 : 22, 23]. The experience of their lot which made him "a merciful and faithful high priest" [Heb. 2 : 17], is assurance that he will be a competent as well as a merciful judge.

3. The procedure.

The judgment will not be a prolonged trial, but an immediate verdict [Matt. 25 : 32, 34, 41]. The Judge will not need to make inquisition, and the risen dead at least shall already have had a foretaste of their eternal state.

4. The grounds of judgment.

Probation having ended, men shall be judged according to its results, that is, according to their character as fixed and shown by the deeds done in the body [Eccles. 12 : 14 ; Matt. 12 : 36, 37 ; Rom. 2 : 6-16 ; 1 Cor. 4 : 5 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; Rev. 20 : 12].

The relation of men to Christ shall then be found, what it has ever been, the all-inclusive reality.

(a) He that believes in Christ receives remission of sins [Col. 1 : 14] ; "cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life" [John 5 : 24] ; does "the work of God" [John 6 : 29] ; is "found in him . . . having . . . the righteousness which is from God by faith" [Phil. 3 : 9] ; and, abiding in him, "will not be ashamed before him at his coming" [1 John 2 : 28].

(b) The wicked shall be condemned "because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God" [John 3 : 18]. During his earthly career Christ was a touchstone [John 3 : 19-21 ; 7 : 7 ; 8 : 42 ; 9 : 39] ; and even those who have never heard his name will at the last day recognize in him "the true light which lighteth every man" [John 1 : 9], but which they had refused to follow. This is because God's relations to the world are through the Son ; so that what the Son of God is to men shows what God is to them, and what they are in themselves.

Whether, therefore, we consider the relation to Christ of the evil or the good, there is no incongruity between salvation by faith and judgment by works.

§ 61. *The Final State.*

I. Of the Wicked.

1. Eternal punishment.

Condemned at the last judgment, the wicked "go away into eternal punishment" [Matt. 25 : 46, cf. Dan. 12 : 2 ; Mark 9 : 43, 44 ; Luke 16 : 26 ; John 3 : 36 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 7-9 ; Rev. 14 : 11 ; 20 : 10].

2. Its sources.

As sin does violence to the natures alike of God and man, both co-act in punishing it. The reproaches of conscience deepen into remorse, and the displeasure of God cannot be inoperative. The displeasure of a man of strong and elevated character is formidable to an offender ; and that of God must be appalling. "Who may abide the day of his coming? and who shall stand when he appeareth?" [Mal. 3 : 2 ; Rev. 6 : 15-17]. If God does anything for the good, he may do something against the wicked [Matt. 22 : 13].

3. Its nature.

What physical suffering the lost may have to bear we cannot foresee ; but that the risen body will share the ruin of the soul to which it so closely conforms would appear inevitable. Indeed, the biblical representations of future penalty are chiefly physical. It is called death, the undying worm, unquenchable fire, outer darkness, everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord. Taken literally, these representations are mutually contradictory ; they are now generally regarded as figurative, and yet as essentially true.

4. Errors as to future punishment.

(1) Annihilationism.

This teaches that the souls as well as the bodies of the wicked will be literally destroyed. It assumes either that the soul is naturally mortal and that regeneration alone confers immortality, or that suffering and the disuse of the soul's normal powers issue in atrophy and final extinction of being.

Against this doctrine may be urged :

(a) The arguments already presented against the natural mortality of the soul.

(b) The wicked are threatened with endless pain. Rev. 21 : 8 expressly states that to be in the lake of fire is "the second death," and Rev. 14 : 11 that "the smoke of their torment goeth up forever and ever."

(c) If the wicked are to be annihilated, it could not be good for any of them "if he had not been born" [Matt. 26 : 24]. In fact, the penalty of the extremest sin would be the ultimate reward which Buddhism accords to the loftiest virtue.

(2) Eternity of Physical death.

Weiss's Biblical Theology of the New Testament [Vol. 1, p. 157], says Jesus taught that the wicked are doomed to an eternal deprivation of the body ; that "they remain forever in the incorporeal and therefore shadowy condition in which bodily death has placed them" ; and that "the continued existence of the soul in this condition, . . . feared even as a transition state, involves the greatest wretchedness when regarded as final."

While this theory meets even better than annihilationism the requirements of the texts upon which annihilationism rests,

it is contravened by those which teach the resurrection of the wicked.

(3) Restorationism.

This is the universalism of the present day. It is now seldom taught that righteous and wicked alike pass at death into a state of happiness. The wicked, it is admitted, must suffer the painful consequences of violating law; but suffering in a future state is believed to purge away sin. At most, those only who have blasphemed against the Holy Spirit are incapable of ultimate rescue. In favor of this view—

A. A few passages of Scripture are quoted [Matt. 5 : 26; John 12 : 32; Rom. 5 : 18; Phil. 2 : 9-11; Col. 1 : 20; 2 Peter 3 : 9; 1 John 2 : 2].

B. Appealing to the nature of God, restorationism urges that the divine justice will not demand, nor the divine goodness permit, the eternal punishment of offences committed in time.

C. Appealing to the humane sentiments which the Bible itself has fostered, it insists—

(a) That the doctrine of endless punishment is revolting:

(b) That, if we really believed in it, we could never smile again: and—

(c) That the redeemed would be miserable in heaven, if they knew that the wicked were to be tormented forever in hell.

D. Appealing to human experience, the restorationist urges that, when the disguises of sin and the distractions of sense are swept away by death, the violence which sin does to the godlike nature of man, and the suffering which it will be found to cause, are certain to fill the sinner with horror and bring him to true repentance.

We object to restorationism—

(A) On Scriptural grounds:

(a) It has not made out its case. The texts appealed to are obviously susceptible of its interpretation, yet this is not a necessary interpretation, nor altogether a natural one to a reader who is not hoping to find restorationism in the Bible.

(b) The explicit teaching of Scripture is against restorationism. The same word, *αἰώνιος*—"eternal," is used in the same verse [Matt. 25 : 46] to declare the duration of blessedness and of woe. Again, the strongest expression in the New Testament for endlessness, *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*—"forever and ever," is used to emphasize the eternity of God's glory [Gal. 1 : 5 ; Eph. 3 : 21 ; Phil. 4 : 20 ; Heb. 13 : 21 . Rev. 1 : 6 ; etc.], the perpetual exaltation of Christ [Rev. 1 : 18 ; 4 : 9, 10 ; etc.], the ceaseless reign with him of the saints [Rev. 22 : 5], and the unending punishment of sinners [Rev. 20 : 10 ; cf. 14 : 11 ; 19 : 3].

Now, seeing our only clear knowledge of the future is obtained from the Bible, it is unwarrantable to make deductions contrary to the Bible from the infinite attributes of God, from Christian sentiment, or from the multiform experience of mankind. And yet, like other doctrines, the teaching of Scripture on this point finds extra-scriptural confirmation. We notice then—

(B) As regards the divine attributes,—

(a) Sin is revolting alike to holiness and to love. Love equally with holiness is supported by the penal sanctions of law ; as may be seen in the fact that God is affronted and the human heart hardened quite as much by repelling the divine entreaties as by resisting the divine requirements.

(b) It is not an adequate statement of the current view that God will punish eternally the sins committed in time. His wrath is directed against evil in character, and against

evil conduct as the expression and intensification of character. We conclude therefore that eternal punishment will be inflicted upon eternal sin; and to object to this would be irrational.

(C) As regards Christian sentiment, the result is not unequivocally in favor of restorationism.

(a) Appeal to human pity is met by appeal to the self-reproaches of the penitent. One who is penetrated with a due sense of his sins, heartily accepts with David [Ps. 51 : 4] the justice of any punishment which God may inflict, and owns to himself that he deserves to be cast away forever.

(b) Believers in eternal punishment do not wholly deserve the reproach that they are either insincere or insensible. It is a beneficent anomaly of our nature that the certainty of death does not often mar the enjoyment of human ties. Only what the present offers is easily paramount in our imaginations and hearts. It is for this reason, in part, that restorationists themselves are not deeply concerned about the purgatorial sufferings of unknown intensity and duration which await the wicked.

(c) The redeemed in heaven will undoubtedly accept the "judgments of Jehovah" as "true and righteous altogether" [Ps. 19 : 9]; and we shall not be more loving than he. But it does not follow that the blessed are indifferent to the sufferings of the lost. Pity may be as consistent with their happiness as with that of God, whose pity moved him even to the sacrifice of his Son.

(D) As regards the moral experience of mankind,—

(a) Suffering is not always reformatory. "The sorrow of the world worketh death" [2 Cor. 7 : 10]. It is entirely within the range of experience that chastisement embitters the evil-doer. Terror and distress might even be too overwhelming to be reformatory. The wicked will seek to "hide . . . from the face of him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the lamb" [Rev. 6 : 16].

(b) Experience emphasizes the ethical importance of the stern teachings of the Bible. The penalty adjudged is the measure of a wrong condemned. To deny the scriptural penalty for sin is to deny the scriptural estimate of the heinousness of sin. Still further, to abate at all the heinousness of sin is to subtract as much from the worth of holiness; the holiness of God will not long be regarded as supremely adorable; hunger and thirst after righteousness cannot remain the heart's deepest longing, nor the attainment of moral likeness to God be prized as the highest destiny of the redeemed.

(4) Future Probation.

A future probation is taught only by Protestants. According to Roman Catholicism, probation ends at death, and purgatory is "a place in which souls who depart this life in the grace of God, . . . but are not pure and holy enough to see God," are cleansed by suffering. The doctrine of restorationism just discussed is a doctrine of future probation. Also advocates of what is called "the New Theology" teach that the period between death and judgment will probably afford a probation to those who have not in this life had an opportunity to accept the historic Christ. This conjectural probation is supported by—

A. An appeal to Scripture. Especial reliance is placed upon the preaching of Christ to the spirits in prison [1 Peter 3 : 18-20; cf. 4 : 6].

But this passage is inconclusive, because—

(a) 1 Peter 1 : 11 calls the spirit which testified in the prophets "the spirit of Christ," and the passage before us may refer to the Spirit which spake through Noah to the men of his generation.

(b) Or, if Peter means that Christ, after the crucifixion, proclaimed the gospel to those who had been drowned in the

flood, he does not tell us that they were delivered from prison ; still less that the gospel was preached by Christ to any ante-diluvian or post-diluvian sinners ; least of all that it was there-after to be offered by him to all who die without having heard it.

(c) Paul, on the contrary, tells us that "as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law" [Rom. 2 : 12] ; adds that this is judgment "according to my gospel" [ver. 16] ; warns us that all will "receive the things done in the body . . . whether it be good or bad" [2 Cor. 5 : 10] ; foretells that the Lord Jesus shall render "vengeance to them that know not God" (heathen), "and to them that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus" (unbelieving Jews) [2 Thess. 1 : 8].

B. An appeal to the universality of Christianity.

(a) Christ came for all ; therefore all will presumably be allowed an opportunity to accept him.

(b) It would be inconsistent with the compassionate love of God to condemn to eternal woe any one whose character is not unalterably fixed in wickedness ; but such a state is not reached until the sinner has rejected the strongest incentives to righteousness, and these are found only in Christ.

(c) Christian consciousness has been trained by the Scriptures themselves to insist upon a future probation which the Scriptures do not expressly declare.

These inferences from the nature of Christianity are open to the objections :

(a) That a finite being is incompetent to judge what the infinite excellencies of God will lead him to do.

(b) Christian consciousness cannot be confidently appealed to in support of a novel doctrine which may prove to be but a passing fancy of the times.

II. Of the Righteous.

The Bible exhausts imagery in describing the blessedness of heaven.

The happiness of the righteous will probably be as varied as their capabilities. The reason for so believing is that unemployed powers are a source of discomfort, while normal activity always produces delight.

The bodies of the redeemed will participate in the well-being of their souls. The resurrection restores completeness, and is an element in their satisfaction [Ps. 17 : 15]. The possession of the spiritual body must be taken into account in every attempt to conceive the estate of the blessed.

More specifically, it is either expressly taught in the Bible, or it may reasonably be inferred, that—

1. The spiritual body will be exempt from physical discomfort and decay [Rev. 7 : 16 ; 21 : 4].

Its local relations could be determined only by making out the constitution of the spiritual body ; but the very idea of body seems to involve the idea of place ; and the Bible certainly warrants an assured anticipation that heaven will be a home [John 14 : 2, 3 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 8, R. V].

2. The mind will be fully employed in knowing God, and in knowing all that is implied in a full knowledge of him [1 Cor. 13 : 12].

The spiritual body will undoubtedly be the facile organ of increasing knowledge ; but in what ways and measure can only be conjectured.

3. Release from sin will be due to the full development of that sonship which is imparted in the new birth, and is perfected when we see the Lord [1 John 3 : 2].

The moral relations of the redeemed body are highly interesting and important.

(a) The senses will no longer tempt to sensuality, nor, presumably, will they distract the attention of the mind from its proper employment; since whatever is presented to the mind in heaven will be a suitable object of notice.

(b) When perfection is in question, much more than deliverance from gross offences is required. In art, said Michael Angelo, "trifles make perfection, but perfection is no trifle." It is a physical law that the least increase in the speed of a rapid runner is secured only by greatly increased effort. Analogously, it is of high moment to the spirit that bodily infirmities shall be at an end; that the spiritual body shall not falter and faint under the demands of moral energy, as often now, when "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." Its healthful alacrity may even stimulate the willing spirit.

4. The recognition of friends in heaven is assured—

(a) By the very fact of the resurrection. To have bodies is to be recognizable here, and recognizable there. Only anxious affection could doubt this.

(b) To have spiritual bodies is not improbably to be far more recognizable than now; because the spiritual body by serving as the perfect instrument, becomes the perfect mirror, of the soul.

(c) The fact that recognition must be inferred from resurrection accounts for the silence of Scripture on a point of so deep and so widely felt interest. The Sadducees took it for granted in the question which they put to Jesus [Matt. 22 : 23-29]; and Jesus took it for granted in his reply that "in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage" [ver. 30]. It would have been an obvious and a complete answer that the wife of seven husbands could not recognize either of them, if this were to be the case.

(d) The social relations of the blessed were illustrated by

the fact that Moses and Elijah talked with Christ at his transfiguration, and were known by the disciples.

(e) Love itself, the crowning grace of the future as of the present life [1 Cor. 13 : 13], will be the ceaseless torment of the holy, if they are never to meet and to know those whom they love. So cruel and so preposterous would such a disappointment be that our eager affections furnish the answer to their own question.

5. A doctrine of Beatific Vision is taught in the New Testament [1 Cor. 13 : 12; 1 John 3 : 2], and impressively supported by the elder Scriptures [Ps. 17 : 15; cf. Num. 12 : 8]. The Roman Catholic church confidently defines the nature of the vision of God which is permitted to his saints : she holds that those who are purified from all sin behold with the spirit the essence, the attributes, and the Tri-unity of the Godhead. But the attempt to construe the knowledge of the Supreme Spirit which the blessed enjoy as different in kind from the communion that believers now have with the Father [1 John 1 : 3] and with the Holy Spirit [John 14 : 17; 2 Cor. 13 : 14], involves self-contradictions which become the more pronounced with every effort at precision of statement.

Whether, then, the spiritual body will possess faculties by which it can discern the Father and the Spirit we cannot know, and well may doubt. But every promise of the Second Coming assures us that we shall see the Lord, behold in him the glory of the Godhead, and be satisfied.

THE END.

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